The genie of Iran's nuclear crisis may be
contained if the much-anticipated meeting in
Moscow between Iranian and Russian officials bears
fruit on the Russian proposal for a joint venture
with Iran to enrich uranium on Russian soil.
Officials from Iran and Moscow were due to
meet on Tuesday, but Iran announced on Monday that
the meeting had been postponed, though it stressed
that it had not been canceled.
So far,
this proposal has received mixed reviews in Iran
and there are indications of a split within Iran's
ruling establishment. Ali
Larijani, Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator, warned on the eve of the
recent International Atomic Energy Agency meeting
in Vienna that the Russian proposal would be
"killed" if Iran's case were sent to the United
Nations Security Council, which it duly was.
Larijani also categorically stated that such a
move by the IAEA would "end diplomacy".
Yet despite such dire warnings,
fortunately neither the nuclear diplomacy nor the
Russian proposal is dead, partly as a result of
timely intervention by Iran's former presidents,
Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, as well
as Hassan Rowhani, who until recently led Iran's
nuclear negotiations and was the architect of the
historic Iran-Europe agreement known as Paris
Accord of 2004 that resulted, in part, with Iran
voluntarily suspending its uranium-enrichment
program, since, according to some reports,
restarted.
Warning of Iran's isolation and
a global consensus against Iran, these and other
leading figures, such as the former Speaker of
Iran's majlis (parliament), Mahdi Karubi, have
definitely leaned on the militants controlling the
presidency and the Supreme National Security
Council to pursue a less confrontational approach.
Yet Iran is not alone in evincing apprehension
about the Russian offer, which has come under fire
in the United States as well as in Russia.
Last November, Presidents George W Bush
and Vladimir Putin discussed the Russian proposal
for the first time, on the sidelines of an
economic summit in South Korea. Subsequently,
Stephen Hedley, the US national security adviser,
clarified that Iran's role in this nuclear scheme
would be "management participation and financial
participation". In other words, the US does not
favor a truly joint venture whereby Iran's nuclear
scientists would gradually master the critical
technology that could ultimately lead to
developing a nuclear weapon.
In a recent
commentary in the New York Times, Valerie Lincy
and Gary Milhollin raised serious misgivings about
the Russian proposal, their main argument being
that (a) it would not stop Iran's drive toward
nuclear weapons, (b) Iran would exploit the
Russian "sweetheart deal" to master the nuclear
fuel cycle, and (c) it would simply adopt it as a
short-term solution.
By all indications,
the earlier White House enthusiasm for the Russian
proposal has disappeared and one is struck by the
peculiar absence of any meaningful follow-up on
the part of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and other US policymakers.
Meanwhile,
according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov, in his press interview of last Friday,
"Russia's suggestion to enrich uranium for Iran on
Russian territory remains on the table." This is
slightly different from the initial pitch for a
"joint venture" by Putin, who is gearing up to
lead the Group of Eight (G8) summit in St
Petersburg in July and, per the advice of the US
ambassador to Russia, William Burns, needs to
"demonstrate a sense of direction".
To
open a parenthesis here, while non-proliferation
is not on the G8's agenda for the moment, events
surrounding Iran between now and July may force
the issue, all the more reason for the G8 working
committees to start on this matter immediately, in
light of the recent meeting of G8 finance
ministers, which addressed risks to oil markets as
a result of Iran's nuclear crisis. One reason
Russia may wish the subject outside the purview of
the G8 summit is that it may complicate Russia's
relations with the West and thus diminish Russia's
chances for economic support from the West's
financial institutions.
This aside, the
Russian proposal has its own domestic critics,
including Anton Khlopkov, the deputy director of
the influential Center for Policy Studies in
Russia, who stated on Russian TV last Wednesday:
"The Iranian request to have access to enriched
technology and centrifuges in the framework of a
joint Russian-Iranian consortium is not acceptable
to Russia. Russia insists on observing a
moratorium on transfer of uranium-enrichment ...
technologies."
Khlopkov and a number of
other Russian nuclear experts have called for a
"feasibility study" before any agreement between
Iran and Russia can be reached on this proposal.
This may take several months, however, hardly
befitting the crisis-prevention momentum generated
by Putin's initiative.
The IAEA is due to
present a report next month to the UN Security
Council on Iran's nuclear program. After this, the
possible imposition of sanctions on Tehran will
become an issue.
The Russian proposal
scrutinized If accepted, the proposed
facility would probably be at Angarsk Electrolysis
Chemical Plant in Siberia, where there is already
a uranium conversion plant, as well as operational
enrichment facilities. Citing safety and economic
reasons against the Iranian idea of transporting
UF4 (uranium tetrafluoride)
from its facility near Isfahan to the proposed
site, Russia insists on conducting uranium
conversion for Iran on its own territory. Yet in
the light of Iran's prior investment in the
uranium-conversion facility and the question of
national pride, Russia may need to compromise on
this issue.
Iran has insufficient uranium
ore for its power plant in Bushehr, which alone
will deplete Iran's proven uranium reserves in
about six years. This is not to mention the
extremely uneconomical uranium mining near
Ardakan. The Iranian media have recently reported
the discovery of smaller uranium deposits in
several provinces, including Isfahan, Khorasan,
Azerbaijan and Sista-Balochistan.
To
assuage Iranian concerns of nuclear-fuel
disruption in light of their history of mistrust
of Russia, this proposal has to be complemented
with another proposal, for a nuclear-fuel bank
under IAEA supervision, inside Iran, stockpiling
several years of fuel, as well as an international
guarantee to substitute Russian nuclear fuel in
case there is a disruption in its flow to Iran. In
turn, Iran would agree to implement its nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty right to enrich uranium
on a rolling basis.
One of the potential
problems of the Moscow meeting is that it may
focus too narrowly on the proposal to enrich fuel
inside Russia, without tackling the other
outstanding issues that may hamper its acceptance
in Iran. Above all, this includes the
national-security concerns of Iran regarding a
possible US and/or Israeli attack on Iran.
Without a firm security guarantee, it is
highly unlikely that the Russian proposal can go
too far in today's rather militant political
climate in Iran. The economic carrot of Western
financial compensation to Iran to recover the
costs of facilities in Isfahan and Natanz is also,
if not equally, important.
From Iran's
vantage point, the Russian proposal has several
merits, given their own technical struggles with
enrichment technology. According to IAEA
inspectors, Iran's UF4 is
tainted with a large amount of heavy metals, such
as molybdenum, which "risks blockages of valves
and piping". Iran's plan is to convert UF4, or yellowcake, into uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) potentially
to be separated into isotopes by centrifuges at
Natanz. Iran prides itself for manufacturing key
centrifuge parts and if the "voluntary"
suspensions continue indefinitely, it may lose
that scientific edge.
At present, Iran has
assembled more than 1,000 P-1 centrifuges at
Natanz and, once operational, the giant facility
could manufacture 100-120 rotors per month.
Henceforth, the incentives to Iran for giving up
its cherished nuclear investments, which are a
source of national pride, must be sufficiently
high, eg, a guarantee of a steady fuel supply and
technological cooperation with Russia and,
perhaps, an international consortium. However, at
this point it is doubtful that the West is willing
to put such necessary incentives on the table.
What then may be necessary is an alternative
proposal.
Alternative Russian
proposal? As an alternative, Russia could
conceivably propose to enrich uranium for Iran on
Iran's territory, together with China and other
participants. In so doing, Russia and China could
build on their own history of nuclear cooperation.
Russia has supplied China with an entire
uranium-enrichment facility at Janzhun, including
a gas centrifuge plant for the production of
low-enriched uranium with an annual capacity of
200,000-300,000 separative work units (SWU).
Russian experts have also participated in
the installation of a Russian-designed Tokamak-7
experimental thermonuclear fusion reactor at
Hefei.
Also, Russia's nuclear transactions
with Europe are instructive, in view of the strict
stipulations for keeping aspects of technology
"black-boxed" so that Russian firms' anxiety about
patent control and re-export of technology by the
recipient nation to third parties are addressed.
This alternative has the advantage of
nuclear safety and likely acceptance by Iran,
compared with the current Russian offer, which can
be telescoped into a scientific feasibility study
that would cover the issue of "objective
guarantees" about non-diversion to illicit
purposes.
This alternative has yet to be
examined by either the IAEA, the US or the
European governments, and yet the mere escalation
of the nuclear standoff requires a broadening of
their horizons to all peaceful options to put this
genie back in the bottle.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005,
with Mustafa Kibaroglu.
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2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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