THE
ROVING EYE Real men go to
Khuzestan By Pepe Escobar
TEHRAN - When it comes to Iran, the
widespread belief is that the United States cannot
possibly occupy the country - it's the size of
France, Britain, Italy and Spain combined - and
thus exercise the avowed White House goal of
regime change.
The next best thing - from
the point of view of armchair warriors - would be
subversion from within. Pentagon chief Donald
Rumsfeld, in a widely distributed opinion piece a
few months ago, stated that should the US attack
Iran, ethnic minorities "might
welcome the humiliation of
their oppressors", that is, the Persians. Nonsense
replays itself, as in the US supposedly being
greeted as the "liberator" of Iraq.
In the
overdrive run-up to the attack on Iraq in 2003,
the ultimate neo-conservative mantra was "Real men
go to Khuzestan." Indeed, some of of these "real
men" may already have been there. The Iranian
government is convinced US, British and/or Israeli
special ops have been conducted on Iran's western
and southeastern borders, at least since early
2005.
Significantly, the new US budget
calls for additional funds to special operations
and psy-ops (psychological operations) in Iran, in
addition to the US$75 million the administration
of President George W Bush wants to spend to
advance "regime change". For their part, the US
marines have commissioned Hicks and Associates, a
subsidiary of Science Applications International
Corp, one of the biggest US defense contractors
and heavily involved in the Iraq invasion, to
carry out in-depth research into Iranian ethnic
groups.
The ultimate prize is Khuzestan
province, where 90% of Iran's oil is located and
which provides the country with 80% of its funds
from oil production. In January, Tehran announced
it had evidence of British special ops and
bombings in Khuzestan, starting last year. Two
Iranian Arabs were hanged in public for bombing a
bank in the provincial capital Ahvaz in January.
Three others were executed in a local prison.
At least 50 Arabs were accused as
perpetrators of bombings that killed 21 people
last April - after an "official" (but unconfirmed)
letter was leaked with detailed plans for the
ethnic cleansing of Arabs in Khuzestan. President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad has already had to cancel three
trips to Ahvaz at the last minute.
The
province could not be more sensitive. Iran's
second nuclear reactor will be built in Khuzestan.
During an extended Nauroz - the Persian New Year -
which in many cases goes on until early April -
the Revolutionary Guards promote instructive
Khuzestan tours to huge groups from all over the
country, who are bused to battle sites of the
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. As many as 2 million
people a year may participate in these tours.
During this period special permits are not issued
for the foreign press.
John Bradley was
one of the few foreign journalists to be allowed
in Khuzestan last month. In a dirt-poor Arab
village near Ahvaz, crossed by pipelines supplying
crude oil to the huge Abadan refinery (450,000
barrels a day), Bradley saw Iranian Arabs
complaining that "we are standing on all of the
country's wealth, and yet we get no benefit from
it". [1] Unemployment is rife, Farsi is the only
language taught in local schools, and no
Arab-language newspapers are allowed. The
pipelines have already been bombed - last
September. One month later, Tehran announced it
had cracked a plot to bomb Abadan with five
Katyusha rockets.
Welcome to the Ahwazi
intifada There is speculation in Tehran
that al-Qaeda may be courting Arab tribal leaders
in Khuzestan as part of its broader strategy of
sabotaging oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf
region. Exiled Khuzestanis for their part pin
their hopes on an "Ahwazi intifada" (Ahvaz, the
Farsi name, is "Ahwaz" in Arabic). The official
Iranian government position remains that this
would-be intifada is being conducted from Iraq -
with substantial help by Britain, Canada and the
US.
Trying to defuse the situation, Tehran
argues that nine of Khuzestan's 17 members of the
majlis (parliament) are Arabs, and Arabs are
posted in senior positions both in Khuzestan and
in Tehran. But the root of the problem - which is
economic - remains. According to the Islamic
Majlis Center for Research - a government
think-tank - Tehran must do everything in its
power to fight poverty in its ultra-sensitive
non-Persian areas, as well as youth unemployment
nationwide.
We will Persianize you
Khuzestan shares a land, river and sea
border with Iraq. Saddam Hussein posed as a
self-styled "liberator" of Arabistan - as Arabs
call the province - during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
War. He embarked on a wide-ranging campaign to
encourage local Shi'ites to rebel against the
Islamic Republic. They didn't. The logic of war
led to the destruction of Abadan and its refinery,
and the devastation of Khorramshar and its port.
Today, still because of the war, Khuzestan is
almost enclosed in a shell. It used to be totally
open to the outside world.
The groups
living in Khuzestan have lived and traded together
for centuries. They have a common history that
reaches beyond ethnic rivalry. Many non-Persian
dynasties have ruled for centuries. It's true that
most of Iran's population whose mother language is
not Farsi lives in the border areas - Azeris,
Kurds, Turkmens, Balochis and Arabs. But their
identity is always imprinted under Iran, not in a
separatist vein.
Iran has a strong
capacity of assimilation, synthesis, cultural
appropriation and Iranization. Alexander the Great
brought Hellenism to the heart of the Persian
Empire, and was totally Persianized afterward.
Iran's Islamization after the Arab invasions was
counteracted by its tremendous intellectual,
artistic and scientific pull, which influenced the
whole Muslim world. Iranian Islam is really
something else. Turks and Mongols were also
Persianized and became promoters and ambassadors
of Persian language, culture, art and literature.
The former foreign minister (under
ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) and current secretary
general of the opposition party, the Freedom
Movement of Iran, Ebrahim Yazdi, nuances the
explosive situation according to different Iranian
borders. "People in Khuzestan complain about lack
of freedom and economic development, and
unemployment. Azeris are not independentists.
Kurds are not for separation. With Arab
governments it's different. They directly support
separation in Khuzestan - ever since [Gamal Abdel]
Nasser, [Hafez] Assad, [Muammar] Gaddafi, Saddam
Hussein. No Arab country will complain when there
are disturbances."
Moreover, "Americans
and Pakistanis are against separation in Pakistani
Balochistan. Once again, it's different as far as
Khuzestan is concerned."
Yazdi sees many
dangers in the venomous atmosphere of mutual
accusations between Tehran on the one side and
Washington and London on the another. Ahmadinejad
has publicly accused the British in Iraq of
"hiring terrorists for sabotage". Yazdi added that
the US "could be tempted to try a real
interventionist policy. If the Iranians are
challenging the US, they must be prepared to react
and defend themselves against the other side."
The crucial fact remains that any US
interventionist dream of the "real men go to
Khuzestan" kind is doomed. It will generate even
more passionate Iranian nationalism, not to
mention a nationwide and potentially bloody
backlash against Arab Iranians, who will then be
inevitably regarded as traitors in collusion with
the Anglo-Americans.
