The fragile Euro-US 'alliance' on
Iran By Michael Flynn
GENEVA - As the United States began making
the case in the United Nations Security Council
this week for what its Ambassador John Bolton
calls "painful consequences" if Iran continues
with its controversial nuclear program, Washington
is facing a familiar dilemma: what to do if the
rest of the world refuses to go along?
Unlike in the debate preceding the war in
Iraq, the US and much of the world seem to agree
that something must be done to restrain Tehran.
However, there is no consensus on the question
of
just how "painful" the consequences should be. And
while its allies across the Atlantic have recently
joined the US in issuing strong statements about
Iran's activities, Europe remains largely divided
on how far it will follow Washington's line.
The five veto-holding UN Security Council
powers are struggling this week to come up with
text the council can issue aimed at curtailing
Iran's nuclear program without threatening
sanctions or other punitive measures. Russia and
China oppose a proposal from the US, Britain and
France for a presidential statement that would
express "serious concern" and urge Tehran to abide
by resolutions from the International Atomic
Energy Agency. An alternative is to call on Iran
to suspend uranium enrichment efforts, which the
West believes are a cover for a program to make
nuclear weapons.
In the US, the recent
rapprochement between the US and Europe has been
cited with we-told-you-so vindication. But
according to observers in Europe, the Euro-US
convergence on Iran is much thinner than it
appears. Europe's willingness to present a united
front with the US on Iran is driven by a number of
factors, they say, including mounting concern for
the US predicament in Iraq, the disappointing
outcomes of its negotiations with Iran, and the
fear that further destabilization in the Middle
East will have serious consequences for European
security.
None of these factors, however,
means that Europe sees Iran as an "enemy that must
be vanquished" - or that it views Washington's
"war on terror" with anything less than
skepticism. And solving the Iranian crisis, say
these observers, will likely hinge more on how far
Washington is willing to move toward a European
position rather than vice-versa.
Tim
Guldimann, a former Swiss ambassador to Iran and
currently a professor at the University of
Frankfurt who co-authored a recent report on the
Iranian nuclear situation by the International
Crisis Group (ICG), argues that the best way out
of the impasse is to forge an agreement that
recognizes an Iranian nuclear-fuel program as a
fait accompli.
"For two and a half years
now, Iran has been perfectly clear about its
intentions to have an enrichment program. But the
EU-3 [Germany, France and Britain] ignored this,
arguing that offering incentives and threatening
sanctions would eventually get Iran to stop its
enrichment program," Guldimann said. "Not
surprisingly, the Iranians rejected out of hand
this approach when it was proposed by the
Europeans last August."
Instead of
insisting that Iran relinquish enrichment, says
Guldimann, negotiators should propose a "delayed
limited enrichment program" as a potential
compromise.
According to the ICG report,
under such a program, "The wider international
community, and the West in particular, would
explicitly accept that Iran cannot only produce
peaceful nuclear energy but has the 'right to
enrich' domestically; in return, Iran would agree
to a several-year delay in the commencement of its
enrichment program, major limitations on its
initial size and scope, and a highly intrusive
inspections regime."
The problem with
this, says Guldimann, is that the US will never
get on board as long it remains steadfastly
opposed to any enrichment program. In Europe, on
the other hand, the reaction to the ICG report has
been at least cautiously curious.
Ultimately, says Guldimann, what Iran
seems to be pushing for is not the bomb itself,
but the capability to produce a bomb if the need
should arise. "The goal, which has not been
officially recognized, is to have the military
option, but not a bomb," he said. "The Iranians
were attacked by Iraq with weapons of mass
destruction; 600,000 died. When that happened they
stood alone, without the support from outside.
That history is critical in Iranian
considerations."
Mohammad-Reza Djalili, an
Iranian-born professor of history at the Graduate
Institute of International Studies in Geneva,
agrees. Djalili, who compares Iran's ambitions to
Israel's policy of nuclear "opacity" - neither
confirming nor denying the existence of its
arsenal - says that while Iran might seek a
nuclear weapons capability, it is not in its
interest actually to have the bomb.
"The
theoretical possibility of having a nuclear
arsenal goes a long way to giving Iran standing
both globally and regionally. At the same time, by
refraining from actually producing weapons, Iran
wouldn't provide sufficient rationale for its
neighbors [including Turkey and Saudi Arabia] to
build their own arsenals."
The author of
the 2005 book Geopolitique de l'Iran,
Djalili argues that Europe and the US need to view
the Iranian nuclear program within the larger
context of Tehran's evolving grand strategies,
which traditionally have included a "European
strategy" aimed at building relations with Europe
to counterbalance US antagonism and an "Eastern
strategy" intended to develop economic relations
with India, Russia and China.
Both
strategies, says Djalili, have at their root
Iran's preoccupation with the United States, which
has been a core concern since the Islamic
revolution.
In part because of the growing
nuclear crisis, he said, "what we are now
witnessing is the ultimate failure of the European
strategy, as Europe adopts a harder stance and
aligns itself closer to the United States".
How far Europe is willing to go to block
an Iranian enrichment program, he said, is another
matter altogether. While Europe and the United
States might agree on sanctions, it is hard to
imagine Europe supporting the use of force, "the
option pushed by some in the United States".
"My biggest concern is that this impasse
will drive some policymakers in the United States
to adopt the view pushed by neo-conservatives -
that is, to try to destabilize Iran by supporting
internal rebellions among different ethnic,
religious and political factions," he concluded.
"This would be disastrous, leading to still
further balkanization in the region, more
conflict, and more bloodshed."
Other
observers note that Europe should not be viewed as
a monolithic block, even if there has been
widespread consensus in support of the EU-3
negotiating efforts. Not only are there opposing
political currents among states on the continent,
there are competing agendas within individual
countries.
According to Jean Brincmont, a
Belgian theoretical physicist and author of
Imperialisme Humanitaire (2005), "There is
a struggle in Europe between pro and anti-US
opinions."
Further, many countries, such
as France, have shown a strong willingness to go
it alone in their foreign policies, which was seen
in President Jacques Chirac's recent declarations
about changes in his country's nuclear posture.
Citing the example of the pro-US and enormously
influential French Interior Minister Nicolas
Sarcozy, Brincmont argued that "France may
sometimes be divided over issues like Iran, but it
is by no means subservient to US positions".
The potential for fissures in the European
position was exhibited early this month in the
wake of allegations that Moscow had floated a
proposal to allow Iran to enrich a small amount of
uranium on its soil in exchange for delaying for
several years larger-scale production.
According to the March 6 New York Times,
European diplomats said the proposal was "driving
a wedge into what had been a relatively united
front on uranium enrichment in Iran". Germany is
cautiously supportive of Russia, they said, while
France and Britain are siding with the US.
Russia later disavowed the proposal. But
the Russian case highlights another complication
in any trans-Atlantic effort to resolve the crisis
- that Western powers do not hold all the cards.
"The West hasn't yet fully realized that
the world has changed," said Guldimann. "The
economic development of Asia, rising oil prices,
the emergence of Russia as a key negotiating
partner - all these things work against the idea
that we can impose an end to the enrichment
program, which is the preferred solution."
In contrast to US Vice President Dick
Cheney's statement that the "international
community is prepared to impose meaningful
consequences", Guldimann contended that while most
countries may pay lip service to the idea that
Iran should not have an enrichment program, "when
you put sanctions on the table things will fall
apart. China won't go along, nor will Russia or
India, or presumably Japan."
Brincmont
agreed, but said that ultimately, the
nuclear-power states have themselves to blame. "As
long as the great powers want to keep their bombs,
smaller powers will emerge asking for the same."
