President George W Bush's speech of
October 7 regarding al-Qaeda is not likely to be
remembered for its phrasemaking, even though he
depicted the "war on terror" as "the central
undertaking of this century".
But no one
can deny the fact that the US presidency still
remains an international bully pulpit: a place to
bring various issues to the attention of the
international community. Now a global debate is
surging on how to deal with al-Qaeda or its
various "franchises" from Indonesia to Iraq. The
topic of debate includes the very objective of
establishing the Islamic caliphate. Such a
caliphate is
supposed to be
established first in a region, then, according to
its proponents, would ensue the macro struggle to
create a global caliphate. That subject was also
an important aspect of Bush's speech.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer made his bid to initiate public debate on
transnational terrorism in his region by stating
that he would pressure Indonesia to formally ban
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). He may not succeed in that
endeavor because, according to one report, Jakarta
has pointed out on numerous occasions "that
banning Jemaah Islamiyah would in itself be
semantically offensive". Since Indonesia is the
world's largest Muslim country, "outlawing a group
whose name translate[s] as 'Islamic community'
would upset even moderates ..."
As
concerned as the Indonesian officials are about
the problem of terrorism, they are in no mood to
respond to foreign pressure and be "seen as
Western lackeys in a country where the US-led wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq are unpopular".
It
is little understood in the West that the JI
creates mixed emotions within Indonesia. There is
quite a bit of support for the JI's anti-American
rhetoric, but not for its sympathies or alleged
connections with al-Qaeda.
Its supporters
include the leader of the popular Justice and
Prosperity party (PKS), Hidayat Nurwahid, whose
popularity also stems from the fact that he has a
clean image. He now chairs the influential
people's consultative assembly, the legislative
body responsible for constitutional change in
Indonesia. In fact, Nurwahid is questioning
whether Islamic extremists should be the focus of
investigations related to the most recent
terrorist attacks in Bali. He said, "I have valid
information that these [terrorist] acts may be
related to inter-state [country] competition in
the tourism industry." Vice President of Indonesia
Jusuf Kalla took somewhat of a mixed stance on the
issue of suicide bombings. He called on the
religious leaders to condemn suicide bombings, but
then proceeded to state, "Suicide bombings in
Afghanistan and Iraq are perhaps understandable
because there is an 'opponent' there. But here in
Indonesia, it makes no sense. Why do they kill
their own people, who have done nothing wrong?"
In Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is
increasingly coming under focus as a party that is
determined to establish a caliphate. Even though
the HT's goals are very similar to that of
al-Qaeda, it has no known linkage with that
organization. Second, and this is the most
important difference, the HT wants to achieve its
objective through peaceful means. According to one
recent report, "The group insists that an Islamic
world will be delivered, country by country,
through proselytizing and capitalizing on popular
discontent with the corrupt and sometimes brutal
leaders in Central Asia, Russia, the Caucasus and
the Middle East."
In other words, the HT
believes in the power of persuasion, not the use
of Kalashnikov or suicide bombers, to achieve the
establishment of a caliphate. That very fact has
been creating a major dilemma in Washington as
well as in London - where the HT maintains offices
- about whether to depict it as a terrorist
entity.
The Central Asian specialists in
Washington remain divided in their recommendations
for the Bush administration toward the HT. The
conservatives and neo-conservatives (the two
groups are not synonymous) want the US government
not to trust the HT's public rhetoric and
imminently declare it a terrorist organization.
The liberal or neo-liberal groups of experts, on
the other hand, are advising a policy of watch and
wait.
What is emerging in different
regions is a heightened awareness of an "Islamic
agenda" and America's reluctance to come to grips
with it. Organizations like al-Qaeda and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - which was
declared as a terrorist organization by the US in
2000 and in 2001 and Bush officially declared it
to be linked with al-Qaeda - may be stealing the
limelight through orchestrating terrorist attacks
either in Iraq or in Indonesia, Morocco or
Uzbekistan. The real challenge (not a threat, and
there is a world of difference between these two
phrases) to the United States in the long run is
likely to come, not from al-Qaeda, but from the
HT.
The HT is working very assiduously and
systematically in a number of Muslim countries -
and especially in Central Asia - to enhance Muslim
knowledge and awareness of their religion. Since
there is no recognized separation between religion
and politics in the Islamic frame of reference,
the HT is using all opportunities to insist that
the chief cause of Muslim backwardness and
downtroddenness stems from the fact that they have
neglected the true path of Islam. Only by
returning to that true path - ie, by totally
committing to Islam and to the ways of the Aslaf
(the pious ancestors), it argues, will Muslims
regain their past glory.
In essence, the
debate in Indonesia and Central Asia - as is also
true of the rest of the Muslim countries - is how
to regain past glory. Why are Muslims not at the
cutting edge of power and upward mobility? In the
absence of any other alternate template for
regaining the past glory related to the golden age
of Islam, returning to the ways of Islam is
becoming a generally accepted theme.
There
are important tactical differences, however.
Al-Qaeda has one recipe to establish the Islamic
caliphate, and the HT is offering another. That
also might be one of the goals of the PKS of
Indonesia, which "also does missionary work, with
the aim of gradually persuading people that an
Islamic state is the best option". It should be
noted, however, the the PKS "has consistently
avoided making any pronouncements about the
possible imposition of Islamic Sharia law". Such a
nuanced stand has confused its critics, who have
often accused the party of "being a wolf in
sheep's clothing, but others argue there is
nothing to worry about because the Indonesian
people will never accept the creation of an
Islamic state". By the same token, the HT is also
confusing its critics.
The challenge for
the US is what to make of the call to return to
the ways of Islam. Bush may be able to condemn
al-Qaeda and its terrorist tactics (as he should),
but he is likely to run into problems talking
about neutralizing the growing influence of the
HT, the PKS, or other similar organizations that
are epitomizing the collective Muslim anguish
about how to regain the path to glory.
In
this sense, the central undertaking of the
post-September 11 era may turn out to be not how
to conquer al-Qaeda, but how to neutralize the
growing effectiveness of Islamist organizations
that are resolute in continuing their call of
return to Islam as a way of regaining Muslim
glory.
Ehsan Ahrari is an
independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria,
VA, US. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. He is also a regular contributor to the
Global Beat Syndicate. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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