Options running out after Iran
snub By Jephraim P Gundzik
Seemingly oblivious to increasing
the chances of potentially fateful confrontation,
Iran this week abruptly informed the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it
would resume nuclear-fuel research next week, and as a
follow-up, failed to show up for a scheduled
meeting with the UN watchdog to explain what it
intended doing.
Senior Iranian officials
snubbed Mohamed ElBaradei by missing a meeting in
Vienna after the IAEA chief demanded an explanation
of
Tehran's nuclear plans. Earlier, Iran told the
IAEA that it was resuming research into nuclear
fuel after a two-year suspension, but refused to
supply details.
As matters drift in
this sea of uncertainty, and talk inevitably
focuses on the possibility of a military strike
against Iran - either by the Israelis or the US,
or a combination of both - international oil
prices can be expected to rise higher in late
January, propelling the price of gold above US$600
per ounce.
And if a military strike
against Iran does materialize, it is reasonable to
expect oil prices to leap well above $100 per
barrel and the price of gold to approach $800 per
ounce.
Positions appear to be hardening,
with the Iranians showing no signs of backing off,
and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warning
that "patience is running out".
Rights
and wrongs According to Article IV of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signatory
countries are specifically allowed the right to
convert and enrich uranium for use as fuel in
civilian nuclear power plants. Iran was one of the
original 43 countries that signed the NPT
after its negotiated implementation in 1968,
and Tehran began to assemble its civilian nuclear
power program in the 1970s.
The 1979
revolution and subsequent US economic sanctions
slowed but did not extinguish the program. The
program was of little international interest until
2003, when Tehran divulged to the IAEA that it had
been building centrifuges for enriching uranium
for nearly 20 years. This revelation immediately
brought accusations from Washington that Iran was
secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons.
To reassure the West that its
activities were purely civilian in nature, Tehran
voluntarily suspended uranium-enrichment activities. This was
intended as a confidence-building measure for
nuclear negotiations with Britain, France and
Germany (the EU-3), which opened in October 2003.
Initially, the EU-3 sought better international
control over Iran's nuclear program through the
IAEA.
In
late 2003, Iran signed an Additional
Protocol to the NPT, which allowed snap inspections
by the IAEA of Iran's nuclear facilities.
The protocol also gave the IAEA wider power
to search for nuclear material in Iran and required
Tehran to fully document its foreign nuclear
procurement activities. Subsequent IAEA snap
inspections in Iran unearthed traces of highly
enriched uranium on centrifuge components.
Tehran maintained
that the centrifuges were contaminated in their country
of origin, not in Iran. This claim was
eventually corroborated by the IAEA last September. However, the
discovery of the contaminated centrifuges
renewed speculation in Washington, supported by
Iranian exile groups, that Tehran had a secret
nuclear-weapons program. This spurred the EU-3 to try to
persuade Tehran to abdicate its right to master
the nuclear fuel cycle.
Last March, Tehran submitted to the EU-3 a
detailed proposal for even stricter IAEA monitoring
than provided for under the Additional Protocol.
This was intended to give the world
objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program had
no military component. The EU-3 countered in August
with an offer of commercial incentives,
including nuclear power plants, in return for
Tehran's repudiation of its right to master the
nuclear fuel cycle. Unsurprisingly, Tehran rejected
the EU-3's offer and resumed uranium-conversion work
at Isfahan.
Incensed that
Tehran restarted uranium conversion (converting raw
uranium or yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas),
the EU-3 threatened to haul Iran before the
United Nations Security Council. However, when the
IAEA vote was finally held in September,
resistance from Russia, China and most members of
the Non-Aligned Movement thwarted Iran's immediate
referral to the Security Council. Instead, the
IAEA passed a resolution describing Iran as having
breached its NPT obligations and that these
breaches constituted noncompliance.
The resolution further called on Iran to end
uranium conversion and to provide additional
information to the IAEA about its program. The resolution
also threatened Tehran with Security Council
referral at an unspecified date. An IAEA
governors' meeting, held in November, decided to give
Iran time to consider a proposal that would allow
Iran to convert yellowcake, but that further
enrichment would be carried out in Russia.
Tehran has rejected the Russian plan,
insisting that it has the right to enrich uranium
in Iran under the terms of the NPT. Hence Tehran's
announcement this week that it was resuming
research on nuclear fuel - and that it was not
even prepared to talk about it, despite the EU-3's
and Washington's demand that it abandon uranium
conversion and enrichment.
Friends in
need Though the EU-3 has coordinated its
diplomatic efforts with Washington, Iran is by no
means isolated. Russia is clearly in Iran's
corner. Moscow has repeatedly rebuffed
Washington's pleas to take a hard line against
Tehran. Several Russian officials, including
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have been emphatic
that Iran's nuclear program should be handled by
the IAEA and not by the Security Council. Moscow
has also maintained, in contradiction to the US
and EU-3, that Iran is in compliance with its NPT
obligations and that Iran has the right to master
the nuclear fuel cycle.
In a very
strong show of support for Tehran, Moscow agreed to
sell Iran an air-defense system known as the Tor-M1.
Arguably the most advanced system of its kind, the
Tor-M1 uses a mobile launcher to track and destroy
multiple targets, which can include incoming
missiles, aircraft and helicopters.
Moscow's deal with Tehran, which
was signed early last month, calls for the
delivery of 30 Tor-M1 systems in 2006 and is worth
more than $1 billion. According to Russian
sources, it is the largest weapons deal between
Moscow and Tehran in the past five years.
China also clearly supports Iran. Chinese
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told EU-3
representatives that placing Iran's nuclear
dossier before the Security Council "could
encourage Iran to take extreme measures". While
Russia has strong commercial ties with Iran in the
nuclear and military fields, China has strong ties
to Iran's petroleum sector. Given China's growing
thirst for oil, it is unlikely that Beijing would
abandon Tehran in favor of the US and EU.
Facing almost certain veto by Russia and
China, any US-EU attempt to impose sanctions on
Iran in the Security Council will fail - a
situation both Washington and the EU-3 are aware
of. Though individually the EU-3 have practically
renounced a military solution to the growing
diplomatic impasse, the US and Israel have not.
Because of its commitment of resources
to the occupation of Iraq, a US military
strike against Iran has been generally described as
not feasible. The partial withdrawal of US troops from
Iraq this year could give the Pentagon's military planners
greater confidence in the success of a strike
against Iran.
Israel could
also mount a major military strike against
Iran, with or without Washington's support.
Last month, stories surfaced in the
international press indicating that Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon had already approved a strike
against Iran to be mounted this March. Israel's recent
acquisition of "bunker-busting" bombs from
Washington indicates that an Israeli strike may
well be under consideration.
Jephraim P Gundzik is president
of Condor Advisers, Inc. Condor Advisers provides
country risk analysis to individuals and
institutions globally.
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