Saudi Arabia caught in Iraqi
jihad By Christopher Boucek
It is widely recognized that Saudi
nationals are participating in the Iraqi
insurgency and have been involved in operations
that have targeted the US-led coalition force,
aspects of the nascent Iraqi security forces, and
segments of Iraq's majority Shi'ite population.
The presence of Saudis in Iraq is deeply
troubling not just for the viability of Iraq, but
also for the future security of Saudi Arabia and
the smaller Persian Gulf monarchies.
Iraq
today is the primary jihadist venue. For the first
time in recent history, the jihadi movement is
centered in the Arab heartland, engaged in what
many in the movement interpret as a struggle
for
a
pivotal Arab country.
Moreover, Iraq is a
target-rich country for those inclined to stage
attacks against the US-led coalition's military
presence. Attackers in Iraq stand a better chance
of escaping to fight again because of the severely
poor security situation; they also need not fear
the ubiquitous security services that exist
elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Iraq is also emblematic of a larger
jihadist project, the successes of which many in
the movement seek to export back to their home
countries. Iraq, therefore, is unlike Afghanistan,
which as a non-Arab country never quite carried
the urgency and fervor of those currently active
in Iraq.
The Saudi government is extremely
concerned by the presence of jihadist Saudi
nationals in Iraq. It is feared that the return of
Saudi jihadis to Saudi Arabia will revitalize what
has become a waning domestic insurgency. These
fighters not only have learned new techniques, but
may also alter the insurgent landscape in Saudi
Arabia by introducing techniques, methods and
operations that heretofore have not existed in the
kingdom.
To their credit, Saudi
authorities have taken significant measures to
combat this trend. The government has launched a
multi-pronged strategy composed of improvement of
border security along the Saudi-Iraqi frontier, an
uncompromising and thorough investigative
monitoring program of people who have spent time
in Iraq, a concerted assault on Saudi Arabia's
home-grown indigenous terrorists, and significant
cooperation with foreign intelligence
organizations (including a major joint program
with their US counterparts).
A major issue
for Iraqi security forces and their Saudi
counterparts is that nomadic Bedouin tribes (who
have previously been suspected of supporting the
insurgency) exist on both sides of the Iraqi-Saudi
border. These tribes frequently move throughout
the vast and sparsely populated southern Iraqi
desert and maintain clan ties in both Iraq and
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, these elements know the
area intimately and are well versed in avoiding
contact with security forces. As such, it is
possible that they are assisting in the movement
of fighters into Iraq.
Saudi al-Qaeda
leader Saleh al-Oufi wrote in support of Saudi
jihadis in Iraq in the July 8, 2004, issue of the
Voice of Jihad online magazine, strengthening
suspicions that Oufi himself had fought in the
strife-torn country. Saudi Islamic militants have
also claimed operations such as the assassination
of US contractor Paul Johnson and the assault on
the US Consulate in Jeddah in the name of the
"Fallujah Brigades", demonstrating - at the very
least - a symbolic linkage between Saudi and Iraqi
insurgents.
In April 2005, Saudi national
Hadi bin Mubarak Qahtani killed himself in a
suicide operation near Qaim, Iraq. According to
the Washington Post, "Five other Qahtanis have
been reported killed in Iraq, including Muhammed
bin Aedh Ghadif Qahtani, a captain in the Saudi
National Guard who allegedly used his guard
identification badge to help gain entry into Iraq
when he was stopped for questioning."
On
March 2, an al-Qaeda operative identified as
Abdullah Salih al-Harbi was captured by Iraqi
border guards trying to cross the Saudi border
near Samawah. Reports at the time indicated that
he confessed during his interrogation to
participating in the al-Qaeda terrorist assault on
the massive Abqaiq Saudi oil facility.
Saudi security agencies have taken major
steps to monitor possible travel to Iraq and other
jihadi locales. It has emerged that some Saudis
have sought to hide their travel to Iraq by
reporting their passports stolen, thus erasing any
consular evidence of travel either to Iraq or to
Syria, widely seen as the most important way
station for those en route to Iraq.
In an
effort to end this practice, the Saudi government
no longer issues replacement travel documents with
"no questions asked". Saudis who have presented
themselves at embassies abroad claiming either
theft or loss of their passports are now subjected
to a rigorous investigation on their return to the
kingdom.
A Saudi intelligence-agency
interrogation revealed that a number of Yemenis
served as facilitators for Saudis going to Iraq.
The same report summary noted that Syria was the
main point of entry into Iraq, largely because of
successful Saudi efforts to increase security on
its own Iraqi frontier.
There exists a
well-worn route into Iraq, from recruitment and
indoctrination in Saudi Arabia to hand-off to
facilitators in Syria prior to crossing the Iraqi
border. Saudi support for the Iraqi insurgency has
also included the issuance of a fatwa in
2004 by more than two dozen senior Saudi mullahs,
including the influential former dissident Salman
al-Awda, endorsing Saudi and Muslim support of the
insurgency.
The Saudi National Security
Assessment Project (an independent consultancy
that works closely with the Saudi government on
security and oil issues) has produced some
original analysis on the subject of Saudi
nationals fighting in Iraq.
Among the
findings, the project has noted that Saudis - and
other Persian Gulf Arabs - often travel with large
sums of cash. This fact makes them especially
sought after, and recruiting affluent Saudis has
been perceived by Iraqi insurgent leaders as a
quick method to finance terrorist operations.
Furthermore, private intelligence reports have
intimated that the Saudis are so valued by
insurgents that they have been sold and traded by
insurgent "brokers" in Iraq.
While the
true number of Saudis fighting in Iraq may never
be known, there have been unsubstantiated reports
that the number of Saudis who have perished in the
insurgency has been exaggerated in a bid to boost
recruitment. A March 2005 Israeli report, "Arab
Volunteers Killed in Iraq: An Analysis", that has
been subjected to wide criticism claims that 94
(or 61%) of insurgents killed in a six-month
period were identified as Saudis, while 70% of
suicide bombers in Iraq were Saudi.
A
separate confidential US report has identified a
Saudi participation rate in excess of 50%, while a
jihadist Internet forum has stated that Saudis
make up 44% of insurgents. According to Nawaf
Obaid, however, the Saudi government-controlled
press has only acknowledged 47 Saudis who have
been identified as participating in the
insurgency. These figures, however, have not been
independently verified or confirmed.
It is
extremely worrying that, according to a Saudi
national-security source, of those Saudis who have
been detained and questioned on their return from
Iraq, about 80% were unknown to the security
services. This fact - if true - is concerning, as
it indicates that the Saudi intelligence and
security services may not have as good a handle on
the issue as they may otherwise try to portray.
In the end, this may well be a significant
contributor to greater violence and domestic
insurgency in Saudi Arabia. Of course, returning
jihadis will not simply abandon their world view
and objectives. Moreover, the Iraq war and the US
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan have polarized a
large segment of the Saudi population.
Some senior Saudi sources have even sought
to blame the domestic terrorist struggle against
al-Qaeda on the situation in Iraq. It is unknown
what, if any, effect disaffection with the ruling
family and anger over the rampant corruption has
had on the motivations of Saudi nationals to
travel to Iraq, to engage in terrorism, and learn
skills and gain experiences that they can
eventually bring back to the kingdom.
In
large part, the problem is greater for the Saudi
government than for the US military and its Iraqi
partners. The overarching question is what the
Saudi government will do to neutralize Saudi
fighters in Iraq once they have returned as
technically adept jihadis and battle-hardened
fighters.
At that point, with potentially
the fate of the kingdom in the balance, many
analysts fear that the problem of returning Saudi
jihadis may have moved well past any comfortable
or easily achievable solutions.
Note This article is based
on extensive research with knowledgeable sources
who dealt with the author only on the strict
condition of anonymity and non-attribution.
