When President George W Bush toppled
Saddam Hussein from power, he never could have
imagined he was paving the way for the emergence
of Muqtada al-Sadr as a kingmaker in the selection
of the first permanent prime minister of Iraq. But
that is precisely what happened when Ibrahim
al-Jaafari, who had the position on an interim
basis, got the nod.
Muqtada made his name
in the Western media by his highly voluble
opposition to the US invasion and continued
occupation of
Iraq. But he already held
impressive credentials stemming from his renowned
lineage. He is the son of the late grand ayatollah
Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a legendary figure in Iraq
because of his opposition to Saddam's brutal rule.
For that opposition, the dictator killed him in
1999.
Muqtada is also the son-in-law of
Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed in 1980.
Baqir al-Sadr was also a prominent theoretician of
Shi'ite Islam. As such, he made a significant
contribution to the concept of Islamic government,
which has become a political reality of the "New
Iraq".
The most significant aspect of the
role of Muqtada - missed by Western observers, but
captured most perceptibly by Shi'ite scholar Faleh
al-Jabar - is that he is an heir to the tradition,
emphasized by his father, that advocates a highly
visible role for "home-grown Arab clerical
leadership" in Iraq.
That tradition has
become a powerful force during the US occupation
of the country. In the tradition of his father,
Muqtada not only challenged the US presence, but
also questioned the very legitimacy of the elected
government stemming from the occupation. In this
capacity, he also came into conflict with the
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in the following
ways.
First, and foremost, the emphasis on
the Arab or native-born Shi'ite cleric implicitly
challenges the role of Sistani, who remains the
most prestigious and revered cleric in Iraq, but
was born in Iran. What that means is, given the
general reverence toward him as a
marja-e-taqleed (source of emulation, which
is in essence a tradition of Shi'ite Islam),
Sistani's leadership may not be challenged while
he is living. However, if there were to be a civil
war in Iraq, the consistently and stridently
anti-American populist position of Muqtada might
enable him to outweigh the nuanced position of
Sistani, which never endorsed the Americans'
presence in Iraq, but advocated cooperating with
them to secure a Shi'ite-dominated democracy.
Second, Muqtada's father, like Sistani,
advocated an advisory role for the leading Shi'ite
cleric with the government. Muqtada, on the
contrary, wants an Islamist government, but
appears to be leaning toward the guardianship
model advocated by the late ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in Iran. Whether he would go to the
extent of endorsing the vilayat-e-faqih
(rule of the clergy) model that ensures the
primacy of the faqih is not quite clear
yet.
What is important here is that
Muqtada is deviating from the model of governance
that his father had preferred. The most important
reality is that he has carved a niche that leans
toward the guardianship model that may turn out to
be more relevant under the political realities of
the new Iraq than what his father had advocated in
the Sunni-dominated era of Iraq under Saddam.
Third, by consistently opposing the US
presence in his country, Muqtada is very much in
conformity with the long-standing legacy of
intense nationalism and anti-Americanism in Iraq.
That legacy also complements the long-standing
tradition of anti-Americanism that Iran and Syria
practice. In this sense, there is a basis of
further rapprochement among Iraq, Iran and Syria,
a potential that goes starkly against everything
that Bush aspired to achieve when he toppled
Saddam. As much as Sistani has differed from Iran
in opposing the vilayat-e-faqih model, he
cannot be labeled an anti-Iranian ayatollah. Under
the best of political circumstances, he would be
in favor of having warm and friendly ties, even
rapprochement, with Iran.
Before the
selection of the prime minister, Muqtada was
reported to have demanded that his candidate,
Jaafari, be given the job. He even went to the
extent of saying that "there is going to be civil
war" if his preferred candidate was not confirmed.
He got what he wanted.
Consequently,
Muqtada's Islamist vision for Iraq is in the
process of being institutionalized. That is a
development that is totally befuddling to Bush and
to his own messianic template for Iraq, where the
US-preferred Western secularism was to be
anointed, and then exported to other countries of
the region.
What are the ramifications of
Muqtada's emergence as a new kingmaker in Iraq? If
the proposition that the heavy burden of
responsibility also brings with it a sobering
necessity for moderation among power-seekers is
true, then one has every reason to be hopeful.
When Muqtada realizes that Iraq under the
premiership of Jaafari has to succeed as an
Islamist democracy, Muqtada would do everything
not to jeopardize the chances of its success.
To ensure the stability of the first
constitutionally elected government, he might
strive hard to build bridges with Sunni groups.
Iraqi Sunnis are already known to be ambivalent
toward Muqtada. That is really saying a lot about
a Shi'ite cleric in a country where sectarian
differences are responsible for a large number of
deaths.
If Muqtada succeeds in "winning
the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi Sunnis, he
might be able to strike a blow to the Sunni-led
insurgency. However, before such a reality
materializes, the Jaafari government has to offer
major concessions to Sunni groups. The most
noteworthy concession would be the abandonment of
a previously agreed arrangement that would set up
a federal form of government for Iraq. Another
Sunni demand would be the incorporation of
explicit legislation that would enhance the role
of the central government in the distribution of
oil revenues.
Any observer of the polity
of the new Iraq knows that the Kurds are strongly
opposed to any abandoning of the federal
principles of governance as well as a heightened
role for the central government. They would
envisage both measures as inherently deleterious
to what they have secured in the framework of the
new Iraq. They will do everything to frustrate and
undermine the final approval of the premiership of
Jaafari in the National Assembly.
So, as
Muqtada becomes fully immersed in the power game
that all Iraqi groups are currently playing, he
will realize that it is comparatively easier to
seek power than actually to exercise it. As the
new kingmaker, Muqtada will soon realize that
dealing with the Kurds might be the
second-most-obdurate challenge, the foremost being
incorporating the Sunni political demands in order
to co-opt them.
He will also have to reach
rapprochement with the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), whose
candidate, Adel Abdul Mahdi, lost the premiership.
The issue with SCIRI is how much Iranian influence
will be allowed in the internal politics of Iraq.
SCIRI is a decidedly pro-Iranian party.
However, Muqtada, while maintaining a
strong nationalistic posture, has not totally
ruled out the proposition of placating Iran. His
recent visit to that country might be evidence of
such overtures. Strangely enough, regarding Iran,
Muqtada's nationalistic position is similar to the
anti-Iranian position of the Americans. However,
it would be folly to think he would do anything to
accommodate the Americans, whose continued
presence in Iraq he is known to loathe.
So
there is decidedly no love lost between his forces
and the Americans. One of the reasons Muqtada
decided to back the candidacy of Jaafari was that
he was amenable to Muqtada's three foremost
demands: negotiation of a timetable for the
withdrawal of US forces, postponement of decisions
about creating autonomous federal regions, and
rejection of a Kurdish demand to repatriate the
Kurds to Kirkuk, the oil-rich city of northern
Iraq.
As a general principle, global
politics is as intricate as it is full of
surprises and unintended consequences. The
emergence of Muqtada as the new kingmaker in Iraq
definitely belongs to both categories. As much as
Bush created an impression, through his public
posturing in the post-Saddam era, that he is
driven by his desire to impose his messianic
template of secular democracy on Iraq, the
election of a decidedly Islamist government and
the growing power of Muqtada are major
disappointments for him.
The worst part of
that development is that if, somehow, the Kurdish
and secular Iraqi groups were to coalesce to
prevent the Islamists from forming a government
(as is being reported by major news outlets), Iraq
is likely to plunge into yet another round of
chaos and cataclysm. In the evolving Iraqi mess,
there is no way one can say that the United States
is emerging as a winner.
Ehsan
Ahrari is a CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an
Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He
can be reached ateahrari@cox.netorstratparadigms@yahoo.com.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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