The US military is now
fighting with Shi'ite militias, raising the
question of whether this is a deliberate attempt
by the Bush administration to diminish the power
of these militias, or an unwitting consequence of
appearing to be impartial in the growing sectarian
violence in the country. Either way, the result is
that the US is alienating Shi'ites, on whom they
have, up to now, pinned most of their hopes for
stabilizing the country.
On Sunday, at
least 40 Iraqis were killed after elite US and
Iraqi troops staged an operation in Sadr City in
Baghdad, the stronghold of influential Shi'ite
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his
Mehdi Army, a militia with
which the US has clashed before. Police said the
incident erupted after the Mehdi Army tried to
stop troops from entering a mosque, but accounts
vary widely.
The United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA), the dominant Shi'ite bloc in parliament,
called for the US to turn over control of all
security operations to the Iraqi government, while
some UIA politicians said they would pull out of
the talks to form a government.
Shi'ites
in Iraq look on US forces in their country as a
necessary evil: a reality that will help cement
their rule, but still an "evil" force given its
pro-Israeli posture. The Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, the powerful cleric to whom Shi'ites
defer, probably has the best idea of exploiting
the American presence in his country: he has used
it to institutionalize Shi'ite dominance, with a
clear Islamist twist.
The fly in the
ointment, from the Shi'ite perspective, was the
decision of Sunnis in January to participate in
elections. Consequently, they emerged as a
respectable bloc, with every intention of becoming
involved in the intricate game of
coalition-building following the elections. This
process is still under way.
In this sense,
the elections became extremely crucial. The UIA
lost its dominance of the previous election. So
did the Kurds. However, in the horse-trading to
choose a premier, a major split emerged among the
Shi'ites and between the Kurds when Ibrahim
al-Jaafari was elected by one vote, after Muqtada
supported him.
Kurdish President Jalal
Talabani, although he holds a largely ceremonial
position, was unhappy with the choice of Jaafari,
and has said he will not accept him. These are
some of the undercurrents that are playing an
important role in the inability of the various
Iraqi factions to formulate a national government.
To understand the growing US-Shi'ite rift,
one has to keep several factors in mind. The Bush
administration is increasingly wary of the growing
power of Muqtada. The young and relatively junior
cleric has proved to be an adept political actor.
By maneuvering the election of Jaafari as prime
minister designate, he clearly established himself
as a power that the US military had to reckon
with.
He also started making confusing
statements regarding Iran, with which the US has
signaled it will hold talks on Iraq's future.
Muqtada has stated that Iraq would not follow the
Iranian example of adopting a
vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the clergy) model
of governance. On other occasions, he showed a
clear affinity toward Iran by stating that any US
attack on Iran would be deemed as an attack on
Shi'ite identity.
Muqtada has also made a
point of building an alliance with Sunni groups.
The Sunnis don't exactly trust him, but they have
ample reason to have more positive feelings toward
him than toward other Shi'ite leaders who are much
closer to Iran. These Shi'ites also want Iraq to
be carved into virtually independent zones,
something that would marginalize the Sunnis,
certainly economically, as they would be excluded
from oil-rich areas.
As the US becomes
focused on creating a "national unity" government,
Muqtada's role is appearing as a major obstacle.
Besides, the bloody role played by Shi'ite
militias in Iraq has also provided ample reasons
for the US military to confront the Mehdi Army.
Sunday's clash might have been the moment of
showdown that most observers have been expecting.
Whether this is an isolated incident, or
the beginning of an era of confrontation between
Shi'ites and US forces, is unclear. There is
little doubt, though, that US forces have shown
their resolve to confront Muqtada.
Considering the growing combustibility of
the political situation in Iraq and amid
increasing speculation about the outbreak of
full-blown civil war, the last thing the Bush
administration needed was to confront Shi'ite
forces. But this is exactly what is developing.
In the wake of the explosion at the
Shi'ite Golden Dome in Samarra last month, US
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad has urged
Shi'ite leaders to be politically accommodating
toward Sunnis, even as the incident inflamed
sectarian violence between the groups.
However, the Shi'ites are depicting the US
diplomat's suggestion as an appeasement of Sunnis.
Thus, Sunday's raid is being interpreted by
Shi'ites as more evidence of strong-arm tactic
used by the US government to force a concession
from them regarding Sunnis, including the "real"
objective of the Bush administration - to drop
Jaafari as the nominee of the UIA for prime
minister.
The most important aspect of the
growing rift between the US and Shi'ites is that
Sistani's reaction has not been forthcoming. It
appears that he is unwilling to show his hand
until he is convinced who is at fault in this
latest development. Sistani is no fan of the
American forces, but he is not likely to be
critical of the Americans at this sensitive time.
There is little doubt that the Americans
are not interested in unnecessarily inflaming the
situation by confronting Muqtada. At the same
time, they are not likely to back down if there is
no unity government within the next few days. The
chief culprits, in their estimation, are Muqtada,
his Mehdi Army and other Shi'ite militias.
They seem to have concluded that they have
reached a point when they must confront or even
help the Iraqi security forces in dismantling
these militias, and as they do this they are
likely to realize that, in most instances, the
Iraqi security forces are an extension of these
Shi'ite militias.
Ehsan Ahrari
is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be
reached at eahrari@cox.net or
stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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