COMMENTARY Iran: Think
long-term engagement By
Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The defining
question with regard to Iran is how it should be
treated in the long term. Tehran is not regarded
as reliable, therefore the West says it can't have
nuclear arms, and must be stopped from developing
them. But this is a short-term goal. What comes
next?
The lack of clear, realistic and
attainable goals after Saddam Hussein's demise is
the reason for the present quagmire in Iraq, and
this experience weighs heavily on the United
States, which does not want to get bogged down in
a similar mess in Iran. As a result, Washington
has been pushed into hoping that negotiations with
Tehran over its nuclear program will work better
than military
intervention, at least for
the time being. But this still fails to address
the underlying issue of making Iran a partner, and
not an enemy.
The North Korean
example With regard to North Korea, the
strategy is much clearer. The US wants to stop
Pyongyang from building a nuclear arsenal, but it
has a fully fledged strategy to nudge the
government into long-term change without pushing
for overnight regime change, which would most
likely result in the collapse of the country.
The US, within the framework of the
six-party talks, with the key support of China, is
saying to Pyongyang: refrain from the nukes, stop
trafficking counterfeit currency and drugs, and we
will provide aid that could improve the situation
in the country. That is, the US and China would
provide investment and know-how on economic
reforms.
Pyongyang may not trust the
United States, and it could believe that nuclear
weapons are its only guarantee against US military
pressure. And it could also be afraid that
economic reforms would be the first step in a
process leading to some kind of regime change.
Nevertheless, given the economic problems
in the country, North Korea is virtually boxed in,
and its present reluctance to rejoin the six-party
talks could easily wane.
Besides, this
strategy is acceptable to China and the other
countries involved in the talks - Japan, South
Korea, Russia and the US. They all broadly agree
on how to deal with North Korea; indeed, in
principle, so does Pyongyang.
The goal is
to improve the economic situation in North Korea
in the long run, to help bridge the gap with the
South and, in a time frame of some 30 years,
reunite the North with the South. The plan is
acceptable and feasible, and it could be a win-win
situation for everybody.
However, with
regard to Iran, there appears to be no such
long-term strategy.
It is not clear what
the West envisages for Tehran. Does it just want
the demise of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad? Or the
overthrow of the clerics? Beyond this, what steps
can be shared by the international community, as
the grand North Korean plan is shared in principle
by all members of the six-party talks?
Unlike on North
Korea, there is no consensus on Iran. Russia and
China have their own strong views and interests, as
they are more concerned with practicalities
(building nuclear plants, energy) than with regime
change. Indeed, the status quo is more or less
acceptable to them.
Without an international
political strategy like the
one toward North Korea, the options become clear:
is it better to risk a larger Iraqi-style crisis
by stopping Iran's proliferation (in the worst
case by the use of force), or should the
international community learn to live with a
nuclear Iran?
In pondering this, two
elements should be considered.
First, it
is necessary to engage the main actors of this
drama. China and Russia, for instance, must be
more proactive. They are already much more
"inside" Iran than the US. They do not want to see
nuclear proliferation, or fundamentalist Islam
triggering their own fundamentalism at home.
Moscow and Beijing cannot stay aloof as if
nothing matters other than their immediate
interests, because in the long run they have a lot
to lose. This is especially so for China, with its
restive Muslim minority. A nuclear, undependable
Iran is in the interests of nobody. They must work
to change this.
Second, despite the good faith
of the kind souls wishing for the messiah of democracy
to enlighten the whole world, democratic change
is very complex. Three good examples: Japan,
Germany and Italy were built on heavy compromises
with past regimes. Democratic institutions
were introduced in these countries after
World War II, but the people running these institutions
were often the same ones who had previously been
in power.
The same must apply to Iran. A
large measure of compromise is needed with the
clerics, and the people around Ahmadinejad and
other power players, if Iran is to be gently
nudged into the political change that will result
in it being considered a reliable partner, whether
or not it has nuclear weapons.
Without
this framework, any sudden "miracle" of Iran
stopping its nuclear program would not solve its
lack of political reliability. Until the
international community can work with Tehran as a
trusted, long-term partner, Iran will always be a
problem. This is goal toward which the West should
work.
Francesco Sisci is Asia
editor of the Italian daily La Stampa.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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