Francis Fukuyama's latest book, America
at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the
Neo-conservative Legacy, [1] provides a good
partial insight into why the neo-conservative
movement within the United States is in a state of
bewilderment.
Paraphrasing the old adage
that those who live by the sword must be prepared
to die by it, the neo-cons' strong emphasis on the
use of military power made the continued
popularity of their
philosophy highly contingent
on success in Iraq. With this not happening,
serious questions are being raised about the very
soundness of their philosophy.
Such
questions become especially compelling when one of
their own raises them. In this sense, people who
care to know about what went wrong in Iraq - or
what is fundamentally wrong with the frame of
reference of the neo-cons - should closely read
Fukuyama's book.
The first and foremost
reason for the mounting sense of irrelevance of
the neo-cons is America's growing troubles in Iraq
and the implications for the entire Middle East.
The "shock and awe" created by America's mighty
military in Iraq was drowned out soon after by the
cries of "tyranny" and "occupation" from the
dungeons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.
The
US found itself on the defensive. The incidents of
abuse of Iraqi prisoners, insisted President
George W Bush, did not reflect what the United
States stood for in the world. But it became clear
soon enough that the requirements of gaining
timely intelligence from those prisoners and
detainees acquired a life and urgency of their
own. The sad reality is that those requirements
were set at the highest echelons of
decision-making of the US.
To create a
semblance of justice, a few soldiers were sent to
prison because they were stupid enough to be
caught in the act of abuse on camera, and a
one-star general was demoted to the rank of
colonel. However, three- or four-star generals and
their senior civilian masters were either not
tried or not given thorough scrutiny for their
alleged dereliction of duty or complicity in the
abuse of prisoners.
The uppermost question
inside the US related to the systematic abuse of
those "detainees" and prisoners was, whatever
happened to American exceptionalism? Who turned
off the lights of that "shiny city on the hill"
about which Ronald Reagan used to get misty-eyed?
The due process of law, the Fourth Amendment to
the US constitution and the entire Bill of Rights
of the same document became merely an afterthought
to the "warriors" belonging to the neo-cons' rank
and file.
Most of those "warriors" - aptly
described as "chicken hawks" - were never exposed
to a battlefield, even for one day of their lives.
The chief chicken hawk, Vice President Dick
Cheney, spent a great part of his draft age
seeking deferments to avoid being sent to Vietnam.
However, as vice president, he emerged as the most
determined advocate of sending other people's sons
and daughters to the killing fields of Iraq.
And Iraq did become a killing field for
Iraqis and Americans. But the neo-cons remained
blase. They were still insisting, according to
Fukuyama, that the internal character of a regime
was the key to its internal behavior, thereby
arguing for "regime change", even when the outcome
of that policy in Iraq had turned out so bloody
and uncertain.
If changing the internal
character of a regime were to become the chief
driving force for America's foreign policy, how
many regimes should it topple? And where should it
draw the line? One apparent answer for the
neo-cons - even though none among them is bold
enough to say it - is that the US should oust all
Muslim dictators. But the example of Iraq has
proved that it cannot be done through military
power alone.
There is a world of
difference between ousting an established
government through military action and ruling it
as an occupying power. Besides, if such a campaign
were to begin, it would only prove the point of
the Islamists of the Middle East that the US is
waging a war against Islam.
A thoughtful
aspect of Fukuyama's discussion regards US power
as a tool for moral ends, a decidedly unappealing
argument for his neo-con cohorts. However, an
emphasis on moral ends is also problematic, for
there cannot be an end to such a purpose. After
making moral ends the basis of conducting
America's foreign policy, one cannot start making
exceptions when encountering a series of "immoral
regimes". The world has more than its fair share
at a given time. However, once such an exception
is made, its critics may condemn the entire basis
of morality.
Former US president Jimmy
Carter tried to make exceptions after initiating a
voluble campaign for human rights on a global
basis during the beginning of his administration.
Those exceptions were Iran and China. Iran became
an Islamic republic during the waning days of his
presidency, in 1979. In fact, Iran was the chief
reason Carter was not re-elected. Even after a
major political change in the nature of its
regime, Iran remains a violator of human rights,
as does the People's Republic of China.
Fukuyama's chief criticism of his fellow
neo-cons of the Bush administration is related to
the fact that they were obsessed about toppling a
nasty regime in Iraq, but paid no attention to the
formidable task of "social engineering" (that is,
nation-building) once that regime was toppled.
However, in this "crime of omission",
there is ample blame to go around. The US neo-cons
- whose knowledge of the Middle East was at best
superficial - should not be blamed for their
ignorance as much as the Iraqi expatriates. This
latter bunch was made up of Iraqis, but only by
birth. They had lived in the West far too long to
comprehend the intricacies and nuances of the
workings of their country.
Besides, most
of them were largely interested in pursuing
personal grandeur, the stuff of which all Middle
Eastern dictators are made. The foremost neo-cons
of the Bush administration - such as Cheney and
former deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz
- and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on the
contrary, were not at all concerned by the
personal greed of the would-be dictators of Iraq.
For them, the ouster of Saddam Hussein was the
chief driving force. And that objective was also
driving Bush.
The neo-cons also behaved as
if the process of rebuilding Iraq would be
automatic. The US would destroy a regime and the
international community would come to the rescue
of Iraqis soon thereafter and would eagerly clean
up the mess, or so they thought.
However,
the world had a nasty surprise for them. The mess
that the Bush administration created in Iraq was
only to be cleaned up by the US and Britain. A few
other countries, including Australia, Japan and
Italy, would be there to show support; however,
none would invest its material resources and shed
the blood of its youth as much as the United
States.
Fukuyama is right in emphasizing
America's "soft power" to promote democracy in the
Middle East and, by extension, in the world of
Islam at large. But he is patently wrong in
assuming that liberalism will emerge as a powerful
idea in the Middle East or in other Muslim
countries. He is also wrong in asserting that
jihadism is a byproduct of modernization and
globalization.
If the emergence of
liberalism means rewriting Islamic theological
principles to make it look like the Christianity
of the 21st century, then liberalism has no future
in the Muslim world. However, if it means a
process of incremental reforms to bring about
gender equality, modernizing educational
curricula, and changing the very nature of
governments to reflect the will of the people,
liberalism holds great promise.
As an idea
that promotes popular participation and freedom of
choice, democracy may only be promoted in the
world of Islam through public diplomacy. However,
it should be clearly understood that such an
approach is starkly different from the kind
promoted by the Bush administration: a kind of
bumper-sticker slogan based on a simplistic public
relations campaign carried out previously by
Charlotte Beers and Margaret Tutwiler, and now by
Karen Hughes, under the secretary of state.
The current administration has only been
paying lip service to the notion of public
diplomacy while creating ample disconcert in the
Middle East by its persistent reiteration of
"regime change" and "preemption". These concepts
provided short-term military victory. However, in
both Iraq and Afghanistan it has been proved that
the long-term outcome of the use of those concepts
is nothing but increasing political instability, a
patent absence of government legitimacy, and the
rising tide of insurgency.
The direly
needed public diplomacy should be practiced though
the use of public and private channels and through
endless and intricate discussions governing the
modalities of political changes affecting Muslim
countries. The idea of democracy has a universal
appeal when it is promoted thoughtfully and
persistently.
Finally, global jihadism is
not a byproduct of modernization and
globalization. Rather, it is just one militant
voice complaining about the current plight of
Muslims. The jihadis equally blame the West and
extant dictatorial regimes for the backwardness of
their polities. Yet they erroneously claim that
the solution to their problems rests in going back
to the ways of the 7th century. In this sense the
jihadis' methods are wrong-headed, but their
questions about the gross backwardness of their
polities receive a very large sympathetic audience
in the world of Islam.
Muslims at large
reject the murderous ways of jihadis. But they
don't question the legitimacy of such questions as
to why aren't Muslim states at the top of the
hierarchy of power. Jihadis may not be best at
articulating these aspects of Muslim frustrations.
They are only repeating simple religious
phraseologies such as "Islam is the solution".
It is possible that at least the political
discourse started by the jihadis will be taken
over by Muslims residing in the West, under the
general rubric of ijtihad (renewal). The
Muslim world is currently abuzz with suggestions
for the necessity for and, indeed, imminence of
the renewal of Islam.
What is not clear is
who (that is, which group) will gain an upper hand
in such debates. If the proponents of
ijtihad were to succeed in not only leading
the debate over ijtihad but also in
focusing on the right set of issues, the political
dynamics of the Middle East and, indeed, of the
whole world of Islam would begin to change
perceptibly.
Note 1.
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power,
and the Neo-conservative Legacy by Francis
Fukuyama. Yale University Press (February 2006).
ISBN: 0300113994. Price US$25, hardcover 240
pages.
Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO
of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be
reached at eahrari@cox.netor stratparadigms@yahoo.com.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online.
His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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