SPEAKING
FREELY Iran's master
puppeteer By Sanam Vakil
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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Just as Iran has
been duplicitous and underhanded in the ongoing
nuclear negotiations, so too has the leadership
elite under the
guise of Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei. In effect, Khamenei, after 16 years in
power, has learned the delicate and tactical
process of manipulating the complicated political
system and its flamboyant actors.
While
Khamenei is indeed the final arbiter and puppeteer
of the Iranian political system, he has been using
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and his ideological
international approach to moderate his own public
image since Ahmadinejad was elected last summer.
In this recent taqieh or dramatic
passion play, Khamenei is the one character who
will emerge from behind the political scenes
having captured not only his domestic audience but
also an international one.
Indeed, 26
years after the Iranian revolution, the mystery
behind the swinging political pendulum of the
theocratic Iranian republic has continued to
confound policymakers and Iran watchers alike.
Dissecting the opaque Iranian political system is
a challenge that must be met especially in light
of the nuclear standoff between the Iranian regime
and the West. This show of audacity has been
deemed the "greatest source of political risk in
2006", as further Iranian intransigence could
trigger eventual military responses from either
the US or Israeli military.
Khamenei was
elevated to the position of the velayat-e-faqih
or Guardian of the Jurist upon the death of
the charismatic ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in
1989. Khamenei was hand-picked by Khomeini.
However, he had neither the overwhelming support
of the public nor that of the clerical
establishment, which looked upon Khamenei's
appointment with disdain. As a cleric, Khamenei
had only limited clerical education, having never
obtained the necessary clerical credentials to
ascend to the position of the faqih. Having
served as the first clerical president of the
Islamic Republic and having received Khomeini's
the blessing, Khamenei was guaranteed to inherit
the theocratic throne, but not without
considerable factional challenges.
Ironically, factionalism is enshrined in
the Iranian political system. These factions have
competed in the parliament, often reinventing
themselves, creating not only a level of
competition but also a clear sense of patrimony.
With parliamentary elections every four years,
factional shifts in the system occurred in 1992 in
the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War and in 2000
when reformist politicians brought wind of a
"Tehran spring". Indeed, the reformist challengers
to the Iranian state were marginalized in the 2004
parliamentary elections due to the much-maligned,
behind-the-scenes direction of the supreme leader.
Equally important to the Iranian political
structure is the institutional system. Modeled
after the French political system with a
parliament, president and judiciary, the
government maintains clerical oversight bodies
that are appointed by the supreme leader. The
former institutions have been dominated by
factional competition as evidenced by the
reformist emergence. Indeed, president Mohammad
Khatami's 1997 and 2001 electoral victories posed
political challenges for the clerical
conservatives.
After 16 years at the helm,
though, Khamenei has learned to use this
factionalism and institutional control to his
advantage, pitting those who support him against
those who do not. Using unelected institutions
such as the Guardian Council to vet candidates
prior to elections and to negate legislation
passed by the reformist parliament, Khamenei
enabled the final consolidation of conservative
power evidenced in the recent round of elections
when only clerically approved candidates were
permitted to run for political office.
Khamenei has remained mostly behind the
scenes, relying on the public face of the
president to play his part in this political
drama. However, the supreme leader is embarking on
a new era. For eight years, Khatami provided the
ever-hopeful West the facade of an evolutionary
Iran. Traveling abroad with promises of a
"dialogue among civilizations and cultures",
Khatami was successful in restoring Iran's public
face and international image. Out of sight,
however, lay a veneer of a revolutionary Iran, for
he too had unleashed a domestic challenge to the
clerical elite. For Khamenei, this could not be
tolerated. Not only was Khatami disturbing the
domestic status quo but his presence upstaged that
of the already unpopular supreme leader.
With Khamenei neither as popular or
charismatic as his predecessor Khomeini, nor
Western-educated to attract the youth as was
Khatami, he tactically fomented support through a
new factional grouping: the ideological underclass
of the revolution. Finding allies in the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other
ideological supporters of the revolution, Khamenei
consolidated his power by surrounding himself with
a cadre of loyalists willing to adhere to the
revolutionary creed that would protect and
preserve the umbilical cord of the Islamic
Republic. From the rank and file of this devoted
group came the son of a blacksmith, Ahmadinejad,
the ever-devoted son of the revolution.
Indeed, the successful election of
Ahmadinejad is the culmination of Khamenei's
masterful engineering. With Western expectation
for continued nuclear negotiation, Khamenei
permitted Ahmadinejad's aggressive nuclear
posturing, commencing with his rejection of the
EU-3 (Germany, Britain and France) proposals in
August and continuing with the recent resumption
of nuclear "research" this past Monday.
Ahmadinejad has inflamed constituencies right and
left with his anti-Zionist rhetoric, even
garnering censure from his own conservative
parliament. The supreme leader recently elevated
former presidential candidate and head of the
powerful Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani,
giving him supervisory power over the elected
branches of government. In effect, Ahmadinejad has
created much dissension among the clerical rank
and file.
Such antagonistic policy has
been a political coup for Khamenei as he has
mobilized popular support behind the nuclear
program as well as demonstrated to the
international community that the Iranian president
is indeed fanatical in his orientation and
objectives. For the supreme leader, who has spent
16 years isolated in power, Ahmadinejad's
unleashing is being manipulated to his benefit. By
taking Iran to the brink, Khamenei, the ultimate
arbiter, will be the moderate one who can take
Iran back.
In this vein, he will emerge
having successfully consolidated his power, with a
motivated Iranian public supporting a restrained
role for the overzealous Ahmadinejad and room to
maneuver again at the nuclear negotiating table.
His tactics will finally win him his long-awaited
support both from domestic parties, which seek to
contain the fanatical Ahmadinejad, and from the
international community, which hopes Iran will
tone down its rhetoric and cooperate with an
ever-impatient international community. Perhaps
now, Khamenei can feature as producer, director
and lead actor in the unfolding Iranian drama,
finally winning the hearts and minds of the
public.
Sanam Vakil is an
assistant professor of Middle East studies at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
(Copyright 2006 Sanam Vakil.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
