DAMASCUS - The most intriguing development in Iraq is the new prime minister's
decision to change his name from Jawad al-Maliki to Nuri al-Maliki.
"Nuri", it has been officially announced, is his real birth name, although he
had been forced to use the name "Jawad" during his years in the underground
under Saddam Hussein.
The name "Nuri" brings mixed memories to the Iraqi people. To some it is
shivers and disgust, while to others it is a reminder of prosperous days under
the Iraqi monarchy. It was the name of Iraq's former strongman Nuri al-Said,
who created
14 cabinets in Iraqi history before he was toppled and killed in cold blood by
the revolutionaries of 1958.
Said, often referred to as Nuri Pasha, was a seasoned pro-Western Sunni
politician who ruled Iraq with force, suppressing opponents and rewarding
others - mainly the aristocratic and the affluent - while making Iraq a
satellite state to Britain from 1930-58.
Bringing a Nuri to power in Iraq is like bringing someone called "Adolf" to
power in Germany or having a new "Gamal" as president of Egypt. Apart from
igniting memories, however, the resemblance ends there.
Nuri Maliki is no Nuri Said. He lacks the experience, the connections, the
vision and agenda and grand political scheming of Iraq's former prime minister,
who earned a name for himself as one of the smartest and most controversial
figures in modern Arab history. He faces a job today, however, that is probably
more difficult and challenging than anything Nuri Said ever experienced as
Iraq's strongman.
Maliki has several monumental tasks ahead of him, mainly creating a cabinet
that will please the different political factions in Iraq. Starting from April
22, he has 30 days to form a cabinet and present it to parliament for a vote of
confidence. This parliament is to meet for the third time on Wednesday - the
first since Maliki was designated prime minister by the country's largest
Shi'ite bloc. The current "hot topics" that have to be dealt with by Maliki
are:
1. The Sunnis, who re-invaded Iraqi politics after last December's elections,
are demanding that they be given the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so they can
maintain brotherly relations with neighboring Sunni countries. These include
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. They feel that the ministry, which since 2004
has been occupied by a Kurd (Hoshyar Zebari), has distanced Iraq from the Arab
community, to which they were and still are attached since the creation of
modern Iraq in 1921. The Sunni demand is currently being debated by all parties
and no decision has been reached.
They also demand the curbing of Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs and reject
carving up Iraq to give an autonomous region to the Shi'ites in the south. This
is an idea that former premier Ibrahim al-Jaafari also rejected, and so did
rebel-cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who believes in a unified Iraq.
Challenging this grand Sunni demand are Iran and its strong ally in Iraqi
politics, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and
its Badr Organization. Thus on this issue we have Iran-SCIRI-Badr on one side
and the Sunnis-Muqtada on another. Maliki is yet to chose which group he is
willing, and able, to support.
2. The Kurds want to retain the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are demanding
that they be given the job of deputy to Maliki. They do not mind creating an
autonomous Shi'ite regime in the south, as long as nobody interferes with Iraqi
Kurdistan in the north. They refuse to disband the paramilitary Peshmerga,
however, claiming that it is not a militia, making it more difficult for Maliki
to centralize arms in the hands of the government.
The Kurdish refusal, certainly, will be echoed by Sadr's Mehdi Army and the
SCIRI's Badr, both of which will also refuse to give up their arms, despite
calls from the new prime minister.
3. The "Iraqi National List" of former prime minister Iyad Allawi, which is
close to the Americans and on opposite ends with both Iran, the United Iraqi
Alliance (UIA) and Maliki, had demanded that Allawi be given the job of vice
president. After being denied, they are demanding a political portfolio and one
that deals with services, giving them enough weight in the Maliki cabinet to
obstruct it and bring it down if the prime minister deviates from their demands
in the future.
Some reports from Baghdad confirm that Allawi has now been offered chairmanship
of the "political committee of national security", in addition to the Ministry
of Defense. He has, however, turned down both posts, and instead demands the
much more powerful posts of director of Iraqi intelligence, national security
adviser, and minister of state for national security.
These demands are currently being debated by Allawi with Maliki and no decision
has been reached. Allawi, like Muqtada and the Sunnis, refuses to carve up
Iraq, although he greatly objects to giving clerics, such as the SCIRI and
Muqtada, any political say in Iraq's future. He also rejects Iran's meddling in
Iraqi affairs.
4. All parties, including the Sunnis, secular Shi'ites headed by Allawi, and
the Kurds, are demanding the ministries of Defense and Interior be given to an
independent, non-sectarian official. This is backed by US Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad. The reason, they claim, is to prevent sectarian officials such as
from the Iran-backed SCIRI from controlling Interior, as was the case under
ex-prime minister Jaafari.
At the time, the SCIRI minister, Bayan Jabr, used his job to intimidate,
arrest, torture and liquidate enemies in the Sunni community. The prime
minister, unable to say no to the SCIRI, did not lift a finger to stop the
atrocities. Although Maliki has pledged to appoint professional ministers for
their merit and not sectarian background, it would be impossible in Iraq to
impose such a formula, especially in two critical posts such as Defense and
Interior.
It has been reported that Maliki has agreed with both Sunnis and Shi'ites that
he will chose a minister to head Interior from a list of three candidates
nominated by the UIA - meaning Iran will have the final say in this nomination.
He will then chose a defense minister nominated by the Sunnis. The most likely
name is Hajim al-Hasani, the former Speaker of parliament. What this means is
that the Shi'ites will still be in control of Interior, which is in charge of
police, bringing everybody back to Square 1. Nothing would guarantee that if
the UIA heads Interior, it won't turn give rise to another Bayan Jabr, who will
use the post to unleash hell on Sunnis. Most probably, this decision will be
vetoed by the Sunnis, who insist on denying the SCIRI (a part of the UIA) any
influence in picking the man to head Interior.
5. Muqtada, the wild card in Iraqi politics, refuses to give the portfolios of
Defense and Interior to non-sectarian officials. A rebel turned political
leader, Muqtada has benefited greatly from the chaos that prevailed under
Jaafari, and his Mehdi Army has become literally a "state within a state" in
the Sadr City suburbs of Baghdad.
That is why he supported and defended Jaafari as the next premier until his
autumn, fearing that his replacement would mean disarming the Mehdi Army.
Bringing in a strong, non-sectarian minister of interior would mean that the
Mehdi Army would be finished. It would either be forced to incorporate into the
Iraqi police and army or be punished and persecuted for carrying arms.
All parties currently fear Muqtada because of his militia. It has dominated the
streets of Iraq and created death squads, which are accused of much of the
sectarian killing since a terrorist attack destroyed a holy Shi'ite shrine in
February. With no evidence, Muqtada's men unleashed their anger on the Sunnis,
accusing them of the terrorist attack and killing off their community leaders.
Muqtada, of course, denies that his men have been sniping down Sunnis, but he
said in a recent interview with Newsweek that his men "are not sinless". Last
Thursday, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a statement - much to the
horror of Muqtada - calling for the disarming of militias. His office said,
"Weapons must be exclusively in the hands of the government forces, and these
forces must be built on a proper national basis so that their loyalty is to the
country alone, and not to political or other sides."
Muqtada snapped back that the Shi'ites only feel safe when the Mehdi Army is on
the streets. He added, "The Mehdi Army is not a militia. I issued a statement
recently limiting the Mehdi Army personnel to cultural, social and religious
acts."
He has denied that there is a Sunni or Shi'ite insurgency in Iraq, claiming
that "there is an Iraqi Islamic resistance". He also told his men in Najaf that
their greatest enemies were "the occupation, the takfiris [those who
excommunicate mainstream Muslim individuals, societies and leaders] and the
Ba'athists".
Fadil al-Shara, a senior aid to Muqtada, also denied that the UIA had agreed to
bring non-sectarian officials to the ministries of Interior and Defense. "All
of this talk," he said, "was idealistic and does not exist in reality."
Muqtada's team is to appear before parliament on Wednesday and make three
demands: 1) a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq; 2)
strengthening the de-Ba'athification committees to punish all those who worked
with the Saddam Hussein regime; 3) obstructing federalism requests by some
parties in the UIA that demand the creation of an autonomous Shi'ite regime in
southern Iraq, similar to the Kurdish one in the north.
In his interview with Newsweek, Muqtada addressed the Sunnis directly,
demanding five clarifications. One is their stance on the attack on Shi'ite
civilians. Second is their stance toward members of the Sunni community working
in the insurgency of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who made his first televised
appearance last week calling on the Sunnis to take up arms against the
Shi'ites. Third, Muqtada requested that they "should specify their stance
toward the Shi'ites. Are we Muslim or not?" Fourth, they should demand the
execution of Saddam. And fifth, they should specify their stance toward
families that have been displaced.
Holding a clear grudge against the Sunnis, Muqtada fears that he is about to be
outflanked by Sunnis, Americans and Kurds, who blame him for much of the
sectarianism in Iraq today. It is unclear where he stands with regard to
Maliki, but for all practical purposes it is safe to assume that the two men
are not enemies. Muqtada, after all, was the man who helped elect Maliki's boss
(Jaafari) in the UIA in February.
This, then, is the troubling agenda facing Maliki in Baghdad. Many have doubts
that he can pull through. Some say that because he lacks experience in senior
government office, the job will be difficult. Others argue that his "lack of
experience" is a plus, meaning that he carries no burdens or grudges and is not
affiliated with blood or failure.
At the same time, National Security Adviser Muwafak al-Rabei said that US
troops would withdraw from Iraq by mid-2008. He also predicted that their
numbers would be cut down from the current 133,000 to fewer than 100,000 by the
end of 2006 and that an "overwhelming majority" will have left by 2007.
But of course this will not end the chaos in Iraq. With or without the
Americans, the country has fallen into disorder. The upcoming weeks will be
very important in Iraq's future, but it is highly unlikely, given all the
divisions, that Maliki will be able to come up with a solution that will suit
everybody.
As veteran Iranian journalist Amir Taheri suggested, one of the priorities on
Maliki's agenda, in addition to everything mentioned above, is to bring
electricity to the people, who have spent most of their days in darkness since
the downfall of Saddam.
As the steaming summer approaches, air-conditioning, perhaps, means a lot more
to day-to-day Iraqis than ministerial posts, party politics and parliamentary
life. Lest we sound too aristocratic, let us rephrase the sentence:
air-conditioning, electricity and security. Nuri al-Said was a dictator. But he
gave the Iraqis electricity - around the clock - during his years in Baghdad.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst. He is the author of Steel
& Silk: Men and Women Who Shaped Syria 1900-2000 (Cune Press, 2005).
