Over the course of the past three weeks,
the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly conveyed its
desire to hold direct talks with the United States
for the first time in 27 years.
While
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's letter to President
George W Bush offered no concrete solutions to
Iran's disputed nuclear program or other tensions
between the two countries, the Bush administration
could have used the symbolic gesture to create
room for opening a dialogue, if not direct
negotiations.
Over the past few days, the
Islamic Republic again asked for direct
negotiations with the US. In response, the Bush
administration refuses to do so.
In fact,
Tehran attempted to avert the current situation by
offering
the
Bush administration a wide range of specific
policy concessions in 2003. (See Iran offered 'to make peace with
Israel' Asia Times Online, May 26)The
2003 proposal took stock of major American
interests - the Iranian nuclear program, its
policy toward Israel, and its potential assistance
with regards to al-Qaeda.
In essence, Iran
was offering Washington a means to achieve peace
and stability in the Middle East. Rather than
making any attempt to resolve issues, the Bush
administration derided officials who suggested
engagement.
Meanwhile, senior
neo-conservative officials proffered that Tehran
would get nuclear weapons regardless and that by
not participating in negotiations, the US was
saved from having to grant concessions that
enabled nuclear proliferation to occur.
Interestingly enough, such an attitude has become
nothing short of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Over the past three years, the Bush
administration has adopted the non-policy Iran
policy of regime change and nuclear
non-proliferation. Individually, each part of this
nascent non-policy undermines the other.
Discussions of regime change enfeeble the
nuclear non-proliferation goal by increasing the
potential for direct or indirect military
conflict. Regime change and its funding of
dissident groups that lack Iranian legitimacy
(like the terrorist-listed Mujahideen-e-Khalq -
MEK) erode any remaining trust or diplomatic
efforts while simultaneously providing the means
to quash the indigenous Iranian reform movement.
Moreover, the regime change policy ignores
the country's nationalistic tendency over the past
100 years - only the fear of foreign interference
or intervention suffices as a reason to overthrow
a sitting government. As a result, not only does
the regime change policy fail in its primary
objective but simultaneously prevents nuclear
non-proliferation because such a policy is the
basis from which the US refuses to conduct direct
negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
As
former US secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and
Madeleine Albright, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, and International Atomic Energy Agency
director general Mohamed ElBaradei agree, without
direct US-Iran negotiations, the Islamic Republic
has and will continue to go forward with its
nuclear program. In the interim, everyone else
will be left wondering whether Tehran has
weaponized its nuclear capability.
As a
result, not only are pundits suggesting living
with a nuclear Iran, but some within the American
State Department and the British Foreign Office
suggest that such "an unthinkable" possibility may
become a reality that requires a new strategy to
handle the balance of power situation.
Such a notion has taken root, particularly
since Tehran suggested that Israel and not the US
or American interests would suffer first if Iran
or its nuclear sites were attacked. As a result,
Israel has taken a moment to reassess.
Israel debates Iran's nuclear
program Part of the Israeli military debate
circles around the strength of the Iranian
program. Appearing before the knesset's
(parliament's) Defense and Foreign Affairs
Committee on May 9, the head of Israel's Military
Intelligence (AMAN), Major General Amos Yadlin,
stated his belief that "Iran will achieve a
nuclear weapon by 2010". On questioning, Yadlin
admitted that the Islamic Republic had achieved an
enrichment capability of only 3.5% (now at 3.8%),
far below the 90% needed to weaponize.
As
he pressed the importance of preparing plans to
act against the Islamic Republic by stating how
quickly Iran had been able to indigenously produce
nuclear energy, Yadlin simultaneously dismissed
the Iranian military when he recalled that "he who
can run a 100 meter race cannot necessarily run a
marathon".
As some Israeli military
members debate the strength of Iran's military
versus that of Israel's, others spend time more
constructively by analyzing Iranian ambitions. On
May 9, some members of Israel's defense
establishment attended and participated in the
Fisher Brother's Institute for Air and Space
Strategic Studies' Conference on Power Projection.
In his speech, Brigadier General Yosef
Kupperwasser correctly asserted that the Islamic
Republic's nuclear ambitions were aimed at
fortifying the current government and achieving
regional and superpower status. While conveying an
understanding of Tehran's desire for prestige,
Kupperwasser also curried favor by declaring that
"wiping Israel off the map is just one step in
Iran's attempt to create a new world order".
Truth be told, and as Tehran's cooperation
with Israel in the Iran-Contra affair conveys, the
Islamic Republic has no intention of wiping Israel
off the map. Rather, the Islamic Republic seeks to
return Iran to its former power position - a place
it once shared and wants to share again with
Israel.
A majority of the debate shrewdly
focuses on collaborating with the West in
pressuring the Islamic Republic while
simultaneously preparing for the future. Yet, in a
break from the perceived strategy, Vice Premier
Shimon Peres declared, on May 8, that "Israel is
not the only country that could be destroyed" and
that "the president of Iran should remember that
Iran can also be wiped off the map".
In
response, at the Fisher Institute, Kupperwasser
warned that any country that planned to act
against Tehran should have the capability to
minimize the expected damaged from an Iranian
retaliation. Similarly, Senior Defense Ministry
official Amos Gilad agreed with Kupperwasser and
others that Israel should not use threatening or
aggressive language in dealing with Tehran.
Similarly, strategists agree that Tel Aviv
should not place itself on the frontline of the
Iran nuclear issue. In explaining the country's
strategy, Gilad stated to Haaretz newspaper that
"international cooperation and legitimacy is
important for Israel. Even if we later demand
other options it is important for us to pass the
necessary course of legitimacy and international
support."
Apparently, some of those other
options include increased first-strike and
retaliatory delivery means. Apparently, too,
Israel has sped up the development of long-range
cruise missiles that could be used to strike at
Iran's nuclear facilities. These efforts arose as
Israel realized its limited first-strike ability.
As Brigadier-General Amir Eshsel, chief of staff
of the Israeli Air Force, stated, "The complexity
of operations in a range greater than 1,000 km
rises exponentially. In these cases, we have a
very limited ability to surprise."
Although Israel has one of the world's
best military and intelligence capabilities, only
the US and Russia are known to have mastered all
aspects of producing missiles that fly low enough
to evade radar detection. In 2004, Jane's Defense
Weekly stated that Israel Military Industries
fielded the country's first cruise missile with a
range of only around 300 kilometers (190 miles).
Foreshadowing Israeli development, Eshsel went on
to declare that "the IAF [Israeli Air Force] will
know how to address the challenges".
Another way to address the challenge is
for Prime Minister Olmert to ask the US for
Tomahawk missiles again. The Bill Clinton
administration denied the request for these
missiles in 2000 while Israel and Syria engaged in
peace talks. Olmert is widely expected to do so on
his visit to Washington this week.
With
growing sentiment within the Israeli establishment
that diplomatic efforts will fail, talk of a
potential Israeli strike ebbs and flows over the
need for a defense and deterrent capability. As
such, Israel has moved to accumulate nuclear
submarine missiles as part of its deterrence and
retaliation capabilities. Apparently, the mutually
assured destruction theory that worked for the US
and the USSR during the Cold War seems to be an
option for which the Israelis are preparing.
A range of models As Israel's
internal debate continues, the US media reported
that the Bush Administration hoped to establish a
defense shield against in the former Soviet states
and that the Bush administration, in advance of
potential but unlikely UN sanctions, had begun
pressing European banks to curb dealings with Iran
or face fines and other penalties against their US
subsidiaries.
Analysts realize that the
former will likely push Tehran, Moscow and Beijing
together - something the US does and should not
want. Similarly, such measures and economic
sanctions are unlikely to directly produce
sustainable results in Iran. Thus, other
discussions have included limiting or barring
Iranian diplomats as well as seizing the bank
accounts of certain members of the Iranian
establishment.
In today's global
environment, such an attempt to isolate Tehran
would not work - it didn't even work with Libya in
the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus, while the major
powers discuss potential negotiation options and
sanctions, the US can use its handling of the
Israeli, Indian, North Korean and Pakistani
nuclear situations as models for living with a
nuclear Iran.
Although long perceived as a
major US ally, Israel's development of nuclear
weapons was first regarded as a potential threat
to US interests. Faced with Israel's de facto
emergence as a nuclear state, Washington accepted
that universal non-proliferation was not feasible.
As a result, the US adopted, in contravention of
international law, a differentiation between
allies and enemies.
Today, some compare
the Bush administration's policy towards India
with the decision of the Richard Nixon
administration to waive Israel's nuclear status.
However, the current policy is more a means of
dealing with a non-nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) signatory (India) than reluctance to
officially recognize and bring a nuclear state
within the international non-proliferation regime
(Israel). While Israel's indigenous capability
enables it to officially maintain nuclear
ambiguity, a position likely to be adopted by
Tehran if it chooses to weaponize, the Bush
administration's proposal to supply India with
civilian nuclear technology serves as another
example.
An India-US deal struck in April,
if ratified by the US Congress, would commit the
US to helping India build a strategic store of
nuclear fuel and establishing an international
group of nuclear suppliers that would assure a
continuous supply of nuclear reactor fuel in the
event that American cooperation with India ended.
In agreeing, Congress must waive export
control restrictions on nuclear trade with India
that were imposed following Indian tests in 1974
and 1998. In turn, India must place its civilian
nuclear facilities (but not its nuclear weapons
program) under international monitoring to ensure
observance of the nuclear test ban. While the
countries have not resolved the key issue of India
refraining from future nuclear testing, part of
the agreement must also eliminate dual-use
technology exports from India to China.
Iranian attempts to develop and maintain
its nuclear program are definitely more likely to
resemble Israel's efforts because of the Bush
administration's refusal to conduct direct
negotiations. The North Korea case also provides a
model of how to handle the Iranian nuclear
situation. While North Korea and the Islamic
Republic are each regarded as a "rogue" state by
Washington, such classification has not prevented
the Bush administration from participating in
negotiations with Pyongyang. By involving China
and Russia in the six-party talks, Washington aims
to diffuse the North Korean threat by pragmatic,
diplomatic means.
In differentiating
between Pyongyang and Tehran, administration
officials note that North Korea is an economic
disaster dependent on imports and Chinese aid to
keep its ailing Stalinist system alive, while the
Islamic Republic is the world's fourth-largest oil
exporter and a regional powerhouse. The implied
and incorrect analysis being that North Korea can
be coaxed into negotiations that include difficult
concessions while the Islamic Republic cannot.
However, the North Korea model that
involves a policy of containment utilizing
diplomatic engagement may provide a workable model
for dealing with the Islamic Republic, merely
because of the direct involvement of the US.
Finally, the US could model its Iran
policy after its Pakistan policy. Since the
September 11 attacks in the US, the Bush
administration has ignored nuclear-armed
Pakistan's support for Sunni extremists in the
region. In return, the US gained Pakistan's tepid
support for the "war on terror". As a result,
al-Qaeda and the Taliban have experienced an
unheralded resurgence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Iraq.
In contrast, however, if Washington
adopted a similar policy towards Tehran, the Bush
administration could at least hope for peace in
Iraq, a Taliban-less Afghanistan and a stable
Persian Gulf.
Another solution While the above models provide analogies
against which to compare any handling of the
Iranian nuclear dossier, none of them would be
appropriate. As part of "The Top Ten Things to
Know about Iran" requires, Iran should not be
analogized to other countries. Too many vast
cultural and historical differences exist.
As a result, using and basing policy off
such analogies will continue to end in failure. As
is, the Bush administration rewards rather than
punishes Iran's extremists.
Tactically and
strategically, Washington and Tehran would want to
marginalize Islamic Republic President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad. As the figurehead for a minority
faction that ideologically opposes ties with the
US, Ahmadinejad and his comments, especially
against Israel, exacerbate the distrust between
Iran and a powerful portion of the international
community.
Moreover, Ahmadinejad uses his
populist image to portray the Muslim world as an
oppressed populace that must shake the hegemonic
powers from its back. In doing so, Ahmadinejad
shores up support on the Arab street for himself,
his supporters and a revolutionary Islamic
Republic. As an evolving state, the Islamic
Republic no longer seeks its former revolutionary
status - it is and wants to be perceived as a
status quo nation. Thus, the populist presidency
of Ahmadinejad complicates matters for the Islamic
Republic's elite establishment and democracy
seeking populace.
In turn, any hope
Washington has for peace in the Middle East
requires the marginalization of Ahmadinejad. As
long as the Bush administration keeps rejecting
the efforts of Iranian pragmatists for direct
negotiations, Ahmadinejad and his faction are
further empowered. In fact, each American
rejection and anti-Iranian statement is used to
portray the West as a hegemonic power seeking to
control the Muslim world. Thus, the current US
policy greatly helps in portraying the Iranian
pragmatists as weak, the West as evil, and
Ahmadinejad as the emancipator of a long-oppressed
people.
While Tehran realizes the need to
reign in Ahmadinejad, diplomatically doing so has
been difficult. Iran is not Kim Jong-Il's North
Korea or Mao Zedong's China. With Iranian
nationalism now at new heights, marginalizing the
nationalistic president is difficult without
overriding, pragmatic reasons. Direct negotiations
with the US and the potential benefits associated
serve as the exact prescription.
In any
such grand bargain, Tehran would accept a
comprehensive inspection regime while maintaining
its low-level enrichment program and ending
support for extremist groups. In essence, Tehran
would deliver on its 2003 proposal. In turn, the
US would arrange a number of guarantees - most
important to Tehran, of course, is a security
guarantee forswearing any military attack.
Similarly, Tehran would also want the US
to help create a new security environment for the
Persian Gulf in which the littoral states would be
primarily responsible for Persian Gulf's security,
but assisted by non-sovereign states as a
cooperative way to address all parties' vested
interests. Washington similarly did so with the
Russians in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s.
Also, vital to Tehran would be guarantee
to lift the current range of sanctions. The West
could also consider bringing Iran into
international economic organizations (such as the
World Trade Organization), granting Iran increased
commercial ties, and perhaps even providing
economic assistance.
Western nations could
and likely would offer to assist Iran with its
energy needs, which would serve as the entry way
into the untapped Iranian market worth hundreds of
billions of dollars in consumer goods,
infrastructure projects, service deals and
developmental possibilities.
In 2003, the
Bush administration stood in a position of
strength and rebuffed the Iranian attempt at
negotiations. Now, in 2006, perceiving itself in a
position of weakness, the Bush administration
continues to refuse direct negotiations with the
Islamic Republic.
If the Bush
administration won't talk to Iran when it's strong
and won't talk to Iran when it's weak, then when
will the Bush administration talk to Iran? With no
communication, there cannot be peace with a
nuclear Iran.
Neda Bolourchi,
JD, MA is currently in New York City.
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