Turkey warms to talk, not action,
in Iraq By Bashdar Pusho
Ismaeel
Turkey suddenly finds itself in
the limelight as international concern over Iran's
nuclear program grows, and the chances of Tehran
being hauled before the United Nations Security
Council increase.
Porter Goss, director of
the US Central Intelligence Agency, visited Turkey
on December 12 and informed Prime Minister
Redep Tayyip Erdogan that the
US was seriously considering striking Iran some
time in 2006, and he asked the Turks to share
intelligence on Iran.
More important, from
a Turkish point of view, Goss also told Ankara
that if it cooperated, the US would "green light"
a Turkish cross-border attack on the People's
Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), now known as the Kurdistan
Freedom and Democracy Congress. The PKK has a
10,000-strong militia in the mountains of northern
Iraq.
Turkey is fearful of an independent
Kurdish state being established in Iraq as this
could ignite its Kurdish minority in its eastern
provinces. Turkey fought a war with the PKK in the
mid-1980s.
Moreover, Turkey is concerned
that if the Kurds seize the oilfields of Kirkuk
and Mosul in Iraq, independence would be a
foregone conclusion. This in turn could revive
separatist demands in the Kurdish populations in
Syria, Iran and, of course, Turkey.
According to Conn Hallinan, a
foreign-policy analyst for Foreign Policy In
Focus, these developments suggest a quid pro
quo between Washington and Ankara. This would
mean that the US attacks Iran, with minimal
protest from the Turks, while at the same time
Ankara hits the PKK and derails the formation of a
Kurdish state, with minimal comment from the US.
This falls into the realm of speculation.
On the ground, there are indications that Turkey
is coming to the realization that armed
intervention is not necessarily the answer.
Recipe for disaster The seeds
for hostility were sown in the aftermath of the
fall of the Ottoman Empire, as Kurds were denied
self-determination and two main swaths of Kurdish
land were submersed into Iraq and the newly
founded Turkish republic. Suddenly, Turkey found a
large Kurdish minority on its doorstep, with a
further Kurdish headache in its back yard that,
unchecked, would threaten the very foundations of
the republic.
Battles ensued in both Iraq
and Turkey intermittently, as a concoction of
repression and rebellion dominated society. With
the ruthless regime of Saddam Hussein taking
adequate care of the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey could
more evidently concentrate on its own far bigger
problem - its own restive Kurds, thought to number
about 15 million and long denied cultural and
ethnic rights.
When the PKK took up arms
in 1984, it was in the middle of the Iran-Iraq
War. Southeastern Turkey became a daily
battlefield, as successive Turkish governments
largely failed to overcome militants, increasingly
causing havoc on the economy.
However, in
1991, somewhat ironically, the tables turned as a
mass of Kurdish refugees arrived at the Turkish
border in frantic flight from Ba'athist
repression, in the middle of the war with the PKK.
With a fierce spotlight on Turkey, it eventually
had no choice but to provide partial humanitarian
relief and eventually support the establishment of
a "safe haven" in the north of Iraq.
Turkey found it difficulty to accept its
new Kurdish neighbor, which embraced autonomy, a
cultural renaissance and literal freedom. If
unchecked, a discomforting paradox could soon
develop, with one side of the border denying any
existence of Kurds and the other side proudly
welcoming visitors to the "Kurdistan of Iraq" at
the border crossing.
Perhaps from then on,
a sense of inevitability hit Turkey, realizing
that it could not actively control the dealings of
the Kurds on both sides of the border. The Iraqi
Kurds, although landlocked, had the benefit of
much sympathy, with their plight brought into the
international arena, and crucially they had
support from the United States and the United
Kingdom via daily air patrols.
In turn,
Turkey's focus shifted to solving the PKK dilemma.
Behind the scenes, a different stance was adopted
and diplomatic cross-border relationships soon
prospered. After all, creating two battles was
almost unwinnable where the setting was in the
middle of the Kurdish plains. Trade and commerce
thrived.
However, the United States'
invasion of Iraq served to cement Turkish fears as
the Iraqi Kurds rejoined the greater Iraq, with
guaranteed sovereignty and an influential role on
the new blueprint of Iraq. Certain ride lines set
by Turkey, such as control of oil-rich Kirkuk, now
all but a certainty, with this being a key Kurdish
stipulation, were soon discarded as the Kurds
continued on a new path to promise. They won
control of leading ministries as Iraqi coalition
partners and became close allies of the US.
Turkish fears were highlighted further
with most of the key Kurdish demands being
enshrined in the Iraqi constitution and Kurdistan
proclaiming its first official president - Massaud
Barzani.
In this light, a continuing blind
eye to the proceeding across the border would be
counterproductive and dangerous.
This
resulted in a more cooperative era between Turkey
and Iraqi Kurdistan, with commerce thriving and
billions of US dollars' worth of contracts been
awarded to Turkish construction firms in the
process. Booming cross-border trade was
highlighted by the commencement of daily flights
from Istanbul to Arbil and Sulaimaniya, to
facilitate popular demand for a more accessible
route.
Perhaps as a more political
solution was sought to the Kurdish problem, there
came a realization that working with the Iraqi
Kurds could actually bring about much-needed
stability to Turkey itself. With Iraqi Kurds the
potential benefactors of a land awash in oil,
Turkey could kill two birds with one stone - solve
its own Kurdish dilemma and also benefit from the
democratic and economic developments in Iraq.
Massaud Barzani recently acknowledged the
thawing of ties and confirmed that he would be
happy to mediate between the PKK and Turkey.
After all, the options left for Turkey are
fast fading. If Iraqi Kurds win a strong
federation, or even outright independence
conducted via democratic means, a border blockade
by Turkey would be catastrophic for the Iraqi
Kurds, who heavily rely on Turkish supply lines,
but this would not be sustainable. Any armed
invasion, threatened on more than one occasion,
would lead to mass bloodshed and would all but end
Turkey's elusive dream of joining the European
Union.
Bashdar Ismaeel is a
London-based freelance writer who also holds
first-class bachelor of science degree honors. The
focus of his work is primarily on Iraq, the Kurds
and Middle Eastern current affairs. He can be
contacted atbashdar@hotmail.com.
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