For the past few years, Iran has been
testing the resolve of the international community
on the issue of its nuclear research program.
Iran, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), argues that it reserves the right to
control the nuclear fuel cycle.
Tehran
states that control over the cycle is important
for Iran's development of nuclear energy. Indeed,
according to the NPT, a state does reserve the
right to control the nuclear fuel cycle, including
the process of enrichment. The sticking point is
that the process of enriching nuclear fuel is
controversial because while enrichment is
necessary to create nuclear energy, the enrichment
process, if enhanced, can also be used to produce
weapons-grade material to create nuclear weapons.
On September 24, the International Atomic
Energy Agency
(IAEA) passed a resolution
stating that "Iran's many failures and breaches of
its obligations [under the NPT] ... constitute
noncompliance." The resolution calls for Iran to
end the conversion of uranium and to answer more
questions about its past nuclear activities.
Failure to comply with these demands could result
in Iran's nuclear case being brought before the UN
Security Council, an action that could result in
economic and military sanctions being placed on
the Persian state.
A referral wouldn't
happen until at least November, when IAEA chief
Mohammad elBaradei delivers his next report on
Iran.
Background to the crisis Certain members of the international
community, led by the United States, for years
have feared that Iran is attempting to develop
nuclear weapons under the guise of its nuclear
energy program. In the past, Iran has admitted to
keeping aspects of its nuclear research program
secret from the international community, and there
is the possibility that there are still aspects of
the program that remain hidden from international
inspectors.
Since the start of the current
crisis, the IAEA has been trying to ascertain
whether Iran's failure to disclose certain parts
of its nuclear research program constitute a
violation of the NPT.
The US and its
allies want to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons because such a development would give Iran
more power in the Middle East. A country with
nuclear weapons has more foreign policy leverage
since it becomes more costly to threaten a nuclear
power with military action. It would limit the
ability of the US - or any other power in the
region - to take military action against Iran,
since any such action could result in Tehran
retaliating with nuclear weapons.
If Iran
were able to add nuclear weapons to its threat
arsenal, it would also be better able to assert
itself in the region, possibly to the detriment of
regional stability and, therefore, to US and
Western interests. Regional instability can create
uncertainty over the global supply of energy, a
concern that was an important factor in the Bush
administration's decision to push Iraq out of
Kuwait in 1991, and played a factor in the current
Bush administration's decision to remove Saddam
Hussein from power in Baghdad.
Furthermore, Israel, which is the major US
ally in the Middle East, views a nuclear-armed
Iran as a major security threat. Iran is the main
sponsor of the Islamic group Hezbollah, an
organization that was responsible for bearing the
brunt of the resistance against the Israeli
invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon and
is still responsible for occasional attacks
against Israeli interests today.
Israel
worries that if Iran is able to acquire nuclear
weapons, it will be able to better spread its
influence in the Middle East to the detriment of
Israel's security situation. Israel remains the
only Middle Eastern state that possesses nuclear
weapons, and by losing its monopoly in nuclear
arms it would also lose some of its ability to
influence Middle Eastern affairs.
The US
has been very clear in its accusations that Iran
is attempting to develop nuclear weapons covertly.
On September 21, for instance, State Department
spokesman Adam Ereli said at a daily briefing that
Iran needs to "stop pursuing a nuclear weapons
program under the guise of a civilian nuclear
program".
Nevertheless, the US does not
consider military action against Iran a viable
option under the present circumstances. For
instance, the ongoing insurgency in Iraq has
resulted in the overextension of the US military;
many of Iran's nuclear facilities are believed to
be hidden, making it difficult to eliminate its
nuclear research program through air strikes; and,
the skyrocketing price of oil is weakening the
economies of oil-dependent countries, and any
military move on Iran would add more instability
to energy supplies, thus lifting oil prices even
higher.
Because of these restraints, the
US has pursued a policy of isolating Iran from the
international community with the hopes that this
pressure will cause Iran to abandon its drive to
control the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran has extensive
relations with the international community, and
the Bush administration thinks that this is the
country's vulnerable point.
This explains
why Washington has been careful not to be
perceived as the primary party taking a hard line
with Iran, as can be seen in US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice's recent statement about the
EU-3's role: "We are not trying to be in the lead
on this one because it's the EU that they [Iran]
walked out on. Remember that our strategy has been
that the European Union offered to engage them in
these talks."
The administration's
strategy has been to lobby the EU's three most
influential states - the United Kingdom, France
and Germany (the EU-3)- to pursue Washington's
hard line with Iran. On September 19, Rice
explained this strategy in an interview with Time
Magazine. Rice said, "Ultimately, I don't believe
the Iranians can afford to be completely isolated
from the international community ... This is a
very worldly population that is accustomed to
being a part of the international economy,
international politics. I don't think Iran wants
to get that isolated. And I think it's one reason
that they have been so anxious to avoid referral
to the Security Council."
Rice's
statements do explain why Tehran has attempted to
engineer a foreign policy that does not relinquish
its right to control the nuclear fuel cycle but
also does not permanently damage relations with
its major trading partners, such as certain states
in the EU; Iran depends on European states
economically and a loss of trading relations with
the bloc would have a negative impact on the
Iranian economy.
Therefore, in the past
Tehran has retreated from its bold nuclear
rhetoric in order to prevent the EU-3 from moving
closer to Washington's policy line on Iran. For
instance, on October 21, 2003, the EU-3 convinced
Iran to place an extra protocol on its signed copy
of the NPT; the protocol allowed for more
intrusive inspections by the IAEA and placed into
effect a temporary halt on all uranium enrichment
activities inside Iran.
Nevertheless,
after this agreement was established, Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi made a statement
highlighting Iran's motivations behind complying
with the European demands: "We suspended uranium
enrichment voluntarily and temporarily. Later,
when our relations with the IAEA return to normal,
we will definitely resume enrichment." Early in
2004, Kharrazi continued to pursue this policy
line, arguing that "it's our legitimate right to
enrich uranium".
Yet, the next crisis
occurred in late 2004. During this crisis, once
the point came where Iran would lose the support
of the EU-3, Tehran announced on November 14 that
it would fully suspend all uranium
enrichment-related activities.
Throughout
these crises, the EU-3 had been hesitant to take
Washington's suggested hard line on Iran, which
involved referring it to the UN Security Council
for a vote on possible sanctions. The EU-3
attempted to work with Iran to offer it political
and economic incentives in return for its
commitment to not control the nuclear fuel cycle.
The main goal of this policy was to
provide Iran with the necessary enriched nuclear
fuel so that it could pursue a nuclear energy
program, yet not allow it to control the entire
fuel cycle, thus removing the possibility that
Tehran could seek to create nuclear weapons at a
later stage through its own indigenous uranium
enrichment program.
However, Iran was
unwilling to accept this deal, calling its right
to control the nuclear fuel cycle a matter of
national pride and security. Secretary of Iran's
Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani
said that "pressuring a country like this is
resisting a country's national pride". In response
to the EU-3's offer of providing Iran with nuclear
fuel, Larijani argued, "There is no international
guarantee that governments would provide us with
nuclear fuel. We cannot lay the fate of this
nation in the hands of other governments."
Therefore, the EU-3 began to move more
toward Washington's current policy on Iran, and on
September 24 pushed a resolution through the IAEA
board that could result in Iran being referred to
the Security Council.
The September 24
resolution In the days before the
September 24 resolution, the EU-3 hesitated over
their proposed draft since Russia and China - two
countries that have veto rights on the Security
Council reacted negatively to the draft motion,
implying that such a resolution could result in a
veto. A veto of this resolution by Russia or China
could create a diplomatic row with the two Asian
states on one side, and the EU and the US on the
other; this is a development that most countries
involved want to avoid.
Indeed, while the
EU-3 did decide to approve a resolution that could
refer Iran to the Security Council, it was watered
down from what the US had initially hoped. Any
threat of sanctions was removed from the
resolution, although sanctions still would be a
possibility if the issue makes it to the Security
Council and it votes to sanction Iran for
violating the NPT. Furthermore, the resolution did
not outline a time frame when Iran would be put
before the Security Council. but instead said that
such a referral could occur if Iran does not cease
uranium conversion and if it fails to answer
additional questions on its nuclear research
program.
The resolution also showed how
the international community is divided over
referring Iran to the Security Council. The
resolution passed with 22 votes in favor, one vote
against and 12 abstentions. In the past 20 years,
there have only been two instances where the IAEA
board has not passed a resolution by consensus.
Both Russia and China abstained from the vote.
After the vote, members of the EU-3
stressed that Iran still had ways to avoid being
referred to the Security Council. French Foreign
Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said, "This
resolution shows the international community's
concern about Iran's non-cooperation regarding the
non-proliferation rules. At the same time, the
text keeps open the possibility of negotiations
which we must take advantage of, without delay, in
order to put forward proposals which could
re-establish trust." The UK, which usually toes
the closest to the US, said, "Iran has an
opportunity now to address the clear concerns of
the IAEA and the lack of confidence in Iran's
nuclear intentions."
But the statements,
and the resolution, did not proceed much further.
While the resolution worked to the Bush
administration's advantage, it still gives Tehran
time to maneuver away from having any punitive
measures placed upon it.
Russian and
Chinese resistance Despite not voting
against the IAEA resolution, Russia and China have
reservations about bringing Iran before the
Security Council. On September 21 in a speech in
San Francisco, RIA Novosti reported that Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "While Iran
is cooperating with the IAEA, while it is not
enriching uranium and observing a moratorium,
while IAEA inspectors are working in the country,
it would be counter-productive to report this
question to the UN Security Council." Lavrov
continued, "It will lead to an unnecessary
politicizing of the situation. Iran is not
violating its obligations and its actions do not
threaten the non-proliferation regime."
Moscow refuses to state that Iran has
violated the NPT, saying instead that the country
is still abiding by the treaty. Washington argues
that because of Iran's decision to keep aspects of
its nuclear research program secret, it has
undercut the principles of the NPT which act as a
violation
In a sign that Russia may be
willing to veto any Security Council resolution
punishing Iran, the Russian Foreign Ministry
released a statement that "it will not contribute
to the search for a solution to the Iranian
problem by political and diplomatic methods".
The statements made by Lavrov and the
Foreign Ministry display Moscow's unwillingness to
support tougher action on Iran. Indeed, for
Moscow, EU-3 and US action against an important
trading partner and a country that resists US
influence in the Middle East is just another sign
of Moscow's weakening international influence.
Combined US and EU efforts in Moscow's
near abroad have led to its loss of influence in
Eastern Europe and, at least temporarily, in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow has been
struggling to reassert itself after the
devastating collapse of the Soviet Union, and so
far it has not been very successful.
Russia also is the party responsible for
being the primary supporter of Iran's nuclear
research program. Moscow is building the US$1
billion nuclear reactor at Bushehr, and has
provided Iran with much of its nuclear knowledge.
If the Bushehr reactor goes operational, it can be
expected that Moscow will assist Tehran in the
creation of more nuclear power plants, offering
Russia a lucrative economic future in the field of
nuclear energy. Moscow also provides Tehran with
the bulk of its military equipment - such as
MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter bombers,
T-72 tanks, and Kilo-class attack submarines -
making it a major contributor to Iran's growth as
a regional power.
The Chinese, on the
other hand, also warned against taking Iran's
nuclear issue before the Security Council. Chinese
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reportedly told an EU
grouping led by British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw that bringing Iran before the Security
Council "could encourage Iran to take extreme
measures" and would, therefore, be
counter-productive.
China has its motives
for preventing a condemning resolution. China, for
instance, has seen a dramatic increase in energy
demand due to its rapid economic development. In
order to find new energy resources, it has looked
to countries near its borders that still have
reserves to be exploited. Since Iran does not
share economic relations with the US due to US
sanctions on the country that stem from the 1979
Islamic revolution, Beijing has been able to
foster new energy ties with the country. About 15%
of China's imported oil and natural gas comes from
Iran, and US attempts to destabilize Iran would
pose a threat to China's energy and economic
interests.
China, too, is wary of attempts
by the US to weaken countries such as Iran, since
Beijing fears that Washington will take future
actions aimed at containing China's rise as a
major power in Asia. For instance, in an example
that displays the Bush administration's views on
China, on September 21 US Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick argued that China's "actions
on Iran's nuclear program will reveal the
seriousness of China's commitment to
non-proliferation". This statement can be read
that China's continued support for Iran on this
issue demonstrates its willingness to take actions
counter to US interests, explaining the US
rationale for containing China.
Furthermore, China and Russia have been
improving their bilateral relations and have been
cooperating in order to limit the spread of US
influence in Central Asia. Both countries are
working together to increase the cohesion of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and have
caused the SCO to release a statement calling for
the withdrawal of the US military from its member
states.
The resistance by China and Russia
played a role on the EU-3's final proposed
resolution; while the resolution passed did affect
Iran's interests negatively, it did not result in
any immediate action on Iran, giving Tehran once
again more time to avoid being the victim of any
substantial international action against it.
Nevertheless, Russia and China still
abstained from voting on the resolution. While the
two states were not willing to vote against the
resolution, questions remain on whether they would
be willing to issue a veto if a future resolution
that threatens sanctions comes before the Security
Council.
Despite their resistance to US
and EU-3 efforts on Iran, it cannot be said that
Russia and China would welcome Iran becoming a
nuclear power; both countries may be interested in
placing restraints on Iran's nuclear development.
Nevertheless, it appears that an Iran with nuclear
weapons is not as much of a concern to Russia and
China than is the ability of the US and the EU-3
to refer Iran to the Security Council and to place
economic and military sanctions on the country.
How Iran might proceed Before
the September 24 vote, Larijani said that it was
unfortunate that "countries with economic ties
with Iran, particularly in the petroleum area,
have so far not defended Iran's rights". This
tactic taken by Iran was an effort to threaten
with economic repercussions those countries that
are supporting US policy on Iran.
Iran is
the second largest oil exporting country in the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and
has the ability to cancel billions of dollars in
contracts with European energy companies. It also
possesses the world's largest gas reserves.
Larijani explained this threat, stating, "Some
countries with economic interests especially in
oil do not show any feelings of responsibility the
[Supreme National Security Council] is determined
to create a balance and provide the ground for
their participation [in energy projects]
accordingly."
Billions of dollars in
contracts are on the line, with companies such as
Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol of Spain and Total of
France facing a major loss of business. Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was even more
succinct on his country's economic threats,
telling the Iranian parliament that "economic ties
are not irrelevant to political ties" especially
with "hostile" countries that "fail to recognize
Iran's legitimate rights" under the NPT. For
instance, China, Russia and India also have major
energy contracts out with Iran, and those
countries have shown no interest in jeopardizing
such contracts due to questions over Iran's
controversial nuclear program.
For
instance, in early 2005 India and Iran signed off
on plans to construct a 1,609-kilometer (1,000
mile) natural gas pipeline from the Iranian port
of Assaluyeh to the Indian state of Rajasthan,
traversing Pakistan; additionally, in 2004, Iran
signed a 30-year, $70 billion liquefied natural
gas deal with China's Sinopec.
That being
said, India did vote in favor of the IAEA
resolution due to its hope of acquiring more
nuclear technology from the US. In July, India and
the US signed a nuclear deal that granted New
Delhi access to civilian nuclear energy
cooperation; however, the US Congress has not yet
approved the entire deal. New Delhi was concerned
that Washington was hinging future nuclear support
on India's vote for the resolution condemning
Iran. However, because India was not behind
drafting the resolution, and has shown little
outspoken regard for punishing Iran due to its
nuclear program, Tehran views India in a different
light as it does the US and the EU-3.
Therefore, behind these threats, Tehran's
hope is that major European energy companies will
lobby their governments and ask for a less
confrontational foreign policy when it comes to
dealing with Tehran. It will be important to note
whether Iran proceeds with executing its economic
threats now that the EU-3 has pushed through a
resolution that threatens Iran with referral to
the Security Council.
Conclusion The three year
posturing between Iran and the US is moving closer
toward confrontation. The US has been able to
convince the EU-3 to put more pressure on Iran to
abandon its desire to control the nuclear fuel
cycle. However, as expected, both Russia and China
have increased their resistance to attempts by the
EU-3 and the US to place Iran before the council.
Nevertheless, the US and the EU-3 have managed to
push the IAEA board to pass a resolution that
threatens to refer Iran to the Security Council if
it does not pursue a series of measures to explain
its nuclear activities.
Before the IAEA
vote, Iran tried to demonstrate to the EU-3 that
it will not abandon its wish to control the
nuclear fuel cycle, even though this could damage
economic and political relations with the European
bloc. Tehran was betting that resistance by Moscow
and Beijing to the joint US-EU-3 maneuvers would
soften the EU-3's line and give Iran the ability
to continue its nuclear research program. While a
softer resolution was passed, it still damages
Iran's interests since the resolution demands that
Iran end the conversion of uranium and demands
that it answer more questions about its nuclear
research program.
It is important now for
Iran to keep Russia and China on its side. If Iran
does eventually get referred to the Security
Council, it will need one of those two countries
to veto any resolution that calls for sanctions.
However, any such veto would create an
international crisis and there is little doubt
that both Russia and China want to avoid this
development. It can be assumed that they will now
put pressure on Iran to make its nuclear efforts
look innocuous and to prevent a major escalation
of rhetoric with the US and the EU-3.
The
US, on the other hand, will have to continue to
pressure the international community to resist
Iran's wish to control the nuclear fuel cycle.
With the intervention in Iraq draining US
resources, Washington is not in a position to
begin a new front across the border in Iran, even
if that only involves executing air strikes on
Iran's suspected nuclear facilities.
With
the price of oil seeing record highs, the US and
the EU-3 cannot afford to pursue any action that
could result in uncertainty over oil supplies
since that would push the price of oil even
higher, threatening a recession in oil dependent
countries. Indeed, this concern could also affect
how willing the US and the EU-3 will be to
eventually implement sanctions on Iran, since this
too would create concern in the market.
Additionally, the failure to find weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq continues to hinder
the US's credibility on the international scene,
and an attack against a country that does not have
a proven nuclear weapons program would not be
welcomed in the international community and could
further erode Washington's ability to pursue an
effective, multilateral foreign policy.
Published with permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
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