COMMENTARY Sectarian flaws in
Iraq By Ehsan Ahrari
The United States wrote the interim
constitution of Iraq to establish a
sectarian-based democracy in that country.
However, it faces a bleak future for three very
important reasons.
First, it made
the Iraqi Shi'ites (about 56% of the population)
and the Kurds (about 15% of the population)
dominant groups. Aside from being two groups that
were tormented by Saddam Hussein, they emerged as
major ruling forces in a democratic Iraq, and also
brought to the table other highly divisive
agendas.
Second, in a democratic Iraq, the Sunnis
lost the predominant status as a ruling group
that they had enjoyed during the Saddam
regime. Now, the Sunnis
(comprising about 20% of the population) must
accept their status as a minority group whose
rights and privileges remain at the beck and call
of the political compromises in which the Shi'ites
and the Kurds are likely to play a crucial role.
Because they remain highly divided, the Sunnis
suffered serious setbacks in the aftermath of the
January elections. They also remain divided
regarding their participation in the elections of
December 15.
Third, democracy in Iraq is
an outcome of the US invasion. As such, its very
legitimacy remains highly questionable in the
minds of the Sunnis who lost political power.
Consequently, they remain acutely sympathetic to
the insurgency that has made Iraq a highly
unstable place, and promises to do so even more as
political pressure inside the US mounts for
withdrawal of its troops.
Sectarian
agendas When the US decided to implant
democracy in Iraq, the natural basis for such a
government had to be sectarian. This virtually
guarantees a Shi'ite-dominated government as long
as the Shi'ites remain highly politicized and
motivated to participate in voting. No one
expected the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) to emerge
as such a dominant group (by capturing 48% of the
votes), if not for its endorsement by the Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani right before the
elections of January.
After its victory,
the UIA had to form a government quickly and then
govern well. In both instances, it did not perform
well. However, considering that Iraq was
experimenting with democracy for the first time in
its existence as a state, it was understandable
that the UIA stumbled badly before a visible new
government could start functioning. Its challenge
was worsened by parts of the insurgency resolutely
fighting against the emergence of a democratic and
stable Iraq.
Another characteristic of the
sectarian-based democracy was the emergence of the
unified Kurdish block that captured 26% of the
votes and became the second-most powerful group in
the Iraqi National Assembly. The Kurds focused on
capturing the presidency, which, even though a
ceremonial office, established that they could
unite as a political group and then indulge
themselves in the post-election bargaining to
become a powerful group. Jalal Talabani duly
became president.
The Sunnis did not fare
well in the election. The insurgency threatened to
kill any Sunni who either ran for office or voted.
In addition, Sunni anger about the way in which
they were deprived of political power persuaded
many not to participate in the
American-established "illegitimate" system that
appeared only aimed at establishing a political
order dominated by the Shi'ites and Kurds.
And then all these groups started to
pursue radically different agendas that weakened
any chance of the creation of a unified Iraq.
The Shi'ites were divided among those who
wanted the establishment of an Islamic government.
However, even among the supporters of an Islamic
government, there were divisions among those who
wanted to incorporate the Iran-style model of
vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the clergy) and
those who preferred a model promoted by Sistani.
His model preferred a system where no clergy would
head the government, but they would serve as its
important mentor.
A third group of
Shi'ites preferred a secular government. However,
their numbers were not strong enough - Iyad
Allawi's party, the Iraqi List, only scored 14% of
the votes.
And then there is the potential
influence of Iran, which wanted an Islamic
government of some sort where it could exercise
influence. If Iraq were to emerge as a secular
state, that would certainly become a special
concern for Iran, for such a country would likely
be receptive of the American presence, as well as
influence.
The Kurds certainly welcomed a
sectarian-based democracy, for that development
enabled them to become a powerful voting block.
They not only participated heavily in the January
elections, they also used their impressive
performance in that election to incorporate a
number of demands in the interim constitution.
For instance, knowing that they had little
chance of capturing the job of prime minister,
they focused on capturing the presidency. Second,
they succeeded in inserting clauses in the
constitution to regain control of Mosul, an area
that has large oil reserves and a heavy Kurdish
population. They also sought a constitutional
guarantee protecting their self-rule in northern
Iraq. Finally, the Kurds and the Shi'ites were
able to arrive at a rapprochement whereby Iraq
became a federal form of government, with the
northern and southern areas of large oil reserves
belonging to the Kurds and the Shi'ites
respectively.
The most troubling part of
the Kurdish agenda is that there is a general
understanding that the autonomy they have acquired
through the interim constitution is likely to be
used eventually to establish an independent
Kurdistan. If that were to happen, Iraq, as we
know it today, would cease to exist.
Sunnis have become the major losers in the
post-Saddam era. Because they form only 20% of the
population, even under the best circumstances of
full participation they were to remain a minor
power group. Since the January elections they have
become insignificant. They realized the gravity of
their mistake of not participating once the
political bargaining began in the National
Assembly over the creation of a new constitution.
The veto clause - which guaranteed that
any one ethnic group might be able to veto any
part of the constitution by a two-thirds vote in
at least three provinces - was not to the favor of
the Sunnis unless they demonstrated a high degree
of unity. The fact that such a provision wasn't
going to work for them became clear when they
decided to defeat the ratification of the
constitution in October, and couldn't.
The
most disconcerting part of the Sunni agenda was
their inability to defeat the Shi'ite-Kurdish
decision to create a federal system of government.
The ideal situation would have been to create a
unitary state, where the central government plays
a decisive role in the distribution of national
resources. But the Kurds wanted none of that.
Fully understanding the Kurdish
motivations and preferences for a federal form of
government, the Shi'ites did not want to be caught
off-guard. What emerged as a consequence was the
Shi'ite-Kurdish grand bargain in which the
provincial governments will play a crucial role in
deciding how much of the oil revenues will be
forwarded to the national government. This reality
has caused an enormous amount of anger and
frustration among Sunni groups and may turn out to
be the major reason for the potential undoing of
the new Iraq.
Condemnation for
sectarian-based democracy For the US,
having a sectarian-based democracy might be a
rational choice, since it determines which group
becomes dominant. Yet, by doing this, the US -
wittingly or unwittingly - has institutionalized a
process that will only intensify divisiveness,
animosity and mutual hatred.
What really
upsets the Sunnis is that their loss of power
materialized as a result of a foreign invasion.
That is one more reason why they so systematically
cooperate with jihadis who have an entirely
different agenda: to undermine all prospects a
long-term survival of a democratic Iraq.
Whither the new Iraq? The
December 15 elections are likely to produce
results radically different from the ones held in
January. This time, the Sunnis are likely to
increase their participation. The Shi'ites are
likely to lose the dominance gained in January,
unless Sistani once again endorses the UIA at the
last moment. If he decides to remain on the
sidelines, the Shi'ites may have to enter into a
coalition among themselves. The Kurds, on the
contrary, are likely to remain an impressive
voting block, remaining close to their current
strength of 26% of the votes.
After the
elections, a significant factor could be the
ability of the three Iraqi groups to compromise.
There are likely to be clashes between the
Shi'ites and the Sunnis over their different
visions of an Islamic government. If the moderates
on both sides prevail, there could be some
rapprochement.
On this issue, the Kurds
are likely to disagree strongly. Then the question
becomes how may sympathetic votes they will be
able to extract from the "secularist block".
As these groups attempt to sort out their
differences, the issue of the scope and nature of
the US presence will loom large.
The
bottom-line objective for the insurgents is that
the US should not be able to withdraw "honorably".
They will do everything in their power to recreate
the type of hasty withdrawal of US forces from
South Vietnam in 1974 or the humiliating
withdrawal of the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan
in 1989.
Is there any hope for
sectarian-based democracy in Iraq? Lebanon is also
a sectarian-based polity, which went through a lot
of turbulence in the 1970s and the 1980s. As a
result, it was long occupied by Syria. However, as
Syria has been forced to pull out of Lebanon, the
future of sectarian-based democracy appears safe.
In the case of Lebanon, the decision to create a
sectarian-based democracy was made in the colonial
era. In the case of Iraq, the decision was made
during the US occupation.
Consequently, it
will take some time before one can be similarly
sure about the future of Iraqi democracy.
Ehsan Ahrari is a CEO of
Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, VA-based
defense consultancy. He can be reached at
eahrari@cox.net or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online His
website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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