The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is the
largest Arab Sunni organization in Iraq. It is
also one of the oldest political organizations in
the country, having been founded in 1960. The IIP
was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood
organization, and some even consider it to be the
extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. The
party is committed to transforming Iraq into an
Islamic state.
The IIP is fiercely opposed
to the occupation of Iraq by the US and its
allies, and until very recently it declined to
participate fully in the political process.
However, the shock of the January 2005 elections
(which effectively handed control of the
government to
Shi'ite organizations and
their allies) propelled it into the center-stage
of Iraqi politics.
The IIP remained
fiercely opposed to the constitution up until the
very last minute. It finally decided to endorse
the constitution in the hope of securing a better
position to revise it after the December 15
elections for a full Iraqi government. The IIP is
participating in the December elections and is
expected to do well. Increased IIP influence in
the Iraqi government will likely put more pressure
on the Americans and their Iraqi allies.
Fareed Sabri is the spokesman of the IIP
in the United Kingdom. He also served on the
party's leadership council in the late 1990s. He
talks to Mahan Abedin in London.
Mahan Abedin: Why did the
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) suddenly decide to
endorse the constitution?
Fareed
Sabri: We only temporarily suspended our
objections; this does not mean we approve of the
constitution. We came to the conclusion that the
constitution was going to be passed anyway, since
there is no way the Iraqi government and the
Americans would have allowed it to be rejected.
Therefore we tried to maneuver ourselves into a
strong position to influence the final status of
the constitution after the elections on December
15.
MA: But you urged Iraqis
to votes yes in the referendum; most people would
say that constitutes endorsement of the
constitution.
FS: The party
leadership decided to temporarily suspend our
objections. We certainly do not approve of this
constitution as its stands.
MA: Why did it take so long
to count the votes?
FS: Some
of the high turnouts seemed suspicious. There were
also some allegations that ballot boxes had been
confiscated by the militias, the police and the
National Guards. There is a deep suspicion in Iraq
that some of the results had been massaged,
especially the votes in the Mosul area.
MA: You are alleging fraud?
FS: A lot of our party
members on the ground conducted exit polls in
Nineveh province and 80% of respondents reported
that they had rejected the constitution. The
official results diverge sharply from this figure,
and this makes us very suspicious.
MA: But did the overall
result still surprise you?
FS:
Not really. The Iraqi government had
mobilized all the media resources in the country
to propagate in favor of the constitution. Also
the Iraqi political parties did not have enough
time to debate the constitution.
MA: What does the "yes" vote
mean?
FS: From our point of
view it is better than "no". If the constitution
had been rejected we would have had at least
another year of interim governance. The interim
governments we have had so far have utterly failed
in their duty to restore a semblance of normality
to Iraq. The "yes" vote, at least, gives the Iraqi
people a sense of direction.
MA: But do you really think
the new National Assembly that will be elected on
December 15 will address your objections and amend
the problematic clauses in the constitution?
FS: It is a delicate process
of give and take. Don't forget that our party,
along with other Arab Sunni forces, will be much
better represented in the next National Assembly.
It will be in the interests of all parties to
negotiate and achieve consensus. For our part, we
will do our best to change this constitution.
MA: Any modification to the
constitution will have to be ratified by two
thirds of the National Assembly, and then put to
another referendum. Is that right?
FS: Yes, and as long as it
is not rejected by two thirds of voters in three
provinces, the new constitution will come into
effect.
MA: The whole
process seems stacked against you. Do you really
think you can get two thirds of the new National
Assembly to agree to your changes?
FS: I think we can reach an
agreement through consultation with our Shi'ite
and Kurdish brothers.
MA:
This means you will have to compromise on some of
your objections.
FS: Of
course, this whole process is about consultation
and agreement.
MA: As far as
the main thrust of the constitution is concerned,
which is to make Iraq a federal state, you are now
resigned to that fact, aren't you?
FS: Not really. We have no
objections to federalism as long as it is a form
of decentralization. But we strongly object to the
kind of federalism which seeks to make Iraq into a
weak and ineffective state. For instance, it is
dangerous to grant the provinces the power to
control their own police and National Guards
forces.
MA: Do you think
federalism will strengthen centrifugal forces in
Iraq? I am referring to the Kurdish north and the
Shi'ite south.
FS: As long
as the monopoly over the use of force and control
over the country's foreign policy is delegated to
the central government, we see no problems in
granting the provinces the right to conduct their
own affairs. If this happens, then Iraq will
remain united.
MA: Let us
talk about the insurgency. How does the IIP see
the insurgency, in terms of legitimacy?
FS: Let me make it clear
that the IIP is a purely political party and we
have no links to the resistance whatsoever. But in
answer to your question, the IIP has divided
opposition to the occupation into two spheres: the
military struggle and the political struggle. We
believe that although the military struggle is
very important, it is also equally important for
our community to have proper political
representation. Moreover, we do not deny any
oppressed and occupied people the right to fight
their tormentors and occupiers. In our case, we
believe that the Iraqi people have every right to
resist the occupation.
MA:
So you support attacks against coalition forces in
Iraq?
FS: We do not deny the
Iraqi people the right to resist the occupation.
MA: How about attacking the
new Iraqi security forces?
FS: We categorically condemn
attacks against fellow Iraqis. This includes the
Iraqi security forces and our Shi'ite and Kurdish
brothers.
MA: But isn't the
insurgency hurting the Iraqis first and foremost?
FS: We have to distinguish
between resistance that targets the occupation and
those forces that are targeting the Iraqi people.
Of course from the point of view of the occupation
all resistance is illegitimate. We need to
distinguish the terrorists from the resistance
forces who are fighting for a free and independent
Iraq.
MA: How long will the
insurgency last? Do you think it could out-last
the occupation?
FS:
Ninety-five percent of resistance in Iraq is
directed at the occupation. Therefore, once the
occupation ends, the vast majority of violence
will subside almost immediately. Of course a small
minority will continue to fight, but their
challenge will be manageable. Remember Iraq was
not known for terrorism before the occupation. All
this started because of the occupation, and we
will only be able to properly restore our country
once occupation forces depart.
MA: What types of people are
involved in the insurgency? Please discuss in
terms of ideology, region and age.
FS: First and foremost, I
would like to reject this myth that most of the
people in the resistance are Ba'athists or former
Ba'athists. Ba'athists are hated in Iraq. The
occupation and the Western media know this very
well and want to discredit the resistance by
painting them as Ba'athists. Evidence on the
ground indicates that the majority of the people
in the resistance are between the ages of 16-25,
and they are motivated by nationalist and Islamic
themes and ideologies. The foot soldiers are all
very young and could not possibly have been
Ba'athists. As for their leaders, again they are
also very young and far away from anything to do
with Ba'athism. These people are a new generation
of Iraqis; they were kids under Saddam. Anyways,
Ba'athism was dead long before the toppling of
Saddam. From the mid 1980s onwards, Ba'athism
operated as a security tool in Iraq, and not as a
popular ideology.
MA:
Elaborate more on the insurgents' ideology.
FS: The backbone of the
resistance is Islamist. There was a study done
some time ago by Baghdad University, which
concluded that the foreign fighters constitute no
more than 4% of the insurgents.
MA: How did they conduct
their study?
FS: They went
to hospitals and the morgues and collected
information on dead and wounded resistance
fighters.
MA: When was this
study conducted?
FS: Late
2004.
MA: What were the
predominant nationalities of the foreign
insurgents?
FS: I don't
know.
MA: What do you make
of claims that at the very highest levels the
insurgents are drawn from elements in the (former)
Iraqi intelligence services?
FS: This is another myth.
Most of the high officials of the former Iraqi
intelligence services have fled the country and
are now leading private lives. Anyways, whenever
the Americans capture a senior leader of the
resistance, they almost invariably introduce him
as a member or associate of the [Abu Musab
al-]Zarqawi network.
MA:
Does the youthfulness of the insurgency make it
almost impossible to defeat it, since there are
plenty of young Iraqis that can replace slain or
wounded fighters?
FS: Yes.
The Americans have a very poor understanding of
the concepts of jihad, martyrdom and the codes of
tribal justice.
MA: Is the
insurgency creating a new form of political
identity, namely an Iraqi nationalist-Islamic
identity?
FS: Yes, and this
predates the occupation. It goes back to the early
1990s when the former Iraqi government launched
Hamla Imaniyah, or Faith Campaign. But the
resistance is adding flesh to that legacy and in
the process is not only creating a new political
identity, but a new Iraq as well. I can tell you
that many people in the resistance are looking
beyond the occupation and are anxious to implement
true Islam in Iraq.
MA: Do
you think this new ideology can be a suitable
replacement for Ba'athism, insofar as ensuring
Iraqi unity is concerned?
FS: It is difficult to say
at the moment. But as far as the Iraqi Islamic
Party is concerned, we call people to Islam
through dialogue. And at this point in time we
strive to promote democracy and an atmosphere of
toleration inside the country. It is too early to
be talking about an Islamic state. We need to
gradually prepare the people for this.
MA: The insurgency is
exclusively Arab Sunni, right?
FS: Yes, it is. The problem
is that our Shi'ite and Kurdish brothers thought
they could rely on the Americans to win rights and
privileges. But in reality the occupation has only
fragmented Iraqi society. It has not empowered
anyone. But I should add that there is a minor
Kurdish component to the resistance, in the form
of Ansar al-Islam and its offshoots.
MA: Do you think we are
seeing the beginning of a Shi'ite insurgency?
FS: There have been a few
operations in the south, particularly against the
British. But the operations are scattered and
sporadic. There is no strong and united resistance
force in the south.
MA: Do
you think the Americans can get on top of the
insurgency?
FS: The
resistance in Iraq is not a pure act of violence.
There is an ideology and a mountain of grievances
behind it. As long as there are occupation forces
in Iraq, there will be fierce resistance.
MA: Does the political
process have a direct impact on the insurgency?
FS: There is some tactical
impact. For instance some resistance groups may
stop operations for a month to assess the result
of elections. But these groups resume operations
in due course, so there is no question of them
laying down their arms.
MA:
Once the New National Assembly takes form after
the December 15 elections, the political process
will be complete in Iraq, insofar as all the
institutions of the new Iraq will be in place. Do
you think this could intensify the insurgency,
especially since the political process lacks any
real depth?
FS: The problem
is that the political process is not having any
meaningful effect on the lives of ordinary Iraqis.
MA: So will this intensify
the violence?
FS: It depends
on the composition of the new National Assembly.
If the Arab Sunni constituency is more fairly
represented, then the resistance might diminish.
If the grievances of our community are addressed,
then this will decrease the violence.
MA: But the problem is that
some elements in the insurgency branded you as
traitors for endorsing the constitution and bombed
your offices around the country.
FS: Some of the more extreme
elements were responsible for that. The fact
remains that we were the only party that sought to
properly educate the Iraqis about the
constitution.
MA: Can the
Iraqi Islamic Party remain united in the face of
the unpopular decision it made? There are reports
that many people inside your party were unhappy
about the leadership's endorsement of the
constitution.
FS: The IIP is
a very resilient organization. It will remain
united because it is a very coherent force with a
powerful ideology. Moreover, we have a long
history and many cherished traditions.
MA: But did the decision to
endorse the constitution cause dissent and discord
within your party?
FS: Yes,
in the first few days there was some disquiet
amongst the grassroots, but the leadership has
managed to reassure the rank and file.
MA: You mean the decision
alienated the grassroots?
FS: A few members,
especially in the western areas, had serious
objections, but the leadership managed to win them
round in the end.
MA: How
about the bombings of your offices?
FS: Thankfully nobody was
killed in these bombings. The "Association of
Muslim Scholars" (AMS) issued a statement
condemning the attacks and the relevant people
took heed of that.
MA: But
the AMS also condemned you for endorsing the
constitution in the first place.
FS: No, they did not. They
asked us to re-think our position because they
reject the constitution outright.
MA: Is the IIP the biggest
Arab Sunni organization in the country?
FS: Yes, we are. Most Iraqi
political analysts would agree with this. We are
also one of the oldest, having been established in
1960.
MA: How big is the IIP
in terms of numbers?
FS: It
is in the tens of thousands, at the very least.
But if we opened up the doors of membership we'd
easily enlist hundreds of thousands of new
members. But we don't have the infrastructure to
absorb all these people at this point in time.
MA: Do your roots go back to
Mosul?
FS: Not really. I
have heard this before and it is not accurate.
Mahmoud Sawaf, a prominent religious and spiritual
leader in the 1940s and 1950s, who influenced some
of the founders of our party, was from Mosul.
Maybe this is why some people think our roots are
in Mosul.
MA: What kind of
political activities are you undertaking in Iraq?
FS: We hold conferences. We
are involved in the political process and
undertake negotiations with different parties at
the very highest levels. We have produced a list
named the "Iraqi Accord", with which we aim to
contest the December elections. The "Iraqi Accord"
is made up of the IIP, the Conference of the
People of Iraq headed by Adnan Dulaimi and the
National Dialogue Assembly headed by Khalaf
al-Elayan.
MA: What kind of
activities do you undertake at the grassroots
level?
FS: Aside from normal
political campaigning, we hold political workshops
and Islamic education seminars. We have
established hundreds of non-governmental
organizations that educate young people,
especially in relation to fighting drug abuse and
promoting Islamic behavior and etiquette.
MA: Nobody tries to impede
or restrict your activities?
FS: It would be very
difficult for anybody to restrict our activities,
because all our endeavors are closely interlinked
to the makeup and character of our community. But
some of our members have been assassinated, and
American forces regularly harass our members.
MA: Your leader's private
residence was raided by the Americans a few months
ago, no?
FS: Yes, because we
are adamant that the occupation has to leave Iraq.
The Americans know that we are a big political
thorn on the side of the occupation.
MA: What reasons did the
Americans give for raiding the private residence
of Muhsin Abdel-Hamid?
FS:
They did not give any reasons.
MA: Was he mistreated?
FS: Yes, this old gentleman
was mistreated by the young American soldiers who
charged into his home. Also his belongings were
scattered around.
MA: Who
interrogated him, the Americans, or Iraqi
government agents?
FS: The
Americans interrogated Dr Abdel-Hamid, with the
assistance of Iraqi interpreters.
MA: Who is assassinating
your members?
FS: We have no
idea who is targeting the IIP, especially since we
are a peaceful party. It depends on which part of
Iraq these crimes are committed. If attacks occur
in the northern and western regions it is probably
the work of either Takfiris or Ba'athist remnants.
But if they occur in the south or in the capital,
the finger of blame is usually pointed to a few
radical Shi'ites who are members of various
militias.
MA: The downfall
of Saddam has clearly enabled your party to
establish a strong presence in Iraq. How do you
reconcile this to your uncompromising opposition
to the occupation?
FS: The
harm that has come out of the occupation far
outweighs its benefits. The entire infrastructure
of our country has been massively damaged by the
occupation. Set against this, the few benefits
that have resulted from the occupation really pale
in comparison. In any case, if the occupation was
not besieged by the resistance, it would probably
come after organizations like the IIP.
MA: Is the AMS your closest
ally in Iraq?
FS: We are
close to the AMS. We have some differences, but we
agree on all fundamental issues.
MA: What do you make of
allegations that the AMS has links to the
insurgency?
FS: Because the
AMS refuses to take part in the political process
and has been very vocal against the occupation, it
is accused of links to the resistance. They
provide spiritual guidance to the resistance, but
I don't think they have any concrete links with
them.
MA: But some of the
hostages are released into their custody.
FS: This is because a lot of
people in the resistance hold these religious
leaders in high regard. The AMS are regarded as
the leading authorities of Sunni Islam in Iraq.
MA: Let us talk about the
Supreme Council of the Islamic revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI). How would you describe your relations
with this organization?
FS:
I think SCIRI should have done more to allay the
fears of the Iraqi people. They should have tried
to project themselves as the representatives of
all Iraqis and not just the Shi'ites. The
occupation has exploited this to create a rift
between the political forces in Iraq.
MA: Do you think they are an
effective organization?
FS:
Of course they are very effective. They have the
full support of the Iranian government and also
benefit from the support of the Marjayeeat
[Shi'ite clerical establishment]. Also they were
favored by the occupation for a long time.
MA: And how are your
relations with SCIRI?
FS: We
have contacts and maintain a useful dialogue. It
is important to remember that SCIRI represents a
big chunk of Iraqi society and nobody can ignore
this fact.
MA: What
mechanisms do you use to maintain dialogue?
FS: It is mainly at the
leadership levels. We also talk to SCIRI through
mutual friends in the Iraqi government.
MA: You think that Shi'ites
in general and SCIRI in particular have been too
cooperative with the occupation, right?
FS: Unfortunately, yes. This
is the point of view of many sections of Iraqi
society, not just the IIP. Even [Shi'ite cleric]
Muqtada al-Sadr shares this view.
MA: Do you think SCIRI is
beginning to distance itself from the Americans?
FS: No, we don't see any
evidence of this.
MA: But
seeing it from their perspective, they are a prime
target for the insurgents. Surely you can
appreciate the difficulty of their situation.
FS: Of course we understand.
But my point is that since the first day of the
occupation, the general perception in Iraq has
been that they have walked down the same path as
the Americans.
MA: How do
you assess the role of SCIRI'S Badr organization
(formerly the Badr Corps)?
FS:
This is a highly contentious issue. We
think that the Badr organization has a lot to
answer for right now. There are unexplained mass
killings and the selected targeting of key people,
and many people think the Badr organization is
somehow involved in this.
MA: Do you think the Badr
organization is implicated in the assassination of
IIP members?
FS: There are a
lot of allegations flying around, and the problem
is that they are not addressed by the government.
Unless there is a proper investigation, rumors
will continue to circulate. It is in the interest
of both SCIRI and the Badr to be as transparent
about their activities as possible. Otherwise the
only beneficiaries will be the occupiers and those
who seek to disunite and fragment Iraq.
MA: How does your party see
Muqtada al-Sadr?
FS: We have
very good relations with our brother Muqtada
al-Sadr. He is one of the most respected leaders
of Iraq and he has tremendous grassroots support.
MA: Some may say the
Sadrists have been more principled in their
relationship with the political process than the
IIP. Whereas you were very oppositional to begin
with but gradually joined the process, the
Sadrists have been steadfast in their rejection of
the political process.
FS:
No, your description is not true. Firstly, we have
never said we are against the political process.
The only thing that kept us away from the
elections in January 2005 were the assaults on
Fallujah and other areas and generally the heavy
fighting between the resistance and the occupation
forces. Secondly, we have always been
anti-occupation and we participate in the
political process in order to hasten the
withdrawal of foreign forces from our country. In
this respect our position is more principled than
Muqtada al-Sadr's. The Sadrists have loudly
proclaimed they will never have anything to do
with the political process while Iraq remains
occupied, but they still included 21 of their
members in the Shi'ite alliance that contested the
January 2005 elections. All these 21 members
currently have seats in the National Assembly.
Moreover, Baha al-Araiji, one of their
representatives in the National Assembly, was
enthusiastically participating in the negotiations
over the content of the constitution. Therefore,
if you weigh all these factors, you are bound to
conclude that the IIP has had a more principled
stance than our brother Muqtada al-Sadr.
Furthermore, we never hide our agenda from the
Iraqi people and we would never join a government,
only to throw stones at it as well.
MA: How do the insurgents
view Muqtada al-Sadr?
FS: I
think the resistance has a lot of respect for
Muqtada al-Sadr, mainly because he has been vocal
against the American military operations against
the Arab Sunni community. In this respect Muqtada
al-Sadr has been radically different from other
Shi'ite leaders.
MA: Do you
envisage Muqtada al-Sadr coming into conflict with
the Americans again, as he did in April and August
2004?
FS: The situation is
now very different from how it was in 2004. I
don't think the Americans can afford to isolate
another major section of Iraqi society.
MA: What about charges that
Muqtada al-Sadr was complicit in the murder of
Abdel [Shi'ite cleric] Majid Khoei in April 2003?
FS: These charges were
raised for political reasons and they were not
properly investigated. Besides, I don't think any
Iraqi government could afford to isolate Muqtada
al-Sadr at this point in time.
MA: Let us talk about Iran.
How do you assess Iran's influence in Iraq?
FS: Iranian influence in
Iraq is very deep. The Iranians have tentacles in
all aspects of Iraq life right now, especially in
the south.
MA: Will it get
deeper?
FS: Of course it
will.
MA: Is the IIP
sympathetic to the new Iranian government, led by
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad?
FS: We are an Islamic party
and we would like to have good relations with all
Muslims. We welcome Mahmud Ahmadinejad because we
believe many of his ideas coincide with our own.
But the Iranians should recognize that Iraq is a
complex society and they should support all
sections of Iraqi society in equal measure.
MA: If you look at your
neighbors, in particular the Saudis, Syrians,
Turks and Iranians, which political model is
closest to your aspirations?
FS: I don't want to upset
any of our neighbors, so I won't be naming any
country in particular. But in terms of democracy,
you could certainly say Turkey is a democracy and
Iran is a young and flourishing democracy with a
sense of direction.
MA: Do
you also favor a strategic Iranian-Iraqi alliance,
as the Shi'ites as do?
FS:
It depends what interests you are trying to serve.
If it is a question of maximizing Shi'ite
influence in the area, then clearly we are not
going to be wholly supportive. But as a block
against Israel for instance, we won't have any
objections. I really think all the countries in
our region should learn from the European
experience. We should cooperate more and try to
develop some common economic and political
institutions. I refer specifically to Iran, Iraq
and Turkey. I think these three countries have a
lot of potential to work together and transform
that entire region.
MA: Do
you envisage the Americans using Iraq as a base to
attack Iran?
FS: Yes, of
course. The Americans are keen to reduce their
forces in Iraq, but some influential Americans, in
particular Richard Perle, have made it clear that
America should maintain permanent bases in Iraq.
Even if the Americans maintained three to four
bases in Iraq, that would still be sufficient for
an attack against Iran. But we are totally against
having American bases in Iraq and moreover we
totally reject using our country as a launching
pad against any of our neighbors.
MA: When can we see a
significant reduction of American troops?
FS: This mostly depends on
the political process and the state of the
resistance. Moreover, the American desire to
confront the Syrians and the Iranians will be a
major factor in their planning. I don't see a
serious reduction for the foreseeable future. They
may withdraw 10,000-20,000 soldiers, but I don't
think they will remove the bulk of their forces.
MA: Will there be
significant American forces in Iraq in five years?
FS: That is quite possible.
Mahan Abedin is the editor of
Terrorism Monitor, which is published by the
Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organization
specializing in research and analysis on conflict
and instability in Eurasia. The views expressed
here are his own.
(Copyright 2005 Asia
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