The Islamic Republic of Iran conducted
military exercises in the Gulf of Oman and the
Strait of Hormuz during the week of March 31-April
6. With all the fanfare surrounding the "Holy
Prophet" maneuvers and intelligence sources
debunking Iranian claims, not much analysis
surfaced regarding why Tehran would make claims of
achieving indigenous "revolutionary technological
leaps".
By including the Fajir-3 and the
Hoot, neither indigenous nor advanced weaponry,
Tehran intended to convey three messages of
nationalism: survival, security and status.
First, the Islamic Republic rallied the
populace around the Iranian nation. As a measure
of a nation-state's ability to survive (or
withstand internal threats of
atrophy resulting from unemployment, dissent and
an inability to feed itself, among others), a
country's populace must support the existence of
the nation-state. With existential threats an
issue, a country must have (a) a populace that
wants the nation to survive (b) order to develop
strategic means of security (withstand external
threats resulting from economic or military
action). Here, a few clarifying points should be
made.
Iranians perceive themselves as part
of a pre-ordained nation of greatness. Home of the
Persian Empire and the first human-rights
declaration as well as a leading political entity
in the world during the pre-Islamic era, Iran
stood at the center of science, philosophy, poetry
and architecture. Even in the post-Islamic but
pre-revolutionary era, the Safavids established
Iran as one of the two main Islamic powers, with
Isfahan being "half the world".
Adding to
the Iranian belief of self-importance, the 1979
Iranian revolution, its revolutionary messianism
and impact on global affairs exacerbated the
notion of Iran as a pre-ordained nation of
greatness. Within this context, understand that
although perceived as a state shrouded in Islamic
discourse, the current government is
Iranian-nationalist draped in the morality of an
Islamic guise. Moreover, popular internal
discontent regarding the governance of the Islamic
Republic should not be confused with support for
Iran as a country.
With Iranian
nationalism built on Persian glories and the
resurgence of the country in the face of its
decades of isolation, Iranians base their pride
and self-confidence on past conquests for future
capabilities. Understanding and putting these
factors into context makes it obvious that the
Islamic Republic will co-opt Iranian nationalism
for survivability purposes.
Given the
above and knowing that the "Holy Prophet"
exercises are not a new development, the
utilization of more than 17,000 troops with 1,500
gunboats, jet fighters and helicopters, was most
certainly intended to convey the strength of "the
Great Iranian nation". Individuals such as Hossein
Salami, head of the Revolutionary Guards Air
Force, described the technology in the
radar-evading, multiple-target-hitting Fajir-3 as
"completely new, [and] without copying any other
missile systems that may exist in other
countries".
Yet Western intelligence
sources claim that the tested projectile was a
Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missile. Even Uzi
Rubin, former director of Israel's Ballistic
Missiles Defense Organization and designer of the
Arrow anti-missile defense system, went on record
several times in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as saying
"the description does not match the picture" and
"maneuvering stealthy ballistic missile[s] with
multiple warheads is beyond Iran's technological
capabilities".
With the Russians not even
claiming to be able to hit several targets with a
single missile and as a variant of the Russian
Scud C, whose capabilities are known, the Shahab-2
poses no new threat.
Yet Tehran used the
exercises to assert that despite the attempts by
hegemonic powers to deny Iran its inalienable
right to defend itself, the bright youth of the
country provide means for development
(survivability). With indigenous advancements
militarily, medically, technologically and
economically, Iran's survivability factor
increases because the populace sees that in some
manners the government is attending to its needs
through self-sufficiency. Moreover, Tehran gets to
assert that the foreign threats previously made
against the country were done "without proper
military assessments".
Knowing that no
substantive action is likely over its nuclear
program, particularly not until after the Group of
Eight meeting on July 19, Tehran can use the
military exercises in conjunction with the lack of
international or US action as a way to buoy its
claims of self-sufficiency that in turn increases
the nationalist tenor. As such, and with US
satellites posted on Iran and analysts viewing the
military games to determine Iranian capabilities,
the exaggerated claims of Iranian officials were
merely intended for internal consumption.
Second, the Islamic Republic conveyed that
its conventional military maintains a defensive
posture as a way of providing security to its
populace against external threats. As a huge
portion of its existence relies on oil, Iran has
always acted to protect its interests in the
Persian Gulf and with regards to the Strait of
Hormuz. Thus on April 2, the Islamic Republic
ironically presented the Hoot ("whale") by
describing the projectile as "the world's fastest
underwater missile".
Although claimed by
the deputy commander of the navy, Rear Admiral Ali
Fadavi, to have been indigenously developed, many
believe the Hoot to be based on the
Russian-developed VA-111 Shkval rocket-powered
supercavitating torpedo. Although based on a
prototype from the 1960s and powered by a
solid-fuel rocket engine, the Shkval can reach
in-water speeds near 100 meters per second and
travel about 7,000 meters.
The importance
of the Shkval is its purpose as a coastal-defense
weapon designed to be fired from surface ships or
shore batteries. With only an effective range of
7-9 kilometers, the Shkval missile does not pose
an overwhelming threat to modern navies, such as
the US carriers in the Persian Gulf, especially
considering that the launching vessels for the
unstealthy missile are very vulnerable to an air
attack. Moreover, if intended for submarines, the
missile needs the support of a full anti-submarine
warfare capability.
Given its two huge
weaknesses and in compensating for limited
air-power and surface-vessel capabilities, the
Hoot signals a way of providing "area denial" with
an emphasis on anti-ship missiles. As a high-speed
underwater projectile guided by auto-pilot rather
than by a homing head, no countermeasures seem to
exist to the Hoot/Shkval. As such, opposing naval
forces are at a considerable disadvantage when
they advance to close range. Thus the Hoot enables
Iran to keep adversaries from its coastal border
in the Persian Gulf.
However, more
important, as any attack on Iran would not rely on
close-range ships, the Hoot demonstrates Tehran's
ability to disrupt tanker traffic in the Strait of
Hormuz. Although the Islamic Republic has
officially and repeatedly announced that Tehran
would not close the strait because doing so would
block Iran's ability to export oil (thus hindering
security and survival), attacks on shipping are a
weapon of last resort to be brought about by
weapons like the Hoot.
The mere fact that
during the exercises Brent crude-oil futures
jumped to US$67.93 a barrel - the highest after
Hurricane Katrina until Iran announced enrichment
capabilities - serves as an important reminder of
the power of such a defensive weapon. While the
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s suggests that no
combination of attacks by aircraft, missiles,
mines, submarines and naval special warfare can
close the Persian Gulf to all shipping for a
sustained period, any provocative measures against
Iran could result in an Iranian reversal of its
defensive posture and the commencement of
anti-shipping attacks.
Third, the "Holy
Prophet" games bring a sense of status to the
Islamic Republic, as measures of nationalism,
survivability, security and status all reinforce
one another and increase nationalism. Moreover,
however, the willingness of the Islamic Republic
to engage in similar war games with the littoral
states conveys a confidence in the country's
military capabilities.
Regardless of
sincerity, the offer of war games further uplifts
the morale of the populace as well as other Muslim
nations because the offer included the larger
military of Saudi Arabia that the United States
supplies and trains. As such, the Islamic
Republic's projection of military power
(regardless of its actual capabilities) delivered
an elevated sense of global status.
Moreover, religiously, the Iranian
government received recognition and respect as a
Muslim nation from the Arab and Iranian street for
attaining that power in the face of its obstacles.
While Arab governments may fear Iran, the streets
support the populist mantra emanating from Tehran.
Neda Bolourchi, JD, MA is
currently in Washington, DC.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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