For Iran, with its millennia of history as
a civilization behind it, eight weeks mean nothing
as a period of reflection. For the United States,
with its compressed, intense history, one-sixth of
a year is an awful long time.
This "clash
of civilizations" over time and space colored the
Iran-US discord this week. Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad, while addressing a small town
audience in the western province of Hamedan on
Wednesday, made a reference to the European Union
package of "carrots" regarding Iran's nuclear
program (specifically to get it to stop
uranium-enrichment activities) awaiting
consideration in Tehran.
Ahmadinejad said,
"We will study the offer and, inshah Allah
[God willing], will give our opinion at the end of
the Mordad," the Iranian
month
that ends on August 22. It was otherwise a speech
that was heavily loaded with the topics of the day
for a provincial audience - social justice, good
governance, unemployment, fair distribution of
resources among the provinces, and so on.
But it goes to the growing stature of
Ahmadinejad on the world stage that within minutes
or hours, what he said reached the ears of US
President George W Bush, who was holding summit
with EU leaders in Vienna's Hofburg Castle. Bush
was not amused.
To quote media reports,
Bush "made clear his patience was running short".
Bush said, "It seems an awful long time for a
reasonable proposal ... It shouldn't take the
Iranians that long to analyze what is a reasonable
deal ... I said weeks, not months."
As for
the US offer to engage Iran in talks, Bush said,
"We'll come to the table when they verifiably
suspend. Period." (He was referring to the US
demand that Iran must suspend all
uranium-enrichment activities as a precondition
for the commencement of talks.)
Ahmadinejad came to know of Bush's anger.
On Thursday morning, while still in Hamedan, he
took an early opportunity at an audience with war
veterans and war widows to shrug off Bush's
irritation. Ahmadinejad said, "Today certain
bullying powers in the international arena seek to
impose their wishes on our nation through force or
threats of the use of force to deprive us of the
benefits of modern technologies. It is our duty to
thwart the goals of these bullying powers by
maintaining our unity." The audience reportedly
cheered the Iranian leader.
Evidently,
word quickly spread about this sharp "exchange"
between Ahmadinejad and Bush. In Moscow, Russian
President Vladimir Putin tried to soothe nerves.
Coming out of a meeting in the Kremlin with
Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi (Italy,
incidentally, is similarly placed as Russia in
having extensive economic ties with Iran), Putin
gently suggested that things were not after all
that bad.
He said, "Our job is to use the
negotiating process of the six nations and Iran to
return the question [of Iran's nuclear program] to
the framework of the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency]. Judging from what we heard from
our Iranian partners in Shanghai [on the sidelines
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
summit on June 15], I think that is entirely
possible."
Equally, at the end of the day,
the joint EU-US summit declaration in Vienna
seemed to visualize the prospects of a negotiated
settlement of the Iran nuclear issue. It took note
that EU-US cooperation over the past year on the
matter had reached a "new level"; that the two
sides had worked "closely together at every stage
of the ongoing attempts to address the question";
and that the EU package offered a "basis for
discussions with Iran" (emphasis added) and
Iran had a genuine chance to reach a negotiated
agreement.
Curiously, the statement made a
distinction that the US (not the EU) is insisting
on Iran resuming "full and verifiable suspension
of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities as required by the IAEA" before talks
commenced. It went on to say, "If Iran decides not
to engage in negotiations, further steps [will] be
taken in the Security Council. We urge Iran to
take the positive path."
The EU-US
declaration was an exercise in brevity and
masterly ambiguity. There was no word of any
"sticks" such as sanctions or ultimatums; there
was no time frame for Iran's response; it was
unclear what form of response should be expected
from Iran - should it be a "yes" or "no" reply or,
if not, what else?
This comes amid reports
that there is a new flexibility on the part of the
US and EU regarding the so-called precondition
that Iran should cease all uranium-enrichment
activities. The New York Times reported last
Saturday, quoting "diplomats involved in the
talks", that the precondition need not be taken as
"surgically precise" and had in fact become itself
the "subject of anxious diplomacy ... a sort of
pre-negotiation negotiation".
The report
mentioned "signs of optimism and flexibility,
suggesting that players on both sides are
struggling to create momentum for talks by finding
common ground ...The question is whether some low
level of enrichment activity, couched as
'research', will be deemed permissible and whether
the objections to such a move will yield to
compromise."
Iran on its part is indeed in
a conciliatory mood. Even after the latest
Ahmadinejad-Bush exchange, Iranian Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki seized the heights
quickly by telling the media on Thursday in Baku,
where he was attending the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) foreign ministers' meet, that
"the important thing is the creation of a positive
atmosphere". He repeated that the EU package
constituted a "step forward as compared to the
ones proposed in previous years". He held out the
assurance that Iran was studying the EU proposals
"seriously and carefully" and indeed with a
"positive viewpoint". He gently chided Bush for
his petulance in demanding a time-bound response
from Tehran - "we hope the disputes over the time
factor would not further politicize the issue".
Mottaki made two important points. He
stressed that "relying on strong political will,
and the goodwill of all sides, the negotiations
might be resumed without any preconditions, but in
any such talks, Iran's right must be recognized on
the one hand, and efforts aimed at strengthening
the NPT [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] can be
pursued on the other" (emphasis added).
Second, Mottaki pointed out that reaching
a "consensus" with the West regarding the above
parameters would have a salutary effect on peace
and stability in the entire region, including in
Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iran is willing to
"offer valuable assistance".
Thus what
emerges is that Iran is likely to signal its
readiness for negotiations provided Washington is
prepared to obfuscate its "precondition"; Iran
will respond only by the end of August at the
earliest; Iran's response may well be in the
nature of "counter-proposals"; pre-negotiations
over negotiations are in effect under way; Iran is
willing to widen the scope of discussions to go
beyond the nuclear issue.
August for
Iran Washington is finding it extremely
frustrating to come to terms with what is going on
in the multipolar world. Ahmadinejad at one stroke
has ensured that Bush will not carry the Iran file
to the Group of Eight summit in St Petersburg on
July 15. So Bush must give up his original
intention to sew up the next move on the Iran
nuclear issue at the G8 summit - a prospect that,
interestingly, also suits Moscow's priorities.
Iran seems to have concluded that it
should not hurry with a response after carefully
weighing its options. Interestingly, the Chinese
spokesman at the SCO summit last week had
forewarned, "I think they [Iran] might need more
time. So we need to remain patient." Chinese
President Hu Jintao had told Ahmadinejad on the
sidelines of SCO that China hoped Iran would
"earnestly study and respond positively" to the EU
offer and that the critical point was to build
mutual trust with the EU.
Hu assured
Ahmadinejad that China understood Iran's concern
over its right to the peaceful use of nuclear
power, and that "China is ready to maintain close
communications with Iran" and to play a
"constructive role".
Again, Putin assessed
his meeting with Ahmadinejad at Shanghai as "very
positive". He said, "First, the Iranians have
reacted positively to the proposals put forward by
the six countries for ending the current crisis.
Second, our Iranian partners are ready to begin
negotiations. Third, I hope the Iranians will
formulate their position regarding the time frame
for the start of these negotiations in the nearest
future."
As regards the time frame for the
commencement of negotiations, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov commented on June 16, "Iran
will soon announce the dates it'll propose for the
talks. I think this is a very constructive
response. It is, of course, tentative ... Iran is
still only preparing its concrete reaction,
including that on the time frame. We'll expect
this encouraging news to be couched in concrete
terms very soon."
The Bush administration
is reconciling to Ahmadinejad's time frame. But
what lies ahead is a lot tougher. Iran may also
have to be allowed to enrich uranium for research
purposes during IAEA inspections, provided Iran
guarantees to the absence of military components
in the program. Washington senses that there are
very few takers in the international community for
its insistence that Iran has no right to a nuclear
cycle.
But the problem is that there is a
deep divide within US opinion itself regarding
Iran. Clearly, a military option is to be ruled
out. Also, neither the US$75 million propaganda
apparatus (approved by Congress) within the US
State Department nor the Voice of America's
Farsi-language broadcasts can be expected to
provide a solution to the "Iran problem". The Bush
administration is believed to be highly skeptical
about the prospects of "regime change" through the
activities of Iranian dissident groups, as they
have no common agenda or political ideologies.
The only other option of attempting a
"regime change" would be through US, British or
Israeli intelligence fomenting subversive
activities within Iran. Such covert operations are
indeed going on, and may have even been
intensified in the recent months. But it is a
double-edged sword - and it can be used only
sparingly and very judiciously.
The plain
truth is that British soldiers deployed in Basra
region have also begun taking retaliatory hits
with greater frequency. Indeed, Iran can always
teach the Israeli elements based in Iraqi
Kurdistan a hard lesson or two. Besides, there is
almost unlimited scope for Iran to turn the tables
on the American or British troops inside
Afghanistan, if it chooses to abandon its
self-restraint, especially at a time when the
Afghan resistance is steadily expanding into
northern and western regions.
But at the
same time, the option of eschewing these hostile
policies and adopting a genuine course of
normalization with Iran is also not going to be
easy for the Bush administration. For one thing,
there is a policy rift within the US
administration.
Israeli leaders, according
to reports, have asked US Jewish organizations to
lower their profile on the Iran issue at the
present juncture so as not to embarrass Bush.
Israel has a lot to lose if it emerges that the
Bush administration's policy toward Iran is
motivated by a desire to protect Israel - an
impression that inevitably leads the world
attention all the way to Israel's own nuclear
program.
It doesn't suit Israel and the
Jewish organizations to be perceived as "the lobby
for war with Iran". But this pragmatism does not
mean that in actuality they have the stomach for
the Bush administration's shift on direct talks
with Iran.
But the pro-Israel
neo-conservative analysts in the US, who have no
such compulsions as Israel and the Jewish lobby,
are loudly condemning the Bush administration's
"softening" approach toward Iran. In the words of
Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise
Institute, a former Pentagon official and a
leading neo-con analyst, "The administration can't
have it both ways. They can't embrace the regime
and still talk about liberty for the Iranian
people."
Rubin lambasted Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, saying she "can spout
whatever platitudes she wants to spout, but at
this point, when it comes to liberty and freedom,
she has no credibility".
At the same time,
it is evident from the EU-US summit in Vienna on
Wednesday that while trans-Atlantic relations have
transformed in the past year or so, part of the
reason for this is that Washington has moved
closer to the EU on issues such as Iran - and not
the other way around.
In fact, Austrian
Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel drew attention to
this by describing the US move to drop its
opposition to direct involvement in negotiations
with Iran as a "historic signal" that helped
foster EU-US cooperation. (Curiously, in European
public opinion, according to a Financial
Times/Harris poll conducted in five leading
European countries last week, 36% of people
considered the US the biggest threat to world
stability - even ahead of Iran.)
Tehran's
diplomatic campaign has been extremely successful
in frustrating the US attempt to isolate Iran.
Consider last week's score. The visitors to Tehran
included Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi;
the secretary general of the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abdul-Aziz
al-Hakim; the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia,
Prince Saud al-Faisal; Moroccan Foreign Minister
Mohamed Benaissa; Syrian Defense Minister General
Hassan Turkmani; Speaker of the Kazakh parliament
Nurtai Abykayev; and a delegation from the British
House of Commons.
This was also a week,
incidentally, during which the OIC foreign
ministers' meeting in Baku adopted a joint
statement strongly supportive of Iran on the
nuclear issue, and endorsed an Iranian proposal
for hosting a conference of foreign ministers of
Iraq's neighbors in Tehran on July 17-18.
Without doubt, there was also enormous
political symbolism in the offer made by visiting
Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Hu Jintao in
Beijing on Tuesday that Afghanistan could act as a
"bridge" connecting China and Iran.
And
Iran has just begun playing its "energy card".
Ahmadinejad significantly added to speculation
regarding the likely formation of an alliance of
gas-producing countries when he said in his speech
at the SCO summit in Shanghai that energy
coordination by the SCO countries could help
"prevent the threats of domineering powers and
their aggressive interference in global affairs".
He further told Putin that Russian-Iranian
energy cooperation "could be even more productive
if we cooperated in pricing gas and forming the
main gas routes".
Putin said he supported
the idea of a SCO "energy club" and joint
Russian-Iranian projects. "Our companies are
holding talks about pooling efforts in the oil and
gas spheres," Putin said. Lavrov later stressed
that such cooperation will increase. No one is
talking about a "gas version of OPEC"
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
here - unless, of course, the US presses ahead
with a common energy strategy with the EU, which
seems unlikely.
But in principle, the
creation of a gas cartel is within the realms of
possibility, although what is in the pipeline as
of now may be in the nature of development and
supply coordination between Russia and Iran rather
than a formal cartel.
Besides, according
to a report from the Beijing Morning Post this
week, China is embarking on the development of a
pipeline system in Central Asia for transporting
30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually
from Turkmenistan starting from 2009.
The
pipeline will go through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. The Chinese report says, "Fortunately,
these two countries [Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan]
also intend to export natural gas to China.
Therefore, once the pipeline is built, the three
countries can export natural gas to China
simultaneously." What the report doesn't elaborate
is that an extension of such a pipeline beyond
Turkmenistan to Iran is completely feasible.
Energy politics involving Russia-Iran
cooperation and the construction of a pipeline
grid in Central Asia by China hold the potential
to shift the global balance of power from West to
East. How Tehran views these prospects finds its
echo in the speech made by the hugely influential
head of the National Security and Foreign Policy
Commission of the Iranian majlis (parliament),
Alaeddin Broujerdi, in Tehran on Wednesday.
Broujerdi undoubtedly spoke for the
highest levels of Iran's religious leadership when
he said, "We believe in understanding and a
logical interaction with the world based on mutual
interests ... [But] continuation of suspension [of
uranium enrichment] will not be acceptable. Iran
welcomes negotiations with no preconditions ...
[But] we still have no confidence in the United
States because, besides its historical hostility
towards the Iranian people, it spares no efforts
even now to put Iran under pressure. The US
Congress has just presented a resolution banning
gasoline export to Iran, which is a new step that
reinforces our lack of confidence in the US ...
"As a great sovereign independent and
influential country, Iran is now determined to
play a historical role."
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years,
with postings including India's ambassador to
Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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