COMMENTARY The passing of the 'unipolar
moment' By Scott B MacDonald
From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the US clearly
dominated in terms of its economic, military and
political power. But now, the "unipolar moment" in
which the United States operates as the dominant
power in the global system is passing.
The
demise of the Soviet Union left it as the sole
superpower, capable and willing to act
unilaterally in the pursuit of its national
interests. At the same time, it is important to
understand that the so-called unipolar moment was
constructed around a certain
degree of myth - there is and
always has been a gap between America's capacity
and its ability to control events.
Those
in Washington who believed that superpower status
was equal to a unipolar international system had
their ready counterparts in the well-oiled tongues
of the purveyors of anti-Americanism. For the
first group, it justified making decisions without
the cumbersome involvement of allies. For the
second group, it was simplistically easy to blame
everything on the United States, rather than
actually come to terms with complicated realities.
Yet there is something to take
from the idea of US unipolarism and its passing,
even if it was more a facade than reality.
Simply stated, the idea of US unipolarism provided
an important warning to rogue players that they
would not be allowed to run amok - at least in a
strategically important area. Stepping over the
line carried consequences, as reflected by
Serbia's reign of terror in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait.
Certainly the
European Union fell down in former Yugoslavia and the
liberation of Kuwait was beyond Saudi Arabia's
military ability. In these cases, retribution was
carried out by use of consensus building,
persuasion and selective power-flexing. Washington
was also selective in pushing for democratic
reform in the Middle East, while helping to
bolster non-democratic regimes in the
strategically important oil-rich West Africa. At
the same time, US power was selective in not
becoming heavily involved in Africa's ethnic
cleansings, Haiti's convoluted political chaos or
Latin America's drift to the left.
The
passing of the unipolar moment idea is evident in
a number of changes, some subtle, others brutally
up-front. Probably the most evident cases are
Russia and Iran.
In Russia, the Vladimir
Putin administration is using its energy as a
political tool in reshaping its neighborhood - a
region called the "near abroad" - that had earlier
slipped out of Moscow's influence. In late 2005
and early 2006, the Putin administration pushed
Ukraine to accept a higher price for its natural
gas, serving notice to Kiev that it has leverage
on its neighbor's affairs.
Sitting at
the end of the pipeline, the EU felt the tremors
of the Eastern European tussle as its energy
supplies were briefly threatened. Russia also put
tiny Moldova on notice in a similar fashion, while
a mysterious explosion on the Russian side of
the border interrupted gas supplies to
Georgia. Russian natural-gas diplomacy is straightforward -
drawing closer to Moscow comes with rewards (a
steady supply of energy and diplomatic support, as
with Uzbekistan and Belarus); opposing Moscow
comes at a cost, such as shivering in the winter
cold (as in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova).
Russia's hardball approach to re-establishing its
influence is reshaping economic dependencies as
well as generating a deep unease in regional
capitals.
In the Middle East, Iran
is determined to become a member of the nuclear
club. This is a well-thought-out decision on the part of
Iran's leadership to rewrite the regional balance
of power, following already-tried and true scripts
from India, Pakistan and North Korea. Part of this
strategy is play to audiences at home; part of the
strategy is to strengthen Iran's position in the
region, with a very strong and threatening stance
against Israel.
As the myth of US omnipotence
fell flat in preventing North Korea, India
and Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons, chances
are the same for Iran. Despite its massive military
deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US
would be hard put to become militarily engaged
in Iran. Iran is aware that it would be difficult
for the US to launch anything beyond a strategic
strike, considering the questionable security of
Iraq as a base of operations. This is where former
US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's
words clearly have an echo, "Preponderance should
not be confused with omnipotence."
Yet another
element in the whirl of events is the victory
of Hamas, officially depicted as a terrorist
organization by the United States and the
EU, in January elections in the West Bank and
Gaza. As the fruit of its victory, Hamas is
forming the new Palestinian government.
Washington's support for democratic reform in the
Middle East has ironically engendered the victory
of what has been one of the most radical
anti-Israeli forces in a free and fair election.
The use of the ballot box also raises tough
questions for the slow-moving nature of democratic
reform in key US allies, such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia.
Washington's options in facing
each of these challenges are limited. Massive
reductions in military strength after the end
of the Cold War, the large-scale troop and
resource commitments to Iraq and, to a lesser
extent, Afghanistan, have reduced the US capacity
to intervene actively in the military sense.
Imperial overstretch has come at a cost - the
armed forces are reaching their limits and there
has been an erosion in the willingness to bear the
burden.
The US has been forced to fall
back on the more traditional use of major power
diplomatic initiatives, as in the case of Iran
and, to some extent, North Korea, already an
emerging nuclear power. In both cases, the US must
rely on countries that can be perceived as rival
powers - in North Korea's case China and in Iran's
case, Russia, China and the EU.
While
China's power is on the rise and is developing a
global reach (witness its recent ventures into
Africa and Latin America), Russia is climbing back
into a position as a great power. The later
development has meant that Russia is important to
the United States in terms of Iran, which also
means that Washington must approach Moscow with
care over such issues as Ukraine and Georgia.
One area where US power remains
comfortably ahead is in the economic realm. Since
the 1980s the US has been the locomotive of global
economic growth and the Federal Reserve the most
important central bank. During this period, both
Europe and Japan have struggled with severe
structural and increasing demographic problems.
The US has also provided a safe harbor for many
investors, including European and Asian central
banks, pension funds and hedge funds.
But
even here there is a change - many foreign central
banks have indicated that they are looking to
diversify away from their heavy dependence on US
assets, including the greenback and US government
bonds. At the same time, China and other large
emerging market countries - Russia, Brazil and
India - are assuming a greater global economic
role, while Japan at long last appears to be on
the track of a sustainable recovery.
This
could have ramifications for the US economy, where
debt-burdened consumers may see their foreign
inflow of capital slow, not to mention the impact
of less foreign demand for US government bonds. At
some point in the future the critical importance
of the Federal Reserve could be eclipsed behind
the actions of the People's Bank of China.
While US power is likely to remain the
strongest, the structure of power in the
international system will become more diffuse.
Stated in another fashion, the US will remain the
leading power, but it will be less inclined and
able to take the same unilateral actions as it has
made in the past. Consequently, the emerging
multipolar system is likely to include the big and
powerful - the United States, Japan, Europe and
what is now being called the BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India and China).
This in itself will
change things - the major powers will be a more
distinct group. As political thinkers since
Pericles have taken note, distinction breeds envy,
envy breeds resentment and, unchecked, resentment
breeds hatred. Some of the visceral dislike for
the United States could now have new targets,
especially as some of the players are forced to
assume responsibility and make difficult decisions
- acts that could make them unpopular.
The
problem of the emerging multipolar system is that
it currently has no equilibrium. The system is
still ill-defined and, as such, is inherently
dangerous. And in this emerging system, new
alliances are being formed and old ones are
tested. The re-emergence of Japan and Russia, the
rise of China and India, and the spread of nuclear
weapons all indicate that the global system is
searching for new parameters.
For those
still believing in the myth of the US unipolar
moment, the next round of international crises
will be harder to understand - and quite possibly
that much more difficult to resolve. Iran will be
a test for a more clearly defined multipolar
system. Let us hope the world can meet it.
Scott B MacDonald is senior
managing director at Aladdin Capital and a senior
consultant at KWR International.
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