The US and that man Muqtada
again By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Everybody seems to be getting
selfish these days in Iraq.
The Shi'ites
are demanding autonomy in southern Iraq, which, if
it happens, will give them control of about 80% of
the country's oil. The Kurds have demanded and
maintained their autonomy in northern Iraq. They
are demanding expansion and Kurdish authority over
the oil-rich town of Kirkuk. The Sunnis,
meanwhile, are left in the middle, fearing a civil
war and begging for a unified Iraq. They have
little say because they have been snubbed by
everybody; they remind the world of Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, and they added to their misery by
boycotting the elections of January 2005.
What is happening in Iraq today is a
recipe for a very ugly and bloody civil war. If it
breaks out, it will cost plenty of Iraqi lives,
more
lives even than those lost in the American-led war
on Iraq and its aftermath. To date, close to
30,000 people have been killed in 30 months of
violence since March 2003.
While many
accuse the Kurds of triggering problems by
insisting on an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the
real problem lies with the Iraqi Shi'ites of the
south. Everybody has accepted Kurdish autonomy in
the north, saying that the Kurds are in fact
different from Arabs, in ethnicity, language,
history and traditions. That cannot be said of the
Shi'ites, who are both Iraqi and Arab. Nothing
about the Shi'ites entitles them to an autonomous
south. They have no unique language, race,
ethnicity or history that qualifies them for a
mini-state. The only reason for their ambitious
demand is the greed for power among a specific
group of Shi'ites, along with a desire for more
oil, and an apparent commitment to Shi'ite
nationalism rather than Iraqi nationalism.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who heads the
largest Shi'ite coalition in the Iraqi National
Assembly, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, urged thousands of supporters
in the holy city of Najaf in August to demand
autonomy for the Shi'ites, saying: "We see the
need to form one autonomous zone in the center and
south of Iraq. We must not miss this opportunity."
A loyalist to the mullahs of Tehran, Hakim
spent many years in exile in Iran during the years
of Saddam's dictatorship, and apparently his
Shi'ite nationalism is stronger than his Iraqi
nationalism. This can be understood for the Kurds,
but not for an Arab like Hakim. As the crowds in
Najaf cheered in support, his right-hand man, Hadi
al-Ameri, the head of the Shi'ite militia, the
Badr Brigade, nodded in support.
Ameri,
who can control the Shi'ite street and mobilize
armed support for Shi'ite autonomy, backed Hakim's
statement, saying: "We have to insist on forming
one region in the south, otherwise we will regret
it. They are trying to deprive the Shi'ites." If
implemented, a powerful and oil-rich Shi'ite
mini-state will be formed inside Iraq, parallel to
the oil-rich Kurdish one.
To date, the US
has not been encouraging, saying that an
autonomous south contradicts Washington's vision
of a united and democratic Iraq. But, to say the
least, the US has done little to thwart Shi'ite
ambitions. The only ones who have seriously been
lobbying against an autonomous south have been the
Sunnis, arguing that this would destroy the modern
Iraq that has existed since the 1920s. One Sunni
member of the constitutional assembly said, "We
were shocked and very upset when we heard this
news. Nobody has been listening to us when we
warned that federalism would lead to the
disintegration of Iraq, and now the Shi'ites have
shown what they really want." Another Sunni,
Mishan al-Jibouri, told Qatar-based al-Jazeera TV,
"This will create civil war. We will never let it
happen."
Some argue that this is not a
genuine Shi'ite demand, and Hakim is using it to
make any other Shi'ite demands bearable. Anything
short of autonomy will be welcomed and accepted by
the Iraqis, seeing it as a big improvement on
dismembering Iraq. Even the Shi'ite premier,
Ibrahim Jaafari, is opposed to such an idea, with
his spokesman declaring that Shi'ite autonomy in
the south is "unacceptable".
Divisions in the
Shi'ite community The one person to stand
up and criticize proposed Shi'ite autonomy,
ironically, is Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the younger
leaders of the Shi'ite resistance. In 2003-2004 he
led his own war against the Americans, before the
Sunni insurgency increased its war against the US
military.
Initially, many wrote him off as
a wild young man who was a product of the hour and
who would fade away once the Americans crushed his
military movement. That has not been the case, to
the surprise of many, and Muqtada waited, joining
the political process in January this year only
because Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the
powerful Shi'ite cleric, said that voting was a
religious duty for every Iraqi.
Another
reason, naturally, is Sadr's desire to be part of
the political process and not be left out in the
cold as other parties and politicians assemble to
create the political order in the post-Saddam era.
Today, he emerges as one of the loudest opponents
of Shi'ite autonomy, arguing that there is no need
for a Shi'ite region since Shi'ites are bound by
religion rather than race, region or ethnicity. He
states that they are part of the Arab world and
the Islamic world and should not, under any
circumstance, be given a mini-state of their own
in Iraq.
Those to welcome his words, in
addition to his Shi'ite followers, were not
surprisingly the Sunnis. First, they have praised
his commitment to Iraq and its historical borders,
and second, they see that if Muqtada decides to
wage war against the political system if Shi'ite
autonomy is implemented, he would help them in the
insurgency, which since 2004 has been headed by
Sunnis. A Sunni-Shi'ite movement would surely not
only defeat any federal projects in Iraq, but also
inflict heavy pain on the Americans. It would
destroy a promise made by US Vice President Dick
Cheney earlier this year, saying that the war in
Iraq would be won by 2009 and that the insurgency
was in its "last throes".
Muqtada, still
in his early 30s, is likely to emerge as the most
important Shi'ite figure in the years to come. He
is the man to be watched in the new Iraq. His
influence will eventually outflank that of Hakim,
but he will remain a controllable rebel, always
willing to obey the orders of Sistani. All reports
in the US media about him being in conflict with
Sistani are false. Sistani might disagree with
Muqtada's young, radical and sometimes wild
approach to politics, seeing him as an amateur,
but he has respect for Muqtada, and likewise
Muqtada obeys his orders.
For years, the
Muqtada family has served as a counterweight to
that the Hakim family in Shi'ite politics. Muqtada
inherited the mantle from his father, the Grand
Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed
by Saddam in Najaf in 1999. Muqtada's
father-in-law was also killed by Saddam in 1980.
Authorities in 1999 denied involvement in the
assassination, fearing the wrath of the Shi'ites,
and instead implicated two men in the murder and
quickly had them executed to wrap up the case.
Unlike his father, Muqtada is not a
religious authority, lacking the age and
experience to become a commanding figure in
Shi'ite Islam. His older brother was devoted to
prayer, with no interest in politics, and Muqtada
was left in charge of family politics and welfare,
caring for his mother and two widowed
sisters-in-law, since both his brothers were also
murdered in 1999.
He rose to fame through
the military wing of his political movement, the
Mahdi Army, created in 2004 to fight the
Americans. It consists of about 1,000 trained
combatants and an estimated 5,000-6,000
supporters. He claimed that he was more legitimate
than any other government body imposed on Iraq by
the Americans, or elected under the auspices of
the US.
Today, he is trying to establish
himself and the younger generation of Shi'ites as
the natural leaders of the community, rather than
Hakim. He grabs every opportunity to challenge
Hakim, including the latest Shi'ite autonomy
issue. In April last year, his army went to war
against US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad. One month
earlier, post-Saddam authorities had shut down his
newspaper, al-Hawza, accusing it of instigating
violence among Iraqis.
Fighting spread
throughout Iraq, and US forces got involved in
terrible and fierce combat with the Shi'ite
militias of Muqtada. By April 8, 2004, the Mahdi
Army had taken full control of the city of Kut and
partial control of Najaf. Fighting broke out in
Sadr City in Baghdad and Sunni insurgents,
inspired by Muqtada's rebellion, also revolted in
Baghdad, Ramadi, Samarra, and, most notably,
Fallujah, where a rebellion raged until suppressed
by the Americans in November 2004.
A truce
was reached in June 2004 and Muqtada, being wise,
decided to disband the Mahdi Army. He added that
he would be joining the political process, an act
that was welcomed by interim president Ghazi
al-Yawer. The then prime minister, Iyad Allawi,
gave him assurances that he would not be arrested.
Allawi reneged on his promise and on August 3,
2004, the US military and Iraqi police raided his
home with mortar shelling, gunfire and grenades.
They wanted to arrest or kill Muqtada and destroy
his movement. Muqtada's army was outnumbered by
2,000 US Marines and 1,800 Iraqi security force
members.
Muqtada was cornered at a mosque,
and hundreds of his supporters were killed in the
fighting. The war was ended by Sistani, who
negotiated that Muqtada be saved but his militia
be disbanded, and that the US troops leave Najaf.
Muqtada joined the political process in
January, but did not personally run for office.
Yet since August, Muqtada has been overwhelmingly
opposed to the constitution drafting process, and
the draft was mainly authored by the Shi'ites and
Kurds. On August 26, 100,000 of his followers
demonstrated all over Iraq opposing the new
constitution. The US and Muqtada's enemies at home
accuse him of wanting to create a theocracy in
Iraq, similar to the model in Iran. Muqtada claims
that this is untrue, saying that this is the
objective of his rival, the Iran-backed Hakim.
What he wants, he has often said, is to create an
Islamic democracy. In May 2004 he told his
supporters: "Don't use my death or arrest as an
excuse not to finish what you have started."
The US has said that Muqtada and his men
are nothing but a group of street thugs who have
no support among the Iraqi grassroots. His
opponents in the Shi'ite community have accused
him of murdering two rival Shi'ite leaders after
the fall of Saddam in 2003. Yet a recent
US-sponsored poll in Iraq showed that 67% of
respondents supported Muqtada. They consider him a
devote nationalist, uninterested in material gain
since he lives a very simple and ascetic life. His
is a gifted orator and is considered a charismatic
leader, due to his age and thundering
anti-Americanism. He has gained thousands of
supporters from the Friday prayers he delivers in
Kufa, where he interacts directly with
worshippers, casting a magical spell on them with
his inflammatory sermons.
Of the 67%
people polled, an impressive 32% offered "strong
support" to Muqtada, while 36% said they "somewhat
support him". His supporters can be found in the
slums and ghettos of Baghdad and southern Iraq,
unlike those of Sistani, who commands support
among middle and upper-class Shi'ites and within
the Shi'ite business community.
Sistani
and Hakim lead the urban rich, Muqtada leads the
urban and rural poor. Young, poor men support
Muqtada not because he is a religious man like
Sistani, but because he is a man of principle,
they believe, and precisely because he is a rebel.
His images are plastered all over Shi'ite towns in
southern Iraq, but particularly in Sadr City, a
slum inhabited by 2 million on the outskirts of
Baghdad that was once called Saddam City but
renamed after Muqtada's father after Saddam's fall
in 2003.
In Sadr City, Muqtada is king.
His authority surpasses that of any other Shi'ite
leader in Iraq. He has his own welfare system, one
codes, laws, education and police system. Judges
in Sadr City are appointed by Muqtada himself and
verdicts are enforced by his stalwarts. The
selling of alcohol is prohibited, as are video
cassettes, CDs and cinemas. Veiling is obligatory.
The religious police force resembles those that
existed in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and under the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
Liberal and
secular Shi'ites claim that Muqtada's authority in
Sadr City is "worse than Saddam". Senior clerics
in the community, fearing his radical politics,
issued an official condemnation of Muqtada and his
Mahdi Army, saying: "The army is composed of
suspicious elements including individuals from the
extinct regime who have wrapped their heads with
white and black rags to mislead people into
believing that they are men of religion, when in
truth they are devils. We do not need your army.
The imam [al-Mahdi] is in no need of an army made
up of thieves, robbers and perverts under the
leadership of a one-eyed charlatan."
Is
Muqtada an imposter and a perverter of the Shi'ite
cause? Is he a terrorist who must be killed? Or is
he a true Shi'ite rebel and honest Iraqi
nationalist? Regardless of the answer, it is too
late to do anything about the rebel Shi'ite. Had
the Americans wished, they could have killed him
in 2003 when they first came to Iraq. They issued
threats to have him arrested, but stopped short of
doing that for a variety of reasons. One was that
they underestimated how strong he really was and
how much he could mobilize the Shi'ite street.
Another reason was that they did not want to make
a martyr out of him and inspire a new rebellion.
The reality in Iraq is that the US should
engage in dialogue with Muqtada. He has the
ability to bring both calm and chaos to Iraq. His
history proves that despite his apparent
rigidness, he can be negotiated with, as was the
case in 2003-2004. He once said, "I will only
negotiate with the Americans if their country says
that it has come here to liberate us, not to
occupy us, as occupying a country is incompatible
with the very principle of negotiations. We are
not hostile to America, but we are the enemy of
occupation. I only want a government based on
freedom and rule by the people. Obviously, such a
government will be an Islamic one."
He
even went on to distance himself from the radical
Islam of US enemies like al-Qaeda and its Iraq
chief, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, by saying: "There is
no religion or religious law that punishes by
beheading. True, they are your enemies and
occupiers, but this does not justify cutting off
their heads."
Muqtada is willing to join
the political process and is willing to silence,
or curb, his opposition to the US military in
Iraq. What he wants is clear: leadership of the
Shi'ite community within the context of a unified
Iraq. If snubbed, Muqtada will probably unleash
his wrath once again, this time against Hakim and
other Shi'ite leaders who are advocating autonomy
in the south.
He will wage a war once
again against US forces, and perhaps will join
forces with the Sunni insurgency. Bickering among
the Shi'ites will deprive the US of its core of
support in the Shi'ite community. With the Sunnis
on the offensive, this would leave the Americans
with nobody but the Kurds as allies.
The
ensuing civil war would shed a vast amount of
blood. To avoid that, the US would have to do two
things: prevent, at any cost, the creation of an
autonomous Shi'ite region in the south, and once
the idea is totally discarded, deal with radicals
like Muqtada with as much seriousness and respect
as it does with Hakim.
By turning a blind
eye to Muqtada, he will not go away or become less
anti-American. By snubbing him at the expense of
Hakim, all the US will be doing is making him more
radical and dangerous. It will be hastening the
onset of civil war.
Some would argue that
negotiating with Muqtada would be a defeatist
policy, and many have already drawn parallels with
British premier Neville Chamberlain's appeasement
of Adolf Hitler in 1938, which gifted
Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. This only enhanced
Hitler's ambitions, bringing him to the conclusion
that he was dealing with cowards who would not
stand in his way of occupying the rest of Europe.
The perfect response to this argument was
made by Professor Juan Cole in an article entitled
"The Crock of Appeasement". He wrote:
"Right-wingers who want to play [Winston]
Churchill and denounce appeasement should please
go off to Iraq and put their own lives on the line
instead of playing politics with the lives of our
brave troops from the safety of Washington DC."
The Americans need a Chamberlain in Iraq
today, not a Churchill. The Iraqis need an Abraham
Lincoln who is determined to keep the country
unified.
Sami Moubayed is a
Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright
2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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