SPEAKING
FREELY America's options for
Iran By Scott Bohlinger
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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As the nuclear
standoff between the US and Iran escalates,
American leaders would do well to look at the
range of options that exist for them. The options
consist of sanctions, military strikes, and a
change in policy. Sanctions and military strikes
would be counterproductive,
but US support for an Iranian civilian nuclear
capability could produce positive results for both
the United States and Iran.
Sanctions have
proved ineffective time and again and are not
likely to obtain a different outcome in the case
of Iran. Faced with shortages and economic
privations, the Iranian populace will blame the
West and cluster more closely around the current
regime.
Sanctions are also unlikely
because they would cut off Iranian oil. China
would never tolerate this because of its
dependency on Iranian oil, and the US economy
could not bear the increase in the cost of oil.
Iraq also taught us that sanctions could also
serve as a fertile breeding ground for corruption
and allow the government further leverage in
exercising its power. Also, the US cannot leverage
Iranian access to America's vast economy because
it has already been closed to Iran for 27 years.
Military strikes would be a godsend for
the regime in Iran, especially the hardliners that
the United States most fears. Targeted strikes on
several key installations might indeed disrupt the
nuclear program, but again these would generate
immense consequences for the US and its allies.
Military strikes would create ill-will from
ordinary Iranians and extend indefinitely the
lifetime of the regime. Such strikes also would
not be enough to topple the regime and no
government now has the manpower or will for such
an occupation.
To the degree that military
strikes would be successful and would manage to
destabilize the regime, US foreign policy would be
faced with a vortex of anarchy stretching from
Islamabad to Damascus. The internal chaos in Iran
in the early 1980s showed how deep and virulent
Iran's ideological divisions can be. All of these
divisions could be strengthened or influenced by
elements outside of Iran were the regime to
collapse. This, coupled with the potential for
ethnic unrest from the almost 50% of Iran that is
not Persian, could lead the country into a long
civil war. Furthermore, even if a stable regime
were to emerge, there is no guarantee that it
would be a more responsible international citizen.
Iran has far more power to cause harm and
pain to the US and its allies than they can
inflict on it. Iran has the ability to destabilize
Afghanistan and Iraq decisively before it even
nudges the valve on its huge energy supplies. US
officials have acknowledged a heavy degree of
Iranian infiltration in Iraq and independent
analysts tend to think it is even greater than
that. The Iranian presence in Iraq is not
nefarious, but it is a major fact on the ground
that the US and its allies cannot ignore.
The United States does not want a nuclear
Iran, but it cannot bear failed states in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Even if Iran were to develop nuclear
weapons, further destabilization would be a far
more dangerous outcome. A nuclear weapon in Iran
would be in the hands of a regime that is not
losing its grip. Unlike the case of Pakistan,
where the highest officials used proliferation to
line their pockets, Iran has every interest in and
ability to keep its technology under wraps and not
let it slip into the hands of non-state actors.
Iran's underlying issues and need for
unlimited access to its own fuel cycle are less
psychological than the outcome of a rational
cost-benefit analysis. It would be easy to
ridicule Iran's vast reserve of conspiracy
theories, if so many hadn't come true. Thanks to a
combination of natural wealth and strategic
location, Iran has been riven by international
intrigue in a way that few other places have been.
The worst episode concerned the British-
and US-backed toppling of the democratically
elected nationalist prime minister, Mohammed
Mossadegh, in 1953. After the shah's
reinstatement, capitulations were granted to
foreign personnel - a practice long abolished with
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of
World War I. Taken together, such policies have
done wonders to promote a deep-seated and
well-founded suspicion of policies that seek to
limit Iran's strategic range. On the day the US
Embassy was overrun in 1979, its ambassador was to
be found in the office of the foreign minister of
the provisional government; the purpose of that
visit was to discuss a reinstatement of
capitulations and special privileges for US
personnel.
Despite the state of relations,
the US generously allows Iranian diplomatic
personnel in its country. Simultaneously, however,
Iran understandably cannot risk having American
diplomats on its soil. Added to this is the
traumatic legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, with its
hundreds of thousands dead and sense of
victimization and isolation at the hands of the
international community.
Iran's bottom
line is complete control over the fuel-production
cycle. The hope of much of the international
community that Iran halt all nuclear activity is
not producing any movement toward that outcome,
nor is the Russian proposal to enrich uranium on
its soil. The option is for the US to remain quiet
and take as little action as possible.
Yet
if US policymakers feel compelled to speak out,
there is one counter-intuitive approach that could
prove effective. This approach would involve far
more than saying, "We understand your security
concerns," it would entail actually understanding
them and then taking measures in that direction,
unilaterally, and without regard for Iran's
reactions or the possibility of rapprochement with
its government.
There are few ways for the
US to get ahead without an outcome that mutually
benefits Iran. A win-win strategy would be to be
wholeheartedly to support Iran's access to the
fuel cycle and the development its own civilian
nuclear program under the International Atomic
Energy Agency inspection regime. From a cynical
point of view, this would call Iran's supposed
bluff - that it only wants nuclear fuel for
civilian purposes. After being given the same
level of trust and responsibilities as any other
state, denying access to the inspectors or playing
games would ring hollow.
Such a move would
show Iranians that the US is not their enemy. This
idea is not without illusions. With a civilian
nuclear program, Iran would be in a position to
drop out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and weaponize in very short order. The US,
however, has a unique ability to stop the process
from ever reaching weaponization by taking away
many of the concerns that drive that desire.
Without the US threatening violence and regime
change, Iran will lose the major threat to its
existence.
For weaponization finally to
occur, there are some hurdles that Iran must
overcome. These two hurdles are the nature of
support for the nuclear program and the religious
establishment's views on the legality of such a
program.
It is well known that the vast
majority of Iranians favor their country having a
domestic nuclear capability. What is far less
certain is how many people really support nuclear
weaponization. In all likelihood, the number is a
small minority (though it could easily gain
popular support if the US threatens military
action, engages in covert activities, or plays
ball with terrorist organizations such as the
Mojahedin-e Khalq). The Iranian public is
relatively intelligent, well informed, and very
cognizant of the dangers of proliferation. The US
could do a lot to support this attitude by openly
encouraging Iran along the peaceful path and in
doing so tacitly acknowledging that a world that
is safe for Iran is also safe for the United
States.
Policymakers and analysts
frequently underestimate the degree of debate
within Iran's conservative circles. Even if this
debate is not proceeding under optimal conditions
of transparency, accountability, and rule of law,
it is still far-ranging. One factor in this debate
is clerical rulings against nuclear weapons. One
such ruling comes from none other than Grand
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself. The strongest
proponents of nuclear weaponization in Iran are
not the highest-ranking members of the Shi'ite
clergy. There is no reason to believe that the
religious establishment would roll over and change
tact just because its nominal allies say so.
The party line of Iran's regime is that it
is only seeking energy for civilian nuclear
purposes. Yet behind the scenes there is a detente
that is delaying a potential political
confrontation until a later date. Supporting a
civilian nuclear program would highlight
differences within segments of the ruling elite,
some of whom would have to find new and clever
ways to admit that Iran wants more than just
nuclear energy. More open differences would then
proffer more opportunities for political change
within Iran.
By supporting Iran's domestic
nuclear capability, the US could overcome fears
held by even the most pro-Western Iranians that
the United States is against their power and
prestige. Such a change in policy would also
separate the majority of the population, who still
see the US as a land of good governance and
opportunities, from the minority who view the US
as an aggressor. Doing so would call the bluff of
this minority who want nuclear weapons, by forcing
them to adhere to their stated purpose of civilian
capabilities.
This would be a radical
shift in foreign policy, but it is the only
available strategy that could prevail for the US.
The other option is for US officials to sit back,
take a deep breath, relax, and then do nothing.
Either way, a beneficial outcome for US and
Iranian interests is possible. The alternatives -
belligerent statements, sanctions, and military
strikes - all range their outcomes from
unproductive to unthinkable.
Scott
Bohlinger is a Washington, DC-based analyst
specializing in the Middle East, most specifically
Iran. He also currently works at Jane's
Intelligence Group.
(Copyright 2006
Scott Bohlinger.)
Speaking Freely is
an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
