Coup and counter-coup: The struggle
for Iraq By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Amid all the political
confusion in Iraq, Baghdad is swirling with rumors
that former prime minister Iyad Allawi is planning
a military coup to end the gridlock over the
choice of Ibrahim al-Jaafari as prime
minister-designate.
Allawi's group
currently has 25 seats in the 275-seat parliament
- not enough to realize the former prime
minister's ambitions through democratic and legal
means, justifying, perhaps, a military coup to
achieve them by force.
The speculation is
that Allawi will use the armed forces to seize
power and topple the stubborn Jaafari, who insists
on staying in power (he was premier in the
previous administration) although he
has
lost support of everybody around him, including
the Americans, the British, the Sunnis, the Kurds,
the seculars and some of the Shi'ites in his own
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). His only remaining
supporters are the Da'wa Party, which he heads,
and the rebel-cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
With
strong American support, Allawi would prop himself
up as prime minister, and probably take over the
Ministry of Defense or Interior as well, then
create a mini-dictatorship where he would unleash
hell on his enemies: the former Ba'athists, the
Sunni insurgency of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
pro-Iran officials of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), the Badr
Brigade and Muqtada al-Sadr.
Allawi said
last month that the sectarian killing in the
country amounted to a "civil war".
US
President George W Bush warned on Wednesday that
Iraqis must move quickly to form a new government
as the "vacuum in the political process" would
produce further instability and violence in the
country.
Negotiations to form a government
headed by Jaafari have been in a stalemate for
four months since elections for the country's
first full-term parliament after the US-led
invasion in 2003.
A coup is undemocratic
of course, but it is one way to bring order to a
war-torn country. Allawi would pledge to restore
Iraq's parliament, which is packed with pro-Iran
politicians and clerics, but not before Iraqi
society was pulled back together - with force and
determination. "Security first, democracy second"
would be his motto.
Allawi has naturally
denied rumors of a coup. In an interview with the
London-based Al-Hayat newspaper on Wednesday he
said, "I never had faith in coups, which brought
nothing but catastrophes to our people (in
reference to the military coups that have rocked
Iraq since the revolution of 1958)."
He
dropped a confusing remark, however, saying that
although he would not support a military putsch,
he nevertheless did not believe that pure
democracy was compatible with Iraqi politics.
Allawi noted, "One cannot bring American democracy
to a country that is occupied like Iraq, and whose
infrastructure, as well as military and
governmental institutions, have been destroyed."
He added, "I warned the Americans
repeatedly from trying to model Iraq on the social
and administrative system in the United States."
Allawi was saying that a military coup was not
desirable, but neither was the chaos existing in
Iraq today. This chaos under Jaafari, he said,
"where the government turns a blind eye to the
militias ... has led Iraq to a disaster".
At first glance, the idea of a coup seems
very ugly. It was the coups, after all, and
ambitious and power-crazy officers who led them in
the 1960s that paved the way for Saddam Hussein to
take power in 1979.
But a coup - or some
kind of coup, not necessarily military - is needed
to end the almost comical political gridlock and
which shows no signs of being resolved.
Despite the clamor for him to step down,
Jaafari, acting in a manner well known in the Arab
world, stubbornly insists on clinging to power,
claiming that he is the choice of the Iraqi
people. He was chosen by the Shi'ite bloc that won
the most votes in the December elections, although
not enough to form a government without support
from the Kurds or the Sunnis, hence the impasse.
Meanwhile, everybody is meddling in Iraq
affairs: the Iranians, the Syrians, the Americans
and the British. While the politicians bicker,
about 25 people are dying each day. Death squads
such as the Mehdi Army and the Badr Organization
roam the streets, killing innocent Shi'ites and
Sunnis at will.
Jaafari has done nothing
to end the violence. The Sunnis don't want him
because he failed to protect their leaders and
places of worships after sectarian violence hit
Iraq in February. At that time a terrorist bombing
targeted a holy Shi'ite shrine in Samarra. Without
a shred of evidence, Shi'ite leaders called for
reprisal attacks against Sunnis. Jaafari did
nothing to stop them.
His allies at the
Ministry of Interior continue to stall proper
patrolling of the streets, and accusations are
mounting in Baghdad that Shi'ite officials at the
ministry are still using their posts to persecute,
arrest and torture traditional enemies in the
Sunni community. Allawi claimed that from day one
of Jaafari's term as prime minister, his loyalists
fired some of Iraq's best troops at the Ministry
of Interior because they were not sectarian.
Allawi revealed in Al-Hayat that Jaafari
had sacked "170 of the finest officers specialized
in security affairs". Some of them, he added, had
been replaced by clerics. Allawi asked, "Is it
possible to give a senior military rank to a
turbaned sheikh only because he is a sheikh?" He
pointing out, "With all our respect for religious
figures, such a post requires specialists." He
wrapped up describing the situation under Jaafari
by saying, "Loyalty to the nation in the armed
forces has dropped in favor of loyalty to a
political group inside a certain sect [the
pro-Iran religious Shi'ites]), and not the sect in
general."
The Kurds also support Allawi
and don't want to work with Jaafari because he is
allied to Muqtada, who in turn is opposed to any
kind of federalism in Iraq, including that of
Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds, along with secular
allies like Allawi, don't want Jaafari to give
government posts to clerics or members of Islamic
groups who would be sectarian in their approach,
as the case with current Minister of Interior
Bayan Jabr. Jaafari, who is allied to Muqtada
because the cleric helped secure Jaafari's
selection as premier-designate, insists on giving
the Ministry of Interior and Defense to sectarian
politicians, mainly Sadrists, despite strong US
reservations.
Because of all this
political uncertainty, none of the Iraqi
ministries or officials, not even Jaafari, is
working to full capacity. They are more concerned
with the talks on who the new prime minister
should be than with carrying out their duties to
provide services, security and reforms to the
Iraqi people.
Passiveness, negligence,
nepotism and corruption are reaching alarmingly
dangerous levels. As a result, legislation is not
being passed. Laws are not being implemented and
security is completely lacking.
In his
interview with Al-Hayat, Allawi predicted that
even if Jaafari stayed in power, with such a poor
government policy (which he claims is a "no
policy"), his cabinet "will not last for long".
Allawi commented that the prime minister must
leave because he, and his entire team, were
sectarian politicians governed by pan-Shi'ite
sectarian policies, rather than Iraqi nationalism.
Allawi claimed that he had received several death
threats for his views, and messages conveyed
through Arab channels saying: "Be sectarian - or
leave!"
Allawi's official demands include
crushing the insurgency, disarming the Shi'ite
militias, bringing secular people to power and
rotating the presidency and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs between Arabs and Kurds. Currently, both
posts are occupied by Kurds. This, however, is a
debatable issue that could be settled with his
friend, President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd.
But the real problem remains the crisis
over the premiership.
Last week it was
reported from Baghdad that Jaafari's Da'wa Party
had come up with four names as possible
replacements for Jaafari: Ali al-Adib, Jawad
al-Malki, Haydar Abadi and Abdul Falah al-Sudani,
all members of the political bureau of Da'wa.
They are all creations of political Islam
and all were linked to Iran at one point in their
history of underground activity under Saddam.
Although they may be opposed to the carving up of
Iraq and the creation of an autonomous Shi'ite
regime in the south, all of them are strong allies
of Muqtada and believe in pan-Shi'ite loyalties
more than Iraqi nationalism.
If any one of
them is seriously put forward as a candidate, he
would be viewed as a proxy for Jaafari, and would
most likely be vetoed by the secularists, the
Sunnis, the Kurds and other Shi'ites.
These men simply do not have the ability
to end Iranian meddling in Iraqi politics. They
cannot bring the security services to order. Nor
can they halt the death squads. Abdul Razzak
al-Kazimi, the official spokesman for the prime
minister, gave a contradictory story to the daily
newspaper Al-Zaman, insisting that Jaafari was the
only candidate for the job. All talk about the
nomination of others from the Da'wa Party were
"rumors", he said. He also denied that Jaafari had
received notice from the influential Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to step down from office,
saying, "Sistani does not interfere in these
things." All members of the UIA, he added, were
holding on to Jaafari.
Adding confusion to
the already complex world of Iraqi politics is a
new demand by Allawi, put forward by one of his
top allies, Rassim al-Awadi. Through Awadi, Allawi
expressed his desire to become a vice president.
Currently, the job is held by one Sunni and one
Shi'ite from the UIA. The new names - much to
Allawi's displeasure - were announced on Thursday:
Abdul Mehdi (Shi'ite) and Tarek al-Hashemi
(Sunni).
Allawi is a member of neither
bloc, and his proposal infuriated the Sunnis, to
whom he is allied in trying to bring down Jaafari.
The Sunni leaders expressed reservations over his
desire, claiming that the job was allocated to a
Sunni, but Awadi replied, "We do not agree with
such sectarian sharing. Nothing in the
constitution says that the posts should be shared
like this. We are Iraq, not Lebanon."
Meanwhile, Sunnis are facing heat more
from the religious Shi'ites, who vetoed the Sunni
candidate, Hashemi (who was just named vice
president), for the post of parliament Speaker.
Hashemi is leader of the Iraqi Islamic
Party and the job is reserved for the Sunni
community, but the UIA is opposed to him "as a
reaction to the Sunni opposition to Jaafari". The
most likely candidate for Speaker, therefore, is
Adnan al-Dulaimi, a prominent leader of the Sunni
bloc. Allawi has not taken sides on the issue of
Speaker, but he is likely to back the Sunnis
against the UIA.
Allawi is a heavyweight
in Iraqi politics who must be reckoned with,
whether he is with the government or in the
opposition. He is currently angry for being passed
over as prime minister, and, more recently on
Thursday, as vice president.
He has
intensified his war of words against Jaafari, and
all indicators from Baghdad show that the current
prime minister's regime is falling apart. But what
if it holds together? What if Jaafari manages to
stay in power, through some sort of deal between
Iran, the UIA and the Americans, who are due to
hold negotiations over Iraq with the Tehran
regime. How many Iraqis would want to live until
2011 under a sectarian government like that of
Jaafari?
This is where the idea of a coup
starts to sound not so alien. It would not be a
coup against democracy, as some would claim, but
rather, a coup against a man who came to power
because of his sectarian origins, rather than his
political program.
And as Arab coup
history shows, Allawi would not necessarily stage
a coup to become prime minister himself. He might
launch his putsch, then set up a puppet regime to
implement his political program, in order not to
alienate other players in the Iraqi political
arena.
But two factors make this idea
unlikely. One is that Allawi, no matter how strong
he may be, is not an officer in the army. Few
officers would risk their necks for a civilian -
again, as Arab coup history has shown since 1949.
As long as he is not a member of the Army, his
chances of a successful coup are limited.
A second reason why his coup would be
difficult is that although the Americans might
allow or facilitate it, Iran would never be so
obliging toward a coup against its allies in
Baghdad.
Thus, if one pro-American coup
took place by Allawi, a counter pro-Iranian coup
would would take place a few months later, headed
by someone like Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the SCIRI.
The situation in Iraq could slide into one
similar to the struggle over Syria in the 1950s,
where every regional player was trying to pull the
weak democracy into its camp. The Syrians badly
wanted democracy, but were unable to maintain it
because of the meddling of so many outside
players, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iraq, Israel and the United States. The title of
British journalist Patrick Seale's classic book,
The Struggle for Syria, summed up the
situation well.
Today, this term applies
equally to Iraq. It is truly a struggle for Iraq
between Allawi, Jaafari, Muqtada, Hakim, Talabani,
the Americans, the British and the Iranians.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst. He is the author of Steel
& Silk: Men and Women Who Shaped Syria
1900-2000 (Cune Press, 2005).
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