US caught in Iran policy squeeze By M K Bhadrakumar
An extensive interview given by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the
Russian media, the full transcript of which has been seen by Asia Times Online,
throws much light on the state of play in the Iran nuclear issue.
His remarks illuminate the paucity of options that the United States has left
itself in dealing with the issue. Washington's May 31 offer to engage in direct
talks with Tehran is in fact its only real option - in Lavrov's words, "a
victory of common sense".
At the same time, Lavrov exposes as grandstanding many of the statements
emanating from the administration of US President George W Bush about the talks
offer. Moscow, it emerges, was not consulted on the matter, and is not party to
any tacit
agreement on imposing sanctions on Iran, despite Washington's
spin to this effect. In other words, an increasingly isolated United States
finds itself with very little room left to maneuver, let alone impose its will
on an increasingly multipolar world.
Lavrov comes in the great tradition of Russia's distinguished diplomats.
Especially given his profound experience in multilateral diplomacy, with
a distinguished spell of a few decades at the United Nations, there is none
among world statsmen who is in a better position to take an overview of the
criss-crossing tendencies and shadows falling on the Iran nuclear issue.
Lavrov revealed in his interview last Friday that it was a year ago, after
Russia and China had joined the ongoing talks between the EU-3 (Britain, France
and Germany) and Iran, that the US of its own accord expressed its readiness to
be "helpful" with the talks.
Thereafter, the EU countries and Russia tried to persuade the Americans to
"abandon their detached-observer status" and to play a more direct role.
Washington's decision last Wednesday to offer direct talks with Iran provided
it suspended nuclear activities constitutes, therefore, "a US switch-over from
a position on the roadside" to active participation in the talks. But Lavrov
implied that the US had made the decision in its wisdom rather than being drawn
into it at the behest of Russia or anyone else.
Clearly, the Russian leadership is not to be regarded as party to the Bush
administration's May 31 decision - as the deep briefings by unnamed American
officials implied in US media reports.
Lavrov reiterated this point by further saying that Russia was as much in the
dark as anyone else as to the timing of the Bush administration's decision. "It
is hard for me to judge what prompted the decision to announce that precisely
now [emphasis added]," Lavrov noted.
Thus what emerges is that Washington did not consult Moscow in the announcement
of the May 31 decision. That is to say, Moscow is estimating that the Bush
administration has acted entirely on the basis of its own compulsions. And that
implies that it is absurd for any claim to be advanced now to the effect that
Russia would be expected to reciprocate the US administration's decision.
What Lavrov said in effect contradicts the contentions that have been made by
unnamed American officials that the United States' May 31 decision, in turn,
made it possible to ensure that Russia (and China) would go along with UN
sanctions in the event of Iran refusing the forthcoming European Union package
being conveyed to Tehran by the visiting EU foreign-policy chief, Javier
Solana.
In a sharp observation, Lavrov described Washington's decision in the above
circumstances as "a victory of common sense" born out of a realization that
"exclusively unilateral demands do not work" in the Iran nuclear issue.
Lavrov indirectly conveyed Russia's skepticism over the condition that the
United States has placed in its May 31 offer to join the "Iran Six" talks (the
US, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany). He said, "We welcomed it [the
US decision] while noting that, of course, attempts should be avoided to impede
the advance to a negotiated result by way of parallel threats or through
placing on the talks agenda questions that have no bearing on Iran's nuclear
program."
Within the purview of the above remark, we can discern three questions and
Russia's position thereon: (a) Is a threat of UN sanctions being held out to
Iran unless it agrees to the EU package? (b) What about a military option? (c )
Is the nuclear issue to be linked to extraneous issues, such as Iran's policies
or regional and international factors at work?
Lavrov distanced himself from any talk of sanctions against Iran being in the
consideration zone. (President Vladimir Putin in a separate interview with
Western media chiefs last weekend noted the improbability of any UN sanctions
against Iran by quoting a Russian proverb that fancies that "if a grandmother
had certain reproductive organs, she would have been a grandfather".)
Lavrov said that guesswork or speculation regarding what would happen if Iran
refused the EU package only served to play into the hands of those "who would
like to thwart everything". All efforts, therefore, should remain focused on
the negotiation process ahead.
Lavrov made an extremely significant point that what was relevant at this stage
was not whether Tehran gave a "yes" or "no" answer. The all-important point was
that Iran should give a "constructive response". That is, Iran should leave the
door to negotiations open.
Lavrov went further by putting the onus as much on the Iran Six: "First of all
we [Iran Six] must develop common approaches with our partners, approaches that
would be acceptable to our Iranian partners and that would not restrict their
possibilities for using modern technology. At the same time, these approaches
must completely assuage the international community's concerns about the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies that could prove
dangerous to international peace."
Lavrov said the EU package did not contain any "ultimatum-like deadline",
either. The time limit given to Iran to respond is "several weeks". The Iran
Six has agreed that if Iran's response is of a kind that closes the door to
negotiations altogether, then the co-drafters of the UN Security Council
resolution (Britain and France) may consider themselves free to revive
discussions over their draft. At the moment, the draft simply lies on the table
since the Iran Six agreed that the "entire work of the UN Security Council is
to be frozen" pending the Iranian decision.
But Lavrov drew attention to the fact that even in the draft resolution, "there
is no talk in it of sanctions". As for a military option, Russia completely
rules it out too. Lavrov said that the Iran Six discussions and accord in
Vienna last Thursday were predicated on the firm understanding that there was
no question of launching any military attack on Iran. Lavrov said this
understanding should hold good for "all contingencies".
When Lavrov's interviewer pointedly asked whether such a categorical
understanding would exist among the Iran Six even if Iran were to refuse the
forthcoming EU package, Lavrov emphatically replied, "For all contingencies.
Interpret that for yourselves. I did not say about the American position, I
said about the agreement reached at yesterday's meeting [in Vienna] with the
participation of the Americans."
Looking back at last week's developments, Lavrov said he saw the process more
as a discussion going on with a view to somehow reducing the respective
positions of the Iran Six participants to a "common denominator". The
significance of the Vienna meeting, in retrospect, lies in that all six nations
have now agreed to negotiate collectively with Iran as a "group of like-minded
actors" in search of a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. This
meant, in essence, "a qualitative upgrading" of the participation by Russia,
China and the US in the negotiation process.
Interestingly, Lavrov confirmed that the question of "security guarantees"
figured in the Vienna discussions. He added that "security guarantees" would
also form a topic of negotiations with Iran in the period ahead. Iran is known
to want some form of guarantee from the US against an attack or covertly trying
to subvert it.
In the Russian perception, at this juncture, the EU-3 is the leading player
with regard to Iran. Whatever issues specific to Russia there might have been
in the past - a guaranteed fuel-supply regime for the Bushehr nuclear power
plant that Russia is building in Iran - are a thing of the past now insofar as
that matter has been settled.
So there is no "Russian angle" to the Iran nuclear issue as such - except, of
course, that the so-called Russian offer regarding setting up a nuclear
reprocessing facility for Iran on Russian soil is included in the EU package.
But Lavrov somewhat underplayed the remaining potentials of the offer, saying
that in his assessment, the offer "cannot radically change".
Germane to the versions appearing in the US media regarding the telephone
conversation between Putin and Bush last Wednesday, Lavrov clarified that it
touched only on "general matters" connected with the nuclear issue. Lavrov
pointed out that by the time the conversation took place, it was already
obvious that the differences among the Iran Six had narrowed ("approaches had
drawn closer") and that an agreement was likely in the cards.
Putin and Bush thus agreed that the focus at this juncture ought to be on
launching the negotiation process.
On the whole, Lavrov's statements dispel the misperceptions and
misinterpretations that have gathered during the past few days over the Iran
nuclear issue. Clearly, much posturing is going on in Washington, with senior
officials of the Bush administration, invariably claiming the cover of
anonymity, giving various spins to the US decision to back-track on its policy
of not being a direct party to the negotiations over the nuclear issue.
The US compulsions for indulging in such sophistry are evident. Washington's
Iran policy finds itself in a cul-de-sac. The United States is manifestly at
odds with majority world opinion. From what we see, no matter the US pressure
tactics and propaganda, the Russian (and Chinese) position on the Iran nuclear
issue has remained firm and consistent. (The Chinese foreign minister couldn't
attend the Vienna meet because of scheduling problems.) The mood among the EU
countries is also for avoiding any confrontation with Iran - if they can help
it.
The US is increasingly left with fewer options. In fact, the options, within
Washington's policy framework, have narrowed down to two: one, get used to the
possibility that a nuclear Iran might well emerge, or, second, resort to a
military strike that might set Iran's nuclear program back for a while.
Actually, both are "non-options". Washington, too, can sense it increasingly.
On the other hand, within the United States there is a growing body of opinion
that calls for a US-Iran dialogue. Influential figures have joined the chorus.
But such a shift in US policy demands an overall realignment of US strategy
toward the entire Middle East.
That, in turn, will profoundly affect Israel's core interests. However, Bush's
political standing domestically is uncertain and does not leave much scope to
make massive decisions of that nature. The Bush administration simply lacks the
political grit to differentiate US interests within this calculus and Israel's
interests at this juncture.
That leaves the administration with an extremely narrow corridor to traverse -
appearing not to be obdurate over the looming crisis while having to be seen,
being a first-rate world power, as doing something about the crisis.
This as opposed to being swept along by the undercurrents, but having to
realize at the same time the bitter truth that it is unable to be flexible on
the fundamentals of its Iran policy while in an increasingly multipolar world
it finds itself unable to change unilaterally the course of events regarding
Iran and the Middle East. The result is the grandstanding.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
diplomats.
Especially given his profound experience in multilateral diplomacy, with
a distinguished spell of a few decades at the United Nations, there is none
among world statsmen who is in a better position to take an overview of the
criss-crossing tendencies and shadows falling on the Iran nuclear issue.
