A
newly leaked confidential British memorandum is
important not only for what was discussed between
London and Washington over Iraq, but the insight
it provides about the ongoing conflict between the
US and Iran over Tehran's nuclear
program.
The memorandum, according to the
The New York Times this week, details
conversations during a private two-hour meeting
between President George W Bush and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair in the Oval Office on January
31, 2003.
Damning memo The
memo, penned by David Manning, Blair's chief
foreign policy adviser at the time, provides a
rare insight into the state of mind of the two
leaders, who were ready to go war and expected a
quick victory. They were right in that judgment.
However, they were sadly wrong in dismissing the
possibility of "internecine warfare between the
different religious and ethnic
groups".
Bush reportedly discussed "three
possible ways" to provoke confrontation with the
Saddam Hussein regime. His first suggestion was to
fly U-2 spy aircraft over Iraq painted in United
Nations colors. The memo reports Bush as saying,
"If Saddam fired on them he would be in breach."
His second suggestion was to bring out Iraqi
defectors, who would give public testimony about
Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. His
third proposal was to assassinate the Iraqi
dictator.
Where the British premier
differed from Bush, according to the memo, was on
the necessity of getting a second UN resolution.
Bush made it clear to Blair that he was determined
to invade Iraq without a UN resolution.
And
the memo shows that the president and the prime
minister acknowledged that no unconventional
weapons had been found inside Iraq, and this just
days before then US secretary of state Colin
Powell was scheduled to appear before the UN to
present evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world
security by having unconventional weapons.
Further, the US did not have a
post-conflict plan for Iraq, a reality that
appears to have contributed to the present
imbroglio in the country.
Implications
for Iran In the ongoing rift between the US
and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, the
Bush administration has frequently used the
diplomatic version of threats by stating that "all
options are on the table". What is working for
Iran is that Washington has been much discredited
and ridiculed over its unilateral decision to
invade Iraq. What is especially favoring Iran is
that the Bush administration is finding out each
day of its occupation of Iraq is that it is easy
to invade a Muslim state, but not ruling
it.
Perhaps given the Iraqi experience,
Bush is showing restraint in threatening Iran.
However, no one should be surprised if contingency
plans are already in preparation for possible
military action. In short, the Bush administration
could pursue the following options.
First,
it would work hard to persuade China and Russia to
go along with some punitive economic sanctions.
Iran is hoping that neither of those two countries
will go along with the US. But it is also
conducting its own behind-the-scenes canvassing
with these countries. Even if Beijing and Moscow
were to go along with Washington's desire for
imposing economic sanctions, they would still want
ironclad guarantees that the Bush administration
would not use that as UN "endorsement" of military
action against Iran, as it did in the case of
Iraq.
Second, the US is likely to seek some
sort of a unified stand from the Gulf States
against Iran's nuclear program, even though it has
repeatedly said that its ambitions are for civil,
not military power. These states have adopted a
measured reaction on the issue thus far. But no
one should underestimate what the US can achieve
when it applies ample pressure on Gulf monarchies.
Iran is fully aware of this reality and might be
doing its own bidding, using back
channels.
Third, the US has not entirely
given up on using the EU-3 (France, Germany and
Britain) card. There is some chance that the EU-3
might be able to persuade Iran to give up its
uranium enrichment program. Talks between Tehran
and the EU-3 have stalled after many months of
negotiations.
The EU-3 may have to rethink
the size of the economic payoffs for Iran if it
agrees to go along. In addition, Iran would want
security guarantees from the US, which the EU-3
might be able to persuade Washington to offer. The
trans-Atlantic relationship between the US and
Western European countries has come a long way
from the dark days following the US invasion of
Iraq.
Finally, if all else fails, the Bush
administration might rely on Israeli willingness
to carry out a preemptive attack on Iranian
nuclear facilities. Here also, what favors Iran is
the fact that its nuclear facilities are purposely
built in heavily populated areas. Israel would
thus have to think long and hard about "collateral
damage" before carrying out
attacks.
Conclusion The fact
that the US has not already rushed into a war with
Iran shows that the cavalier approach used in Iraq
has been tempered. The Iraqi adventure has taught
one cruel lesson: the US's military capabilities
to create a quick victory have very little
stabilizing effect in a conquered land. This
reality might be serving as the most constraining
factor on Bush as he contemplates
Iran.
Nevertheless, one has no real idea on
how serious the Bush administration really is
about closing the nuclear option for Iran, and
that the measured steps now being taken
diplomatically might simply be a response to the
headlong rush to war in Iraq, but with the same
end result as the objective.
Ehsan
Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an
Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He
can be reached at eahrari@cox.net or
stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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