The sectarian violence which has swept
across Iraq following last month's terrorist
bombing of the Shi'ite Golden Mosque in Samarra is
yet another example of the tragic consequences of
the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Until the
2003 US invasion and occupation, Iraq had
maintained a longstanding history of secularism
and a strong national identity among its Arab
population despite its sectarian differences.
Not only has the United States failed to
bring a functional democracy to Iraq, neither US
forces nor the US-backed Iraqi government in
Baghdad have been able to provide the Iraqi people
with
basic security. This has led many ordinary
citizens to turn to extremist sectarian groups for
protection, further undermining the Bush
administration's insistence that US forces must
remain in Iraq in order to prevent a civil war.
Top analysts in the Central Intelligence
Agency and State Department, as well as large
numbers of Middle East experts, warned that a US
invasion of Iraq could result in a violent ethnic
and sectarian conflict. Even some of the war's
intellectual architects acknowledged as much: in a
1997 paper, prior to becoming major figures in the
Bush foreign policy team, David Wurmser, Richard
Perle and Douglas Feith predicted that a
post-Saddam Iraq would likely be "ripped apart" by
sectarianism and other cleavages but called on the
US to "expedite" such a collapse anyway.
As a result, the tendency in the US to
blame "sectarian conflict" and "long-simmering
hatreds" for the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq is,
in effect, blaming the victim.
Fostering fragmentation One of
the longstanding goals of such neo-conservative
intellectuals has been to see the Middle East
broken up into smaller ethnic or sectarian
mini-states, which would include not only large
stateless nationalities like the Kurds, but
Maronite Christians, Druze, Arab Shi'ites and
others.
Such a policy comes not out of
respect for the right of self-determination -
indeed, the neo-cons have been steadfast opponents
of the Palestinians' desire for statehood, even
alongside a secure Israel - but out of an imperial
quest for divide-and-rule.
The division of
the Middle East has long been seen as a means of
countering the threat of pan-Arab nationalism and,
more recently, pan-Islamist movements. Given the
mosaic of ethnicities and sects in the Middle
East, with various groupings having mixed together
within both urban and rural settings for many
generations, the establishment of such ethnic or
sectarian mini-states would almost certainly
result in forced population transfers, ethnic
cleansing and other human suffering.
The
risk of Iraq breaking up into a Sunni Kurdish
state, a Sunni Arab state and a Shi'ite Arab state
is now very real. And, given the intermixing of
these populations in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and
scores of other cities, the potential exists for
the most violent breakup of a country since the
partition of India 60 years ago. Recent weeks have
shown ominous signs of what may be yet to come on
a massive scale, as scores of Shi'ite families
were forced to flee what were once mixed
neighborhoods in and around Baghdad.
Even
barring a formal breakup of the country, the
prospects of a stable, unified country look bleak.
As the Los Angeles Times reported on February 26,
"The outlines of a future Iraq are emerging: a
nation where power is scattered among clerics
turned warlords; control over schools, hospitals,
railroads, and roads is divided along sectarian
lines; graft and corruption subvert good
governance; and foreign powers exert influence
only over a weak central government."
Much
of Iraq's current divisions can be traced to the
decision of US occupation authorities immediately
following the conquest to abolish the Iraqi army
and purge the government bureaucracy - both
bastions of secularism - thereby creating a vacuum
which was soon filled by sectarian parties and
militias.
In addition, the US occupation
authorities - in an apparent effort of
divide-and-rule - encouraged sectarianism by
dividing up authority based not on technical
skills or ideological affiliation but ethnic and
religious identity. As with Lebanon, however, such
efforts have actually exacerbated divisions, with
virtually every political question debated not on
its merits, but on which group it potentially
benefits or harms. This has led to great
instability, with political parties, parliamentary
blocs and government ministries breaking down
along sectarian lines.
Even army divisions
are separated, with parts of western Baghdad being
patrolled by army units dominated by Sunnis while
eastern Baghdad is being patrolled by
Shi'ite-dominated units. Without unifying national
institutions, the breakup of the country remains a
real possibility.
Sectarian conflicts
Theologically, there are fewer differences
between Sunnis and Shi'ites than there are between
Catholics and Protestants. In small Iraqi towns of
mixed populations with only one mosque, Sunnis and
Shi'ites worship together. Intermarriage is not
uncommon. This harmony is now threatening to
unravel.
Shi'ite Muslims, unlike the Sunni
Muslims, have a clear hierarchy. (Ayatollahs, for
example, are essentially the equivalent of
Catholic cardinals.) As a result, the
already-existing clerical-based social structures
in the Shi'ite community were among the few
organizations to survive Saddam's totalitarian
regime and were therefore more easily capable of
organizing themselves politically when US forces
overthrew the government in Baghdad in 2003. Sunni
and secular groupings, then, found themselves at a
relative disadvantage when they suddenly found
themselves free to organize.
As a result,
the US initially insisted on indefinite rule by
Iraqis picked directly or indirectly by
Washington. However, when hundreds of thousands of
Shi'ites took to the streets in January 2004
demanding the right to choose their country's
leaders, the Bush administration reluctantly
agreed to hold direct elections.
Having
been dominated by Sunnis under the Ba'athists, the
Hashemites and the Ottomans, the Shi'ite majority
was eager to rule. Not surprisingly, elections
have brought Shi'ite religious parties to power
which have since marginalized other groups and
imposed their repressive and misogynist version of
Islamic law in parts of Iraq where they dominate,
particularly in the south of the country.
Sunni opposition to Shi'ite dominance does
not just stem from resentment at losing their
privileged position in Iraqi political life under
the former dictatorship. Indeed, Saddam suppressed
his fellow Sunni Arabs along with Sunni Kurds and
Shi'ite Arabs.
What US officials have
failed to recognize is that Iraq's Sunni Arab
minority, regardless of its feelings about
Saddam's regime, has long identified with Arab
nationalism. Not surprisingly, the armed
resistance which emerged following Saddam's
removal from power three years ago has come
largely from the Sunni Arab community.
The
insurgency has also targeted the US-backed
Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government, which came to
power as a result of the US invasion and which
many see as being puppets of the US occupation.
They also fear that the Iraqi government may
identify more with their fellow Shi'ites of Iran
than with other Arabs. More radical Sunni
chauvinists, many of whom are foreign Salafi
extremists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have engaged
in widespread terrorist attacks again Shi'ite
civilians and their holy places.
Despite
its dependence on the US and ties to Iran,
however, the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government
has its own agenda. Culturally and linguistically,
Iraq's Shi'ites are every bit as Arab as the
Sunnis. Yet while the vast majority of the
country's Shi'ite Arab majority has no desire to
be pawns of either Iran or the US, the response by
the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and Shi'ite
militias has done little to lessen Sunni fears and
hostility.
Seeing their government faced
with a growing insurgency and their community
falling victim to terrorist violence, the Shi'ites
have responded with aggressive counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorist operations against the Sunni
community. Human rights abuses by Shi'ites against
the Sunni minority have increased dramatically,
polarizing the country still further.
Even
before the latest upsurge in sectarian violence,
the Baghdad morgue was reporting that dozens of
bodies of Sunni men with gunshot wounds to the
back of the head would arrive at the same time
every week, including scores of corpses with
wrists bound by police handcuffs.
Death
squads John Pace, the outgoing head of the
United Nations' human rights monitoring group in
Iraq, has reported that hundreds of Sunnis are
being subjected to summary execution and death
from torture every month by Iraqi government death
squads, primarily controlled by the Ministry of
the Interior.
High-ranking American
officers have reported that radical cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr's al-Mehdi Army maintains a strong
presence in the regular police force, including up
to 90% of the 35,000 officers currently working in
the northeastern part of Baghdad. In addition, the
Iranian-trained Badr Organization dominates police
commando units. A police unit known as the
Punishment Committee goes after civilians believed
to be flouting Islamic laws or the authority of
Shi'ite militia leaders, particularly Sunnis.
The Shi'ite government of Iran, long cited
for its human rights abuses by both the Bush
administration and reputable human rights
organizations, has actively supported Shi'ite
militias within the Iraqi government and security
forces. (Despite this, the Bush administration and
its supporters, including many prominent
Democrats, have been putting forth the ludicrous
theory that Iran is actually supporting the
anti-Shi'ite and anti-American Sunni insurgency.)
Iraq's former interior minister Bayan Jabr
was trained by Iran's infamous Revolutionary
Guards and later served as a leader of the Badr
Organization, the militia of the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Americans have also trained Interior
Ministry police and commandos, though - unlike
some notorious cases in recent Latin American
history - there is little evidence to suggest that
US trainers have actively encouraged death squad
activity.
Still, there is little question
that actions by US occupation troops over the past
three years - such as the torture of detainees,
the hair-trigger response at checkpoints, the
liberal use of force in heavily-populated civilian
neighborhoods and the targeted assassinations of
suspected insurgent leaders - have contributed to
the climate of impunity exhibited by forces of the
Iraqi government.
Pace has also observed
how US troops are making things worse by rounding
up large numbers of innocent young Sunni men and
detaining them for months. Noting how such
"military intervention causes serious human rights
and humanitarian problems to large numbers of
innocent civilians", he lamented at the fact that
many of these detainees, in reaction to their
maltreatment, later joined Sunni terrorist groups
following their release.
Despite last
month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite shrine
and the tragic killings that followed, however,
there were also impressive signs of unity. In
cities throughout Iraq, Sunnis and Shi'ites
mobilized to protect each other's mosques and
neighborhoods.
Even the young firebrand
Shi'ite cleric Muqtada emphasized to his
followers, "It was not the Sunnis who attacked the
shrine ... but rather the occupation [forces] and
Ba'athists." He called on his followers not to
attack Sunni mosques and ordered his Mehdi Army to
"protect both Shi'ite and Sunni shrines". He went
on to say, "My message to the Iraqi people is to
stand united and bonded, and not to fall into the
Western trap. The West is trying to divide the
Iraqi people." In a later interview, Muqtada
claimed, "We say that the occupiers are
responsible for such crises [Golden Mosque
bombing] ... there is only one enemy. The
occupier."
Similarly, Sunnis were quick to
express their solidarity with Shi'ites in a series
of demonstrations in Samarra and elsewhere.
Anti-American signs and slogans permeated these
marches. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that
it was the US, not fellow Muslims or Iraqis, which
bears responsibility for the tragedy.
Even
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi claimed the
US was responsible for the bombing of the Golden
Mosque, "especially since occupation forces did
not comply with curfew orders imposed by the Iraqi
government". He added, "Evidence indicates that
the occupation may be trying to undermine and
weaken the Iraqi government."
Though
charges of a US conspiracy are presumably
groundless, it does underscore the growing
opposition by both communities to the ongoing US
military presence in their country and how the
United States has little credibility left with
either community as a mediator, peacekeeper,
overseer or anything else.
And it
underscores the urgency for the United States to
withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.
Stephen Zunes is Middle East
editor for Foreign Policy in Focus. He is a
professor of politics at the University of San
Francisco and the author of Tinderbox: US
Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism
(Common Courage Press, 2003).
