THE ROVING EYE Why Iran can't become the new
China By Pepe
Escobar
TEHRAN - Ibrahim Yazdi was the man
who convinced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to wear
a bulletproof jacket on the chartered Air France
flight that took the imam from Paris to Tehran to
consolidate the triumph of the Islamic revolution
in January 1979. He was one of the Westernized,
Islamic non-turbaned princes of the revolution
himself. He was the man who "translated" Khomeini
to the international media.
Then he became
foreign minister in the first, post-revolutionary
Mehdi Bazargan government. He fell out with the
system after Khomeini's death and was inevitably
branded a counter-revolutionary. As the leader of
the liberal, secular Iran Freedom Movement, Yazdi
saw his party banned and party candidates
routinely excluded from standing for office. He
was even dismissed himself for not holding a
higher education degree - when in fact he's a PhD.
His latest disqualification - by the Council of
Guardians - was for the June presidential
elections. He
has been repeatedly thrown in
jail - facing accusations like "attempting to
convert the velaii [jurisprudence] rule
into a democratic rule".
Yazdi, arguably
Iran's top dissident politician, received Asia
Times Online at his residence in the comfortable
middle-class neighborhood of Valiasr to deliver a
devastating indictment of the regime. Yazdi is the
quintessential Islamic republic version of a
"leftist". Iranian "leftists" are in favor of
total freedom of speech, liberal democracy,
deregulated economy, a strong role for private
enterprise and foreign investment, a strong voice
for women and a strong civil society. In sum,
post-modernist Islam.
Yazdi divides the
new government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejadin
into three groups. The first group "are those in
charge of economic matters, qualified, with a
proven record. They know what they want - a market
economy, support for the private sector, reducing
the size of government". The second group, bundled
as security/intelligence/culture, "represents
extreme, repressive forces, displays a disbelief
in human rights and advocates harsh treatment" of
any dissent. The third group is composed of
technocrats, in ministries like health or
communication, "individuals with good academic
records, but not a management record. A good
professor is not necessarily a good minister."
Yazdi sees a glaring internal
contradiction in this new cabinet. The first
group, pushing for privatization, knows that
capital only flows to places under political
stability, "They cannot help the privatization
drive while confronting the suppressive group. If
the hardliners - in the ministries of information,
interior, culture and Islamic guidance - want to
continue in their harsh ways, capital will flow
elsewhere." The total amount of Iranian capital
flight may now exceed US$600 billion.
Lessons from the Middle Kingdom
Yazdi
deconstructs the idea exposed by many "rightists"
of Iran rising to become the new, Muslim China.
"There are three components - economic
development, social freedom and political
expression. The Iranian authorities are only
equipped for suppression. Social freedoms in China
- like freedom for boys and girls to get together
- are no problem in China, as long as they don't
involve anything political. The dress code was
never an issue. The Iranian government, on the
other hand, keeps hammering an Islamization of
social behavior. Even novels are censored - there
is no kissing in novels published in this
country."
Yazdi appreciates how "the
Chinese divorced themselves from the Cultural
Revolution. They put Mao's [Zedong's] widow and
her cohorts in prison. They released liberals, and
invited them to government. The Communist Party
decided to remove any ideology. Only nationalism
remained. Can Iranian authorities divorce
themselves from Islam? No. They do have a
problem." He adds, "The Chinese understand the
world superbly, how to explore all international
opportunities in favor of implementing their
goals. They have extended their economic
relationship with the US." He compares it with
Iran's Kish Island, a free zone in the Persian
Gulf shores that is "a separate entity, and was
not supported enough to set an example".
Yazdi says that from the beginning the
revolution has evolved a variation of the same
theme: "They [the conservatives] were insisting
they should have total power. We always said this
is very dangerous." This has led to what Yazdi
considers the crucial problem, the isolation of
the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
"During the revolution, the slogan was 'we are all
together'. After the revolution , the slogan was
switched to 'all with me'. This phenomenon
gradually eliminated everyone, one way or another.
Those dedicated to the cause of the revolution
gradually left. 'All with me' has been the slogan
all the way up to this last election."
Yazdi points out that even Khamenei's
closest associates, such as former speaker of the
parliament Mehdi Karrubi, were sidelined (Karrubi,
who maintains that the June 17 elections were
stolen, has started a new political party). "This
means that the leader is alone. None of the old
comrades are with him anymore. So we have reached
a critical point. The history of Iran offers
several examples of the caliph surrounded by
squabbling groups. At the moment Khamenei feels
that he has total power. But lessons from our own
history show how dangerous this could be."
Montazeri rules It all comes
back to the holy of holies, the problem of
Khamenei's legitimacy. Yazdi is extremely
attentive when he learns about the official list
of eight marja'as - sources of imitation -
according to the clerical establishment in Qom.
"So Montazeri is not on the list? But he's the
most influential of them all." Yazdi remembers
how, five years ago, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri
literally opposed the Supreme Leader, saying, "You
are not qualified to issue a religious verdict."
On top of it, Montazeri always insisted that the
Supreme Leader must be a spiritual guide, and that
control of the police, state security, armed
forces and state media is certainly not part of
his attributes.
Montazeri - who was
Khomeini's most prized colleague and political
confidante - remains a giant thorn in the side of
the regime. He was to be Khomeini's successor - as
designated by the imam himself, and confirmed in
1984 by the Council of Experts. But three years
later he was already enmeshed in a web of
revolutionary intrigue branding him a "liberal",
ie, counter-revolutionary, just like Bazargan and
Yazdi.
When Khomeini died in 1989 there
was what secular Iranians call nothing less than a
coup d'etat: a triumvirate composed of Khamenei,
Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmad Khomeini, the imam's
son, changed the constitution. From now on, one
would not necessarily have to be a marja'a
to assume the functions of the
velayat-e-faqih (the ruling of the
jurisprudent). So a sort of junior cleric,
Hojjatoleslam Ali Khamenei, became the new leader,
while he was not even an ayatollah, much less a
revered marja'a.
Montazeri happens
to be one of the world's leading authorities on
velayat-e-faqih - a doctrine that is the
Shi'ite theological version of Plato's
philosopher-king. He was the president of the
assembly of experts that drafted the constitution
of the Islamic republic. And the constitution was
explicit: the faqih must be a
marja'a.
As Supreme Leader,
Khamenei has centralized total religious and
political power. To doubt it is to risk a Shi'ite
inquisition. Yazdi says, "For Khamenei's
supporters, he is the leader of all Muslims. At
most, he is the leader of the Shi'ites." And he
adds to the chorus pointing out that "many
Shi'ites object to it as well. Fadllulah [the
Lebanese ayatollah] objects to it openly. Khomeini
has been an ayatollah long before becoming a
political leader. Others recognized his title as a
genuine gift. Khamenei on the other hand got this
title as an 'honorary degree' by the Council of
Experts." Yazdi stresses the example of Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq. "He does not
believe in velayat-e-faqih. This is how he
earned the power to bring together Shi'ites,
Sunnis and Kurds. It's completely different from
the Iranian authorities."
The dilemma
of the ruling class So now, for Yazdi, as
far as the regime is concerned, "They say 'we are
the ruling class, and we are equal to Islam'. To
stay in power is more important than the daily
life of Iranians. But now that they have full
power, how can they keep it? In the Japan of the
Meiji emperor, the conservatives had full power.
To keep it, they made changes." But however hard
the struggle, he remains an optimist:
"Intellectual power in Iran is strong. We are the
youngest nation in the world, 70% of the
population is younger than 30. In Iranian
university classes, women account for 80% of the
students. Women are active in all walks of life.
They don't believe in this regime. And the
government is helpless to do anything about them.
They may try something harsh, but will have to
retreat."
As a former foreign minister
educated in the US, Yazdi sees the non-stop
Iran-US diplomatic conflagration centered on two
themes: nuclear activity and human rights. "Iran
has no other choice but to accept IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] resolutions.
Many Iranians believe we should stop uranium
enrichment and solve the crisis." That's not
exactly the feeling one gets in the mosque, in the
bazaar or in the teashop, where Iran's nuclear
program is viewed as an assertion of national
will.
On human rights, Yazdi is convinced
"there's no way out of the global village. This is
not an American design. America is also trying to
adjust. Even the US cannot compete if it has a
backward government. Some Iranian authorities
blame it all on American democracy. There is no
such thing. Even if Iran succeeds in its nuclear
program, the human rights question will remain.
That's why the rightists cannot do whatever they
want." Or can they? One may ask the collective
leadership in Beijing. But the only one with a
definitive answer may well be the Supreme Leader
himself.
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