Friendly fire and the US in
Iran By Neda Bolourchi
In recent months, the Mujahideen-e Khalq
(MEK) and its attempts to prove that the Islamic
Republic of Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons garnered widespread media coverage and
speculation. While bringing forth a modicum of new
information, the attention fails to illuminate
just how dangerous the MEK could be to the United
States.
Grappling in Iraq, the Bush
administration now faces an analogous yet graver
situation in the Islamic Republic. In the years
leading up to the Iraq war, Ahmad Chalabi led the
exiled Iraqi National Congress. In courting Bush
officials like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz to
stoke the war flames in Iraq, Chalabi materialized
defectors who affirmed suspicions about Saddam
Hussein's ethereal weapons of
mass destruction. Chalabi then secured
administration support by seducing it with visions
of Iraqis showering American liberators with
flowers and a quick handover of a well-ordered
Iraq from US troops to his Free Iraqi Fighters.
Today, Maryam Rajavi, the so-called
president-elect of the MEK's National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI), conjures up the same
desert visions for Iran.
Like the case of
Chalabi, who offered information on the seemingly
impenetrable Iraq, reliance on Rajavi and her
supporters superficially makes sense. Given the
US's lack of human intelligence inside the Islamic
Republic's government, supporting the MEK would
naturally appeal to the US administration as a
means to quickly develop and install agents who
can provide reliable information regarding the
Islamic Republic's nuclear advancements.
The MEK even appears to fit the bill
better than Chalabi in many respects. As an
Iranian opposition group with members inside and
outside the country, the MEK can utilize its
nativist connection to seamlessly merge with
countrymen without fear of being detected by
foreign accents, mannerisms or characteristics.
Moreover, the MEK is the largest and the
best-organized Iranian opposition group, with
realistic estimates between 6,000 to 10,000
fighters, members and supporters combined. More
importantly, the MEK demonstrated its ability to
deliver reliable information when it revealed, on
August 14, 2002, that the Islamic Republic
possessed an advanced nuclear program that
included facilities at Natanz and Arak.
The MEK now finds support within parts of
the American government as a "third option". Such
support is built on the fallacy that the MEK can
not only provide information, but also enjoys
enough popular support so that diplomacy and
direct military action can be skirted. By lobbying
to remove the MEK from the US's list of foreign
terrorist organizations and considering the group
as leverage to destabilize, overthrow, and/or
replace Tehran's clerical government, supporters
ignore the unsavory history of the MEK.
And that puts the United States, its
citizens and its interests in grave danger.
Under the Bill Clinton administration, the
State Department placed the MEK on its terrorist
organization list in 1997 as a conciliatory
gesture to the then newly elected Mohammed Khatami
moderates. In justifying its decision, the State
Department used several acts of violence committed
against Americans to justify its actions.
These acts included the November 1971
attempt to kidnap the American ambassador, as well
as the 1972 bombings of the offices belonging to
Pepsi-Cola, General Motors, the Hotel
International, the Marin Oil Company, the
Iranian-American Society and the US Information
Office. Over the next three years, the MEK robbed
six banks, assassinated the deputy chief of the US
Military Mission (Colonel Lewis Hawkins), killed
the chief of the Tehran police, killed five
American civilians and/or military advisers,
attempted to assassinate the chief of the US
Military Mission in Iran (General Harold Price),
and bombed the offices of Pan-American Airlines,
Shell Oil Company, British Petroleum, El Al and
British Airways. [1]
In a military
tribunal in 1972, MEK leader Massoud Rajavi
explained such acts of violence by premising that
the future of Iran depended on armed resistance.
Blaming most of the world's problems on
imperialism, Rajavi insisted that "American
imperialism" was the main enemy of Iran because
the United States conducted the 1953 coup d'etat
that overthrew the then prime minister, Mohammad
Mossadeq. [2] In retaliation, the Shah attempted
to discredit the group by labeling the mujahideen
as "Islamic Marxists" and by claiming that Islam
merely served as a cover to hide the group's
Marxist ideology.
In response, the MEK
declared its respect for Marxism "as a progressive
social philosophy" but stated that "their true
culture, inspiration, attachment and ideology was
Islam". [3] Attempting to clarify its position,
the MEK later published an article declaring that
[T]he regime is trying to place a
wedge between Muslims and Marxists ... Of
course, Marxism and Islam are not identical.
Nevertheless, Islam is definitely closer to
Marxism than to Pahlavism. Islam and Marxism
contain the same message for they inspire
martyrdom, struggle, and self-sacrifice. Who is
closer to Islam: the Vietnamese who fight
against American imperialism or the Shah who
helps Zionism? Since Islam fights oppression it
will work together with Marxism which also
fights oppression. They have the same enemy:
reactionary imperialism. [4]
With
this history, news that the MEK engaged coalition
forces during Operation Enduring Freedom should
not be surprising. [5] With their obvious
ideological differences, the US and MEK have been
separately battling the Islamic Republic of Iran
for about the past 25 years. Now, however, the MEK
and its supporters within the American government
want to temporarily put aside such differences to
bring about regime change.
Intelligence
sources, though, are quick to note that the
information the MEK/NCRI provides is only
sometimes correct.
For example, on
September 16, the group's "spokesman", Alireza
Jafarzadeh of Strategic Policy Consulting, a
corporation viewed as established to circumvent US
laws prohibiting the MEK/NCRI's existence on
American soil, proffered that the Islamic Republic
had secretly built an underground tunnel-like
facility deep in the mountains of the Parchin
military complex, in order to transfer secret
nuclear components and conduct other activities
related to a supposedly vibrant nuclear weapons
program.
The tunnels allegedly house
secret "military-nuclear factories" and serve as
storage space. Diagrams that were produced appear
to show that the tunnels are supplied with water,
electricity and ventilation, providing a suitable
and seemingly extensive working space deep
underground. Jafarzadeh claims that Iranian
officials decided to construct the tunnels in
response to continuing leaks regarding the
country's nuclear activities, and that they serve
to prevent the easy destruction of essential
facilities by US "bunker-busting" munitions.
Yet neither a direct inquiry into the
credibility of the statement nor confirmation from
reliable sources seems to exist. Given that
American satellites would be able to detect the
mass movement and transit required to perform the
alleged tunneling activities, and with access
given again to international nuclear inspectors,
additional skepticism is in order.
In much
the same manner that the American intelligence
community questioned the credibility of Chalabi
over his allegations regarding Iraq, it is
rightfully wary of the MEK.
Unlike
Chalabi, though, the MEK's disdain for democracy
is clear. In the years following the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, when the MEK arguably reached
its height both in popular domestic support and
sheer strength, the mujahideen avoided legitimate
elections for its top leadership positions and any
democratic formulation for an official strategy.
Instead, Massoud Rajavi assumed the
chairmanship of the NCRI, with the result that as
other Iranian dissident groups joined the MEK in
the 1980s, most quickly left the national council
because the MEK insisted on full control over all
important decisions, including who could join the
NCRI, who would receive full voting rights within
the NCRI and who could represent the NCRI at
international meetings.
Although in recent
years the MEK has recast itself as a
pro-democratic, pro-capitalist organization that
provides equal opportunities to minorities and
women, the group continues to exert authoritarian
control over its members.
Having
essentially declared himself the leader for life
of the Iranian people, Massoud Rajavi appointed
his wife, Maryam, as so-called president-elect.
Saddled with one appointed leader for life in
Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Iranian people are
unlikely to want another. Like Tehran's regime,
the MEK has its own interpretation of Islam that
includes mandatory Islamic dress for women. On the
verge of potentially re-embracing secularism,
Iranians do not want another government-mandated
and imposed interpretation of Islam.
Moreover, supporting the MEK will
irrevocably alienate all classes because Iranians
do not consider the group a legitimate source of
resistance. Now alienated from the Islamic
government, Iranians remember that the MEK
significantly aided Khomeini in bringing about the
revolution and the current government. Multiplying
their grievances against the group, Iranians say
that when Khomeini pushed out the former icons of
the Islamist movement, the MEK used assassinations
and terrorism in an attempt to destabilize the
regime.
Once beloved by the masses, "the
hypocrites" turned and fought for Saddam Hussein
during the grizzly Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s - an
act that continues to outrage Iranians. At the
war's end, Saddam attempted to use the MEK as a
fifth column, but the Islamic Republic set a trap
and massacred thousands of MEK paramilitary
fighters and prisoners. No Iranian publicly
objected at the time. Thus, despite arguments that
empowering the MEK would "support President
[George W] Bush's assertion that America stands
with the people of Iran in their struggle to
liberate themselves", Iranians with their long and
collective history will neither forgive nor forget
the "traitors" who attacked their own country and
people.
As such, the MEK cannot be an
asset to the US because the group carries a deadly
legacy from the Iran-Iraq War that only stokes the
embers of Iranian nationalism. Such nationalism
brought about much in the last century: from the
1905 constitutional revolution to the
nationalization of oil and the Mossadeq movement;
from a vital role in the 1979 revolution to
surviving a deadly war with Iraq. Any foreign
military action can expect a similar reaction.
The MEK and its supporters, however, will
encounter a rare ferociousness because the group
presents the kind of common enemy against whom the
reformists, the conservatives, the students and
common people will all rally against - something
that has not happened since the conclusion of the
Iran-Iraq War.
But now the Islamic
Republic is dangerously better armed, holds a
network of relations throughout the Middle East,
and is bolstered by proxies operating widely and
freely from Russia to Bosnia and from Lebanon to
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although the Iranian
people are clearly the most pro-American populace
in the Middle East, does the United States really
want to turn that advantage on its head and be on
the receiving end of such an Iranian nationalist
movement?
While the Persian puzzle
continues to perplex, Chalabi-style fantasies are
not an answer. The lessons from Iraq have been too
many, at too high a price, for that mistake to be
made again.
Notes [1] In
defending the current Rajavi leadership,
supporters cite that Massoud Rajavi was in jail at
the time of the American murders. However, in the
critical early months preceding the Revolution,
the MEK (under the leadership of the freed Rajavi)
not only moved towards clerical power bases but
cooperated with radical clerics to weaken and
eliminate the moderate leadership of prime
minister Bazargan, whom they viewed as bourgeois
and pro-American. See Ervand Abrahamian,
Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin 184-85
(1989).
[2] Viewing the Pahlavi regime as
having little social support outside the middle
class, the MEK asserted that the monarchy had to
rule through terror, intimidation, and propaganda.
In aiming to shatter the "atmosphere of terror"
through heroic acts of violence that would bring
the collapse of the regime, the Mujahideen
ultimately intended to could out carry out
"radical reforms" that included ending Iranian
dependence on the West, building an independent
society, and redistributing wealth while giving a
free voice to the masses. See Ervand Abrahamian,
The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-77, 86
Merip Reports 9 (1980)
[3] See The
Mujahideen Organization, Dafa'at-i Naser
Sadeq (The Defense Speech of Naser Sadeq) 24
(1972).
[4] See The Mujahideen
Organization, Pasokh Beh Etemat-i Akher-I
Rezhin (An Answer to the Regime's Latest
Slanders) 10-13 (1973).
According to
Abrahamian, note 1, 92-93, original members of the
MEK's "Ideological Team", Hosayn Ruhani and Torab
Haqshenas, explained that their "original aim was
to synthesize the religious values of Islam with
the scientific thought of Marxism ... for [the
two] were convinced that true Islam was compatible
with the theories of social evolution, historical
determinism, and the class struggle." The fusion
of Islam and Marxism made sense because the
Mujahideen believed that the Prophet Mohammed
sought to establish not just a new religion but a
new ummat(progressive society) that sought
social justice by delivering the message of
nezam-e tawhidi (a classless society free
of poverty, corruption, war, inequality, and
oppression).
In contrast, at least one
author asserts that the MEK, as a group of
Marxists, realized they lacked grass roots support
and tried to legitimize their movement by
utilizing Islam and following Ali Shariati's
interpretation. In opposing the view of Frantz
Fanon, who believed that people from non-Western
countries must give up their religion to bring
about revolutions in their countries, Shariati
argued that without rooting identity within
religion and culture, non-Western peoples could
not fight Western imperialism See Asaf Hussain,
Islamic Iran: Revolution and counter-revolution
85 (1985).
[5] See Sam Dealey, Iran
"Terrorist" Group Find Support on the Hill, The
Hill, April 2, 2003.
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