COMMENTARY The clash of
fundamentalisms By Ehsan Ahrari
We live in an era when two types of
fundamentalisms are running rampant. One is
religious fundamentalism, the other is its secular
version. Both types of fundamentalism are equally
dangerous, especially since neither side realizes
how treacherous it is, and
also
because the people on both sides are convinced
that they are so right and other side is so wrong.
Muslim hardliners have been most visible
in their practice of extremism since the 1990s, if
not earlier. Then their ranks were taken over by
the likes of al-Qaeda, who declared a global jihad
against the United States.
There is no
denying that because of the absence of any
distance between religion and politics in Islam,
most Muslim grievances are couched in the language
of religion. One has to look at the history of
Islam to validate it. In the 19th century, Islam
also became an anti-colonial force. As such, its
forces fought losing battles with European
colonialists. By the same token, Islamic forces of
the early 20th century (the so-called "Basmachis")
clashed with the communist czars of Russia and met
the same fate, when they put up bloody resistance
against the communist takeover of their homeland
in Central Asia.
In the era between the
two world wars, Islam remained in the background,
while Arab and other Muslim countries were busy
emancipating themselves from the yoke of
colonialism-imperialism. In Indonesia, Sukarno
championed socialism and secularism, since it was
in vogue among all major leaders of the so-called
non-aligned countries.
The Arab leadership
of the republican states created the goddess of
pan-Arabism. The Arab monarchies remained loyal to
Islam, but without trying to promote it as a
regional or global force. After the humiliating
defeat of pan-Arabism at the hands of Zionism in
the fateful Arab-Israeli war of 1967, that idea
was thoroughly discredited, but did not really
die. At the same time, Islam did not truly emerge
as a visible or a voluble medium of political
expression until the Iranian revolution.
The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 - which
was in essence a political movement of the Shi'ite
Islamic forces - was the first occasion when
Muslim voices were heard raised across the globe
against Western subjugation. The world also became
aware of an Islamic framework of governance called
"Islamic government", or at least one version of
it. The dynamics of the Islamic revolution of Iran
left an indelible imprint on the memory of the
world, especially the Western part of it.
The Iranian revolution was indeed a
revolution in the sense that it discarded monarchy
and brought to power a republican form of
government. It was an expression of the long
suffering of the Iranians at the hands of an
Anglo-American puppet, Mohammad Reza, the shah. In
that sense, it also became a powerful expression
of the pent-up hatred of the people against the
two Western powers - two democracies to boot -
which shamelessly sabotaged democracy in 1953 and
brought back the monarchy. The chief rationale
underlying that Anglo-American measure was that a
hand-picked monarch would show his gratitude by
offering the most favorable concessions to their
oil companies and would also provide guaranteed
access to Iranian oil.
If the Islamic
government of Iran had succeeded in providing its
populace economic prosperity and internal harmony,
it could have been perceived by the world as a
viable model that all Muslim countries should at
least consider emulating. But that was not to be
the case.
One can look for excuses - one
being that the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s was a
major setback, another being that the US did its
best to isolate Iran - but the chasm that was
created between the US and Iran in the aftermath
of the revolution remains wide and appears to be
getting wider. Both sides are responsible for it.
Now Iran's determination to continue with its
uranium-enrichment program seems to be pushing
Washington and Tehran toward the politics of
brinkmanship, a potentially dangerous development
indeed.
No one should forget that the US
itself played a crucial role in the militant
aspect of Islamic resurgence in the sense that it
revived the doctrine of militant jihad during the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Washington was fully aware that Islam could be
used as powerful political rhetoric against it,
since at that time the late ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini was doing just that in Iran.
The
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan created in
the minds of the Islamists the notion that they
were solely responsible for bringing an end to the
occupation in 1989. That is an important point,
because that very idea - no matter how wrong it
happens to be - also drives today's Islamists in
fighting a global jihad against the remaining
superpower. And the struggle between the global
jihadis and the US has emerged as the major
conflict of our time.
From the side of the
jihadis, the essential aspect of their global
struggle with the US is about the primacy of
Islam. The fact that the US does not see it that
way may not be too relevant here, because even a
majority of those Muslims who don't share the
radical perspectives of global jihad are
sympathetic to the proposition that their religion
is under attack.
To add fuel to the fire,
the US decided to embark on a program of
democratizing the Middle East, after invading and
occupying Iraq. Even though it had already made
significant progress in that direction by toppling
the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, the Afghan
military operation was not seen by a majority of
Muslims as an invasion of a Muslim country by a
Christian power. By and large, it was seen as a
defensive measure by the Americans.
The
Iraqi invasion, on the contrary, was seen as an
offensive move, and one that had "sinister"
designs against Islam, whereby first Iraq and then
the rest of the Muslim world would be subjugated
in the name of democracy.
The fact that
the administration of US President George W Bush
promoted Western secular democracy for the Muslim
Middle East also whipped up Muslim passions
against this "anti-Islamic" alternative. Even if
one were to accept that the idea of promoting
democracy in authoritarian regions is a noble goal
- and it indeed is - the manner of promoting it
(by toppling an existing government and by
occupying it) became its major enemy.
The
secular fundamentalists of the US did not
understand that reality, or perhaps they did, but
could not care less. What they also didn't seem to
understand was that implanting democracy in Iraq
through invasion might have doomed it as a form of
government elsewhere in the Middle East for a long
time.
As the major conflict between the US
and the world of Islam was still going through its
volatile phase, secular fundamentalists in Europe
decided to publish cartoons insulting the Prophet
of Islam. Even though the Nordic countries are
insignificant in the larger conflict that has been
brewing between the US and the Islamic world, they
have had enough exposure to Islamic countries to
know what is permissible and acceptable about
their religion to Muslims. One explanation is
that, somehow, certain Nordics also wanted to
pitch in and show their own lack of regard - if
not contempt - of Muslims, when they showed their
contempt in the name of freedom of expression.
What is at issue here is that the
fundamentalists of both sides are equally at
fault. The secular fanatics are as much
responsible for fanning the current flames of
hatred and turbulence in Europe and other Muslim
countries as their Muslim counterparts.
It
is very easy in the West - where secularism is
understood more clearly, especially when it
involves someone else's religion than their own -
to get on one's high horse and condemn religious
fanaticism. Religious fanaticism should be
condemned, and condemned unequivocally. But
secular fanaticism should also be condemned,
especially when it acquires ostensibly a benign
form, while it is perceived as nothing but
malignant by those who are hurt by it. Ample
consideration must also to be given to the
proposition that secular fanatics should also
examine their own behavior about the overall issue
of insulting someone else's religion, then call it
merely an exercise of free speech.
Muslims
living in Nordic countries - or anywhere else -
don't have to impose their religious template on
others (as some Nordic peddlers of freedom of
expression are uttering these days). However,
expecting a due regard to Muslim religious
sensibilities (or toward other religions) is very
much part of polite behavior that those countries
claim to be championing everywhere in the world.
Besides, being offensive and derisive does not
have to be the signature mode of expressing one's
thoughts. If so, those who express them that way
are also speaking volumes about the depth of
ignorance to which they can reach. In this sense,
there is little difference between the religious
fundamentalists and the secular fundamentalists.
The time has arrived when partisans of
both camps should stop indulging in sloganeering
and blame-gaming, and start communicating with
each other, as Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi suggested last Friday. Voices of reason
have to prevail if we are continue to live with
each other.
Ehsan Ahrari is a
CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be
reached ateahrari@cox.netorstratparadigms@yahoo.com.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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