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    Middle East
     May 5, 2006
Iraq as a US political football
By Ehsan Ahrari

No one should doubt that Iraq will be the central issue in US congressional elections this November and of the presidential election in 2008. The war in the Middle Eastern country has wreaked havoc with the popularity of President George W Bush and his Republican Party. But that does not mean the opposition is guaranteed a walk-in.

The Democratic Party has been stymied by the perception that it has no ideas of its own to solve the Iraq mess other than to "cut and run". Senator Hillary Clinton, the front-runner for the party's presidential nomination, voted Yes on the authorization to go to war in 2002 and still says as little as possible on subject.

This week Senator Joseph Biden offered a comprehensive plan



that calls for the creation of separate and autonomous regions for Iraq, leading to the withdrawal of US troops by the end of 2008. Biden, the ranking Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is his party's most respected spokesman on foreign policy.

But more to the point, Biden is widely expected to run for president as the nominee of the Democratic Party. By making his plan to extricate the US from Iraq public, he provides some cover for Democrats running this year but, more important, helps himself in 2008. The voters may not care that much about the details; they care simply that the opposition has a plan.

That might be one of the reasons the White House quickly denounced it, thereby establishing the fact that the plan could emerge as an alternative between the Bush administration's refusal to spell out an exit strategy and Democrats' increasing demand that he come up with an exit strategy without offering any ideas of their own.

There is little doubt that Biden is trying to carve a niche for his candidacy. In contrast with Senator John Kerry, the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004 who could do no better than present himself as the "Bush lite" version of his Republican opponent, Biden wants people to see him as the man with the plan.

The Biden proposal, which the senator depicts as the "third way", is carefully calculated to appeal to the US experience with its emphasis on federalism and a central government with limited powers. Never mind that these elements may not transfer easily to the Middle East.

Iraq, in Biden's vision, would be divided into three largely autonomous regions with a viable but limited central government in Baghdad "responsible for border defense, foreign policy, oil production and [distribution of] revenues". The Kurds, Shi'ites and Sunnis would be responsible for administering their own regions.

He proposes to gain agreement from the Sunnis for the federal system by making them "an offer they can't reasonably refuse". That offer is a constitutional guarantee that they would receive 20% of "all present and future oil revenues", which is based on their proportion of Iraq's population.

US assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq under this plan would be based on the condition that the Iraqi government protects minority and women's rights. In addition, it proposes convening a "regional security conference", where Iraq's neighbors, especially Iran, pledge to respect its borders, "and work cooperatively to implement this plan".

Finally, the Biden plan proposes a gradual redeployment of US forces from Iraq by 2008 or even earlier if feasible.

There are a number of "sacrosanct" concepts of US democracy that, in the view of American politicians, should be equally sacred to the rest of the world. Foremost is the desirability of a federal (or federally based) democracy.

However, they tend to forget that, when first established, the United States was not a federal democracy as we know it today. The great Civil War of 1861-65 was one of the chief reasons for its emergence as a federal democracy.

Yet a federal government with limited power is a recipe for disaster in Iraq. In the first place, "autonomy" is a code word that the Kurds hope to use to break away eventually and establish an independent Kurdistan. Emulating the Kurdish practice, a number of Shi'ite groups envisage the creation of an autonomous region in the south.

The Shi'ite aspirations, to be sure, may not be a prelude to the integration of that region with Iran. However, the very notion of an autonomous southern province of Iraq would certainly be viewed by the neighboring Arab states, as well as Iran, as a prelude to the potential creation of another Shi'ite country.

Obviously, Biden has not given much thought to such an eventuality, but the Iraqi Sunnis certainly have. That is one reason they are fighting so hard against any notion of autonomy and for a strong central government as a guarantor of the integrity of Iraq in its present borders.

Autonomy is an effective administrative arrangement, but only in mature states. Biden points to Bosnia-Herzegovina as an effective example of an autonomous federal arrangement; however, even that arrangement seems to be working only under foreign occupation. No one knows whether that arrangement would survive once foreign troops are gone.

The proposal of guaranteeing 20% of oil revenues to Sunni Arabs is interesting. However, given the intensifying sectarian animosity, one wonders whether the Kurds, or even the Shi'ites, would go along with it. It should be kept in mind that in their zeal to have substantial, if not total, control of their own oil revenues, the Kurds have yet to demonstrate how far they would go to compromise on that issue.

Another chief drawback of this particular proposal is that various sectarian groups in Iraq are currently operating on the basis of two principles: "winner take all" and "zero-sum game". The first principle drives them to seek as many political and economic advantages over other groups at a given time as possible, without contemplating the implications of such advantages on other groups.

The second principle prevents them from cooperating with other groups, fearing that any ground thus lost would be converted into permanent victory by the other groups, without offering any concessions of their own. This is not a unique trait of the Iraqi polity. All political entities where ethnic, racial or religious rivalries and hatred are intensified also manifest similar traits.

The proposal to hold a security conference on Iraq is both timely and thoughtful. However, Iran is not likely to give any serious guarantees on Iraq unless the Bush administration forswears any idea of regime change and preemptive attack on Iran.

What the United States does not understand - or maybe it does understand, but refuses to admit - is that Iran has every right and interest to influence events in its immediate neighbor Iraq as the US itself does regarding Mexico and Canada. If any one of those two countries were to become hostile toward America's interests - admittedly a very unlikely scenario - Washington would not sit still and do nothing.

Similarly, as long as Iran respects the national integrity of Iraq, it has every right to influence events. Besides, aside from being its neighbor, Iraq has many hundreds of years of Islamic ties with Iran.

If or when such a security conference were to take place, the US should take special care to bring in a number of major Sunni neighbors of Iraq, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, as well as Egypt (even though Egypt is not one of its neighbors, it certainly is an important Arab state). The participation of these countries would also send clear signals to the Iraqi Sunnis that their interests are not being jeopardized. Such an assurance is extremely vital at this stage in the evolution of a national-unity government.

The gradual withdrawal of US troops appears reasonable. However, the proposed date is highly contingent on what happens in that country between now and 2008. In the most optimistic scenario, the Iraqi security forces would become strong and effective, and the US forces would start leaving within a year or so.

In the pessimistic scenario, the situation in Iraq would get so bad that there would be a growing clamor for immediate US withdrawal. It is interesting to note that a visible critic of US presence in Iraq, former US Army General William Odom, [1] is already proposing that the United States should "cut and run" from Iraq.

Even though Biden's plan depicts itself as an "alternative" to partition, quite ironically, it is likely to be envisaged as a well-intended argument for precisely that. However, inside Iraq it is not likely to get much notice or attention. The fight in Iraq is getting bloodier as the national-unity government is about to become a reality. Its chief adversary, the insurgency, is doing its very best to make the emergence of that government impossible.

But inside the US, the Biden proposal is likely to emerge as a major source for debate, especially as this November's congressional election gets closer. After all, a plan, any plan, is better than no plan at all.

Note
1. See Cut and run? You bet, Foreign Policy, May/June. Odom was director of the US National Security Agency from 1985-88.

Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be reached at eahrari@cox.net or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)


Saudi Arabia caught in Iraqi jihad (May 4, '06)

In Iraq, chaos by another name (May 3, '06)

Iraq's choice: Revolution or nation-building (Apr 29, '06)

 
 



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