THE ROVING EYE Iran impasse: Make gas, not bombs
By Pepe Escobar
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled - and expressly told
Revolutionary Guard commanders - that nuclear weapons are against Islam, and
cannot be used in war even for self-defense. For all practical purposes - and
with International Atomic Energy Agency confirmation - Tehran is pursuing a
civilian nuclear program. Virtually the whole country is behind the theocratic
nationalist regime in this effort.
Moreover, the regime knows that both China and Russia will oppose any excessive
action by the administration of US President George W Bush. Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki
said recently that both countries had "officially" informed Iran about "their
opposition to sanctions and a military attack".
On Sunday, Iran's parliament threatened to force the government to withdraw its
agreement to allow unannounced inspections of its nuclear facilities under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The move follows pressure from
Washington and its allies for a binding United Nation Security Council
resolution demanding that Tehran suspend its uranium-enrichment program.
The United States is behind attempts by Britain and France to draw up a UN
resolution that would declare Iran in violation of international law if it does
not suspend uranium enrichment. They want to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter
that would authorize economic sanctions or even military action. Russia and
China, the other two permanent Security Council members, oppose such action.
Iran has important links with Moscow. The Russian-Iranian contract for the
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was signed in 1995. Their
geopolitical concerns in the Caucasus and Central Asia - to fight both US
influence and Sunni fundamentalism - coincide. Iran is a preferential client of
Russian weapons - including anti-aircraft systems capable of protecting Iran's
nuclear installations from US strikes.
The Iranian regime does not take Bush's "regime change" rhetoric seriously (see
What's really happening in Tehran, April 26). But even if there were a
military attack, the regime is sure it would make Washington pay a very heavy
price - in Iraq, Palestine and the oil markets.
Western accusations aside, most observers assert that Iran would not be able to
manufacture a nuclear weapon for at least the next five years. But the
Revolutionary Guards, which are in operational charge of the nuclear program,
may believe Iran could approach this development without incurring excessive
risk. They, but not necessarily the theocratic leadership, may be convinced
that only as a nuclear-weapons state will they be able to counter a US attack.
Is there a way out of this fatalistic scenario? Yes, there is.
The way out would depend on Iran's theocratic nationalism reaching an agreement
among the factions vying for power in Tehran. In essence, there has to be a
consensus that for the national interest, Iran does not need a nuclear bomb;
what it needs is to export its wealth of natural gas. And no customer would be
happier to buy it than Europe.
Enno Harks, a senior fellow on energy and resources at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, and Friedmann Muller, head of the research
group Global Issues at the same institute, were both in Tehran recently for an
energy conference. Their studies and conclusions are important to understanding
what's at stake in the convoluted relationship between the European Union and
Iran and how ostracizing and sanctioning Iran may turn out to be yet another
case of the EU shooting itself in the foot.
Muller emphasizes that 10 of the current 25 EU member states depend on Russia
for more than 50% of their total natural-gas supplies, and five of them for
100%. France, Germany and Italy import between 25% and 50% each. Muller is
doing nothing but echoing a fierce ongoing debate in Brussels on whether the
EU's dependence on Russian gas is desirable and sustainable - in terms of
security as well as politically.
Harks points out how Europe today is by far the world's biggest natural-gas
import market - and will remain so at least until 2030. According to
projections by the International Energy Agency, by 2030 North America will
import just less than 200 billion cubic meters of gas a year, China/India some
85 billion cubic meters and Europe more than 530 billion cubic meters. "Europe
thus amounts to almost double the two regions added together," said Harks.
Muller notes how Russia is fiercely pushing a so-called Eurasian Natural Gas
Alliance, "the purpose of which is to channel as large a portion of natural-gas
supply as possible via the post-Soviet pipeline network and thus to monopolize
the European natural-gas market".
Harks said that "according to the optimistic scenario in the Russian energy
strategy to 2020, gas exports to Western Europe will rise by only approximately
30 billion cubic meters over the period". And even these projections are not
assured because they involve the successful development and financing of at
least one of two giant northern Russian fields.
Then there's the intractable problem of Russia's grip on Central Asian gas. As
Harks explains it, "Long-term gas-supply contracts between Russia and
Turkmenistan at far below market price give Russia some leeway concerning their
own production decline and export contracts. But at the same time, they will
delay domestic gas-market reform - a situation that will seriously constrain
necessary investment in Russia and reduce its export potential to Europe."
In short, Russia by itself will not solve Europe's gas thirst, especially
because Russia also wants to export heavily to both China and Japan.
So Europe will have to find the gas it needs somewhere else - North Africa and
the Caribbean, for instance. But most of all it will need Iran. Iran holds 15%
of total world proven gas reserves - positioned only behind Russia. It is much
closer to Europe than the West Siberian gas fields, and eventually it could
share a border with the EU itself (should Turkey be accepted as a member).
Iran and Qatar hold the second- and third-largest reserves in the world. This
means that in tandem they have more natural gas than Russia. For the moment, as
a practical matter, they do not export to Europe. There are no pipelines - at
least none yet; and liquefied natural gas (LNG) has to be transported by long
sea routes or aboard expensive small tankers.
Muller is adamant; natural-gas production is cheaper in Iran, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan and even North Africa (in other countries apart from Algeria) than
in Western Siberia. As Muller explained, "The excessive infrastructure linking
Siberia to Europe is a product of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, this argument no longer carries any weight."
The smoking (gas) gun
Harks is convinced Iran is the best solution for Europe's energy problem,
diversifying supply sources that up until now have in essence been Russia (65%
of imports) and Algeria (25% of imports). Together, Russia and Algeria hold
barely 30% of the worlds's natural-gas reserves - "while around 80% of reserves
are located within a 4,000-kilometer radius of Central Europe", said Muller.
The Holy Grail is a branch of "Pipelineistan" from Iran to Europe: the Nabucco
Gas Pipeline Project, sponsored by an Austrian company, OMV (which is a small
European player in the business), and tentatively scheduled to start operating
in 2011. What is needed above all is "greater political will on both the
Iranian and European sides", said Muller. An enlarged Nabucco pipeline could
transport not only Iranian but also Azerbaijani, Turkmen and even Qatari gas to
Europe.
Harks warns that such an approach would "contradict long-term US containment
policy on one side and Russia's inherent dreams of a Central Asian gas alliance
on the other". But it could be a win-win situation for both Europe and Iran.
Brussels has to act fast - otherwise China will spare no effort to get all that
gas for its own gargantuan needs. And Tehran has to act fast - otherwise the
Bush administration's war logic may prevail.
