SPEAKING
FREELY Why Iran is taking its
time By Sanam Vakil
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As the world
cautiously awaits the official Iranian response to
the 5+1 (UN Permanent Five plus Germany) nuclear
proposal that includes an offer of direct talks
with the United States, Tehran has pursued
delaying tactics in responding to the proposal,
foreshadowing the difficulties that lie ahead.
Clearly, the regime is struggling to assess its
options in the wake of the Bush administration's
continued pressure over Tehran's two ticking
clocks - one nuclear, the other democratic. The
nuclear clock
represents international
pressures; the democratic clock, internal
pressure.
These ticking clocks are
important to consider as Iran ponders the nuclear
offer, and the administration of US President
George W Bush continues to pressure the regime and
stimulate the Iranian people with words about
democracy and freedom. At the same time, Iran has
been subject to a burst of domestic hostility
toward the regime from students, ethnic minorities
and religious leaders. Undoubtedly, this increase
in internal activity has made the regime feel the
ticking of its democratic clock. While Washington
hopes to stimulate this movement, Tehran aims to
re-create a situation that balances its nuclear
clock while stalling its democratic one.
Understanding the dynamics behind these two clocks
is necessary to deconstructing the Iranian
decision-making process.
For many months
it appeared that Tehran had managed to capture the
upper hand in the nuclear balancing act through
its divide-and-conquer confrontational strategy
with the international community. The breakthrough
counter-announcement by the Bush administration
tactically tilted the scales of power in favor of
Washington and gave Tehran's leaders reason to
pause. Now, it is the Islamic Republic that has
experienced a reversal of fortune and must
carefully weigh its delicate international
pressures against its domestic ones.
The
ultimate goal for the Islamic Republic is regime
preservation. To this end, the mullahs have
pursued a two-pronged process: they've tried to
keep the nuclear clock running while stalling the
democracy clock. This approach worked for the
regime throughout the nuclear negotiations until
Washington pulled out its trump card. Tehran can
no longer use the nuclear issue to buffer against
the threat of growing domestic unrest.
Should Tehran engage in diplomatic talks
with the "Great Satan", a maneuver that would be
supported by the majority of Iran's youthful
pro-American street, it would serve to protect the
regime by providing it with a guarantee of
international security but would simultaneously
release the suppressed forces of the nation's
democratic clock. Thus a compromise with the
international community would ultimately lead to
further concessions on the domestic front.
Throughout this game of nuclear cat and
mouse, internal tensions have mounted as the
regime has tied its ideological legitimacy to
nationalistic foreign-policy issues while
attempting to unite its diverse population.
Indeed, what has emerged on the Iranian street is
a fractured edifice that could damage the
long-term viability of the regime. In this period,
the regime has seen a surge in ethnic violence,
worker strikes, student protests and religious
persecution.
These threats to the regime's
domestic stability are of utmost importance. Any
perceived government compliance with the
international community could be domestically
destabilizing should the nuclear program be
replaced by pressing issues of domestically driven
mandates.
Important considerations for the
regime are whether the benefits of nuclear carrots
outweigh the consequences of international sticks.
Here the answer lies in either the international
response should Iran reject the nuclear offer or,
conversely, the domestic reaction should Iran
accept the deal and move toward cooperation with
the international community. The former would
apply should Tehran force this last opportunity
for engagement to fail by offering a
counter-proposal. Indeed, any Iranian attempt to
bargain in an effort to advance its nuclear clock
would lead the United States to abandon any
further dialogue.
For Iran, the prospect
of international isolation through stringent
sanctions and military action, while bleak, would
at least stall Iran's democratic clock in the
short run. None other than President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad would gain from this strategy, since
his factional brand of nationalistic politics has
only bolstered his presence. Any military strike
or sanctioning of Iran would further aggrandize
the president and enhance the strength of the
regime while under external pressure.
Knowing that the Eurasian movement toward
China and Russia has significantly benefited Iran,
this route might also protect Tehran, as its
commercial and strategic ties to Beijing and
Moscow have enabled it to pursue a
divide-and-conquer strategy among the permanent
members of the Security Council. The exchange of
goodwill among Arab and Muslim neighbors and
countries alike will be sure to benefit Tehran
should it proceed down such a path of
confrontation to protect its domestic frontier.
Conversely, the consequences should Iran
compromise are a burgeoning concern, for the
Islamic government has not been able to curtail
the signs of domestic unrest throughout the
country, even during the nuclear crisis. Indeed,
this strife foreshadows the challenge to come once
the democratic clock resumes its forceful ticking.
Since last summer, Kurdish unrest has
increased in the hopes that more attention will be
brought to bear on local developments and
political representation. In southwestern Ahvaz,
rioting, violence and October bombings have led to
arrests and clashes with Iranian security forces.
Most recently, two people were executed for their
purported participation in the uprising that the
government has associated with outside forces.
The Sunni minority in Sistan and
Baluchestan provinces near the Pakistani border
has also agitated against the government, forming
a group known as Jundallah, or God's Soldiers. In
January they held a group of Iranian border guards
hostage, demanding the release of 16 jailed
members in exchange. The group claims that the
regime has killed more than 400 of its members and
has become politicized in an effort to protect the
Sunni minority, which like the other minority
groups has been subject to political, economic,
and human-rights violations in the decades since
the 1979 revolution.
Additionally, the
Azeris, Iran's largest minority ethnic group,
consisting of 16% of the population, have recently
demonstrated in cities around the country in
response to a racist cartoon published in an
Iranian newspaper. The awakening of this minority
group among others only adds tension to the
central government's ability to manage its
relations with these ethnic groups that have
significant economic, social and political
grievances. Should the president and his cadres in
the Revolutionary Guards continue their strong-arm
tactics of repression, these issues will most
likely intensify.
It's important to note
the revivalist demonstrations of students who have
protested against government interference in
campus affairs and student elections, including
the removal of faculty. Many of the demonstrators
were chanting: "We don't want nuclear energy" and
"Forget Palestine - think of us". While Iran's
student movement was usually deemed apathetic
since the failure of the reformist movement, such
bursts of political activity amid the increasingly
stringent crackdowns indicate that public demand
for change could reawaken.
Even more
threatening for the conservative elite has been
the February bus drivers' strike in Tehran. This
important event was barely noticed by the Western
press. The bus drivers united against a political
ban on trade unions accusing their managers of
corrupt practices. Their demands included better
salaries and working conditions. Ironically, these
demands coincided with the election of
Ahmadinejad, who campaigned on an anti-corruption
platform and promised to confront the crooked
practices of the entrenched regime.
However, the president understands that to
curb corruption would, in essence, be biting the
hand that has fed him. Moreover, it would only
increase his factional challenges on the domestic
front. Without presidential support, these
government workers joined forces in solidarity.
Many were arrested over this defiance and
undoubtedly some are still in prison.
In
meeting the United States at the negotiating
table, Tehran not only will be compromising over
the nuclear program but will lose nationalism as a
way of deflecting dissent. Certainly, an immediate
gain of international security could foment a loss
of domestic instability, as internal political and
economic concerns would force the regime into
further national confrontations. This, of course,
is the objective of the international community,
but it runs counter to the interest of regime
preservation designed to enshrine the Islamic
Republic.
President Bush's latest speech
directly addresses the Iranian people, hoping to
empower them while simultaneously speaking to the
regime's fears: "I've a message for the Iranian
people: The United States respects you and your
country. The people of Iran, like people
everywhere, also want and deserve an opportunity
to determine their own future, an economy that
rewards their intelligence and talents, and a
society that allows them to pursue their dreams
... We'll provide more than [US]$75 million this
year to promote openness and freedom for the
Iranian people."
With these words,
Washington continues its shrewd double policy of
engagement and regime change that signals its
subtle reluctance to directly engage the
theocratic regime. The Islamic Republic's subdued
approach to the nuclear proposal can be
interpreted as equally calculated. As Tehran
considers this nuclear proposal, its insecurity is
undoubtedly attributed to the conflicting global
visions of its two clocks. Indeed, either option
for Tehran will have uncertain consequences.
With Tehran and Washington bound to clash
over nuclear diplomacy and democratic
transparency, the echo of these two clocks will
continue to emanate loudly in both capitals
without a clear resolution.
Sanam
Vakil is an assistant professor of Middle East
Studies at Johns Hopkins' Paul H Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
(Copyright 2006 Sanam Vakil.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
