A leap of faith for Iran and the
US By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
This week has been widely described as one
of the "best weeks" in US diplomacy under the
current administration, in light of the latest
package of "carrots and sticks" thrown at Iran by
the big powers, eliciting a mildly positive first
reaction by Tehran.
The big question is
whether the mood of optimism will spill over to
the following weeks or dry up like a meteor in the
dark sky of global diplomacy on Iran's nuclear
issue.
The package, details of which were
disclosed by the American Broadcasting Co and
confirmed by the Washington Post, is indeed the
most general proposal yet put on the table. It is
a comprehensive, multi-faceted package that nicely
fits the description of a "grand bargain", in
essence asking Iran to trade its current
enrichment-related programs in exchange for
nuclear
assistance, trade, economic
and security incentives. It warns, on the other
hand, that Iran's failure to accept the deal would
implicate it in tough United Nations actions, such
as a travel ban for Iranian officials, blockage of
Iran's World Trade Organization entry, curbs on
arms sales to Iran, etc.
According to Ali
Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, both
sides in the nuclear row are now on the verge of
an important crossroads. This is certainly true
for Iran, which must weigh carefully the
advantages and disadvantages for its national
interests by its positive or negative response to
the proposed carrot-and-stick approach. This
includes the US offer of nuclear assistance, as
reported in the Washington Post, which quoted US
officials going even further and stating the
United States' willingness to consider allowing
enrichment of uranium by Iran on its own territory
should it satisfy all the lingering concerns and
assure the world of its benign nuclear intentions.
This is, without doubt, a major concession
on the part of the administration of US President
George W Bush, which had previously opposed even a
single centrifuge spinning inside Iran. This news
coincides with a new report by the International
Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's relentless
pursuit of the nuclear-fuel cycle. The IAEA's
latest finding is yet another indication that Iran
is unlikely to meet the outside demands to suspend
fully its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing
activities.
Javier Solana, the European
Union's external-affairs chief, who delivered the
package, has described his visit to Tehran as
"very constructive" and has hinted that he may
need to return to Iran for another round of
consultations.
Meanwhile, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated that the
possibility for revising the Iran package is open,
and British and French officials have similarly
expressed guarded optimism.
A golden
opportunity The stalemated US-Iran
relations now has been potentially given a new
opportunity to awaken from more than a quarter of
a century of slumber. The US has offered to lift
its ban on the sale of aircraft and aircraft parts
for Iran's aging fleet, among other things, and
one could well witness the unblocking of Iran-US
trade should the nuclear row be resolved.
All this depends, of course, on the
trustworthiness of the US-led package, which in
turn raises the question of how to assure Iranians
that past episodes of broken promises will not
happen again. What if the next US administration
reneges on the commitments made to Iran by this
administration?
After all, per the US-Iran
Algiers Agreement of 1980, the United States has
pledged not to interfere in Iran's internal
affairs, and yet today we are witnessing a most
blatant piece of legislation pending in the US
Congress, backed by the pro-Israel lobbyists. The
Iran Freedom Support Act, a bill aimed at
tightening US sanctions on Iran, has
overwhelmingly passed the House of
Representatives, but must still be voted on in the
Senate.
In other words, Iran cannot afford
to be indifferent to the anti-Iran developments in
the US Congress, which may culminate in a
bifurcated US policy toward Iran, one by the White
House and one by Congress.
Henceforth, it
is vitally important that the US government speaks
in one voice on Iran, thus putting to rest Iran's
continued, history-fed misgivings about the
package mentioned above.
The question
of geopolitics One of the complicating
factors of the Iran nuclear crisis may be
identified by future historians in terms of its
timing in relation to the changing tectonics of
geopolitics in the great landmass of Eurasia and
beyond, in light of the upcoming summits of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the
Group of Eight (G8) countries in June and July
respectively.
Chinese officials have made
it official: Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
has been invited to the SCO summit next Thursday,
roughly three weeks ahead of the G8 summit in St
Petersburg, presided over by Russia.
Intent on strengthening the SCO as a
viable political-military bloc, Russian President
Vladimir Putin is now faced with one of the most
complex challenges of his presidency, that is, how
to take advantage of the West economically while
looking eastward geostrategically.
According to Sergei Lavrov, the Russian
foreign minister, "The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization understands the problems of its
regions very well and is capable of solving them
by itself." In other words, US power out, just as
the SCO demanded the closing of US military bases
in Central Asia at its summit last year. (The SCO
comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.)
Consequently,
Iran's inclusion (as well as that of other
potential new members such as Ukraine, Belarus,
Pakistan and India) would serve to bolster the
Russia-China common cause to barricade
geopolitically against US military intervention.
But not all is well within the SCO, and
the current rift between Uzbekistan and
(US-friendly) Kyrgyzstan is just one example of
how things can go sour with respect to the SCO's
rather grand security designs, above all its
long-term vision for collective security. Even
Kazakhstan, which participates in North Atlantic
Treaty Organization programs, is not particularly
inclined to emulate China and Russia with regard
to US power or NATO, at least not under the
present leadership.
Nonetheless, the fact
remains that the SCO's likely expansion and
adoption of important decisions at its summit,
including on new members such as Iran, will move
the geopolitical tectonics a couple of tremors,
and one wonders whether the new "soft power"
approach by the US toward Iran has anything to do
with this prospect, that is, as a preemptive
counter-move, or has it been designed completely
in isolation from these developments?
Iran's internal debates The
sheer depth and comprehensiveness of the nuclear
package has clearly surprised Iran and will likely
fuel the argument of political moderates who
counsel a compromised solution to the dangerous
crisis. With sufficient guarantees in a true
multilateral framework, the incentives can make a
meaningful and long-lasting effect on the Iranian
economy, security calculations, and so on,
warranting serious consideration by the political
leaders.
As of this writing, Tehran's
dailies and the official and semi-official blogs
have provided little commentary on the package, to
which Iran has been given "a few weeks" to
respond. Most comment is self-limited to carefully
calibrated responses by a few key officials. Given
Russia's and China's endorsement of this package,
and Lavrov's warning that Russia may back
sanctions if Iran is found in violation of its
obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Iran may lose the support of Moscow and
Beijing if it flatly rejects the package.
What may happen, alternatively, is Iran's
willingness to re-suspend centrifuge operations
for the duration of coming talks featuring the US
alongside the EU-3 (France, Britain and Germany).
This alternative has been vigorously pushed by
Solana, and there are rudimentary signs of an
Iranian willingness to accept it. Of course, it is
perfectly possible that such signs will get buried
by an avalanche of negative second thoughts that
would place the singular emphasis on Iran's right
to produce nuclear fuel independently.
A
good many Iranians are, on the other hand,
beginning to question the wisdom of risking
"practically everything" for the sake of nuclear
technology, and the tide of public opinion may be
shifting in favor of a compromised formula as
well. All in all, the underlying ground for the
new optimism is hardening.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005,
with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping
Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard
International Review. He is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating
Facts Versus Fiction.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing
.)
