DAMASCUS - British prime minister Winston Churchill once said: "I pass with
relief from the tossing sea of Cause and Theory to the firm ground of Result
and Fact." Today in Iraq, we stand - for the first time since the Iraq war
began in 2003 - on the firm ground of "result and fact".
First, we had the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (announced on June 8),
followed 40 minutes later by completion of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's
cabinet and the appointment of a Sunni as minister of defense. Hopes that the
Sunnis, now in government, would shoulder responsibility for security and end
the three-year-old insurgency were once again heightened.
Next, we had the national-reconciliation plan of Maliki, who said a truce would
be reached with armed groups in the Sunni
insurgency followed by a series of amnesties. Last Tuesday, Maliki
released 450 detainees from Abu Ghraib prison, bringing the number of Iraqis
released from jail since May to more than 2,500. Government employees released
from jail would be allowed to return to their jobs and to start new lives with
an unblemished record, and their service, bonuses and pensions would be
considered uninterrupted.
Students released would not be failed for the academic year 2005-06 and would
be allowed to sit for their final exams. Those arrested and released without
charge would have their prison time calculated as part of their compulsory
military service. All of these privileges, Maliki added, would be canceled if
any person were arrested again for political crimes.
None of the released had been convicted of setting off bombs, sectarian
killings, torture or kidnapping. According to the Ministry of Human Rights, a
total of 28,700 detainees were held in Iraqi jails as of April 30. Maliki
announced that more releases were yet to come to bring down the number
significantly, saying: "Those who will be released are people who are not loyal
to ousted president Saddam Hussein or terrorists or anyone who stained his
hands with the Iraqi people's blood." He added that those who "committed
killings or bombings will not be released".
So far, six Sunni political and military groups (previously hostile to Maliki's
government) have welcomed the premier's initiative and pledged to enter the
political process and lay down their arms. They have either lost faith in armed
combat or prefer to save what can be salvaged of their careers and lives and to
turn a new page in the political system of Iraq.
This was echoed by the Iraqi Islamic Party that is close to the Muslim
Brotherhood. Sunni cleric Ahmad Abdul-Ghafur, the head of Sunni Endowments who
is responsible for mosques and shrines in Iraq, also supported and "blessed"
Maliki's initiative. With no surprise, however, the Mujahideen Shura Council -
a legacy of Zarqawi - flatly rejected Maliki's reconciliation. This rejection
was echoed by 10 other Sunni groups in Iraq.
At first blush, all of this means an A-plus for Maliki. Many had doubts
that this relatively unknown politician, brought to power in May, would be
able to solve Iraq's numerous woes. He lacked a power base in the Shi'ite
community and seemingly the political experience to lead a war-torn country
like Iraq. He was neither one of the brains of Islam, like Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, nor one of the traditional leaders of the Shi'ites. He was not
close to Iran, as many Shi'ite politicians are, nor did he command a militia to
enforce his will.
Maliki, however, has so far passed with flying colors. His most difficult task,
however, will be to disband the armed militias in his own Shi'ite community,
such as the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of
Iraq (SCIRI) and the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Without achieving that,
Maliki will simply never be able to impose his will on the rivaling Iraqi
factions.
In a reminder of just how potent the insurgency is, a terrorist bombing took
place in Baquba, 56 kilometers northeast of Baghdad, killing 25 and wounding 33
Iraqis. Another 22 were blown up while watching a World Cup match in a Shi'ite
village. Minutes later, another blast killed 15 Iraqis and wounded 56 in Hilla,
a Shi'ite city 105km south of Baghdad. Meanwhile, a professor at the University
of Technology was killed in a drive-by shooting in al-Mansur, and the bodies of
five men, all riddled with bullets, were found in Baghdad.
These bloody terrorist attacks drowned out the initiative of the six Sunni
groups who pledged to work with the prime minister. Maliki's aide Hassan
al-Sunaid said the prime minister was considering meeting with the heads of
these groups to cement the reconciliation between them and the government.
Sunaid said they were the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the Mohammad Army, the Abtal
al-Iraq (Heroes of Iraq), the 9th of April Group, Al-Fatah Brigade, and the
Brigades of the General Command of the Armed Forces. All of these groups,
presumably, had already made contacts with President Jalal Talbani.
As all of this good news was coming in from Baghdad, more news was emerging out
of Washington. General George Casey, commander of the US troops in Iraq, told
the Pentagon last week that the number of combat brigades in Iraq is due to by
cut by 60% over the next 18 months. Up to 7,000 troops would be withdrawn from
Iraq by the end of the year. Two brigades set to return to the US in September
would not be replaced. They are the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division,
stationed in west Baghdad, and the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division,
in Diyala and Salhuddine provinces.
This classified material was revealed by the New York Times on June 26. By the
end of 2007, the newspaper said, "the United States would still have
responsibility for the Iraqi capital and the area west of Baghdad". This
reasoning implies that the Sunni insurgency is only strong in Baghdad while
being reduced, marginalized or eradicated in other districts, meaning that it
would safe for the Americans stationed in the outlying areas to leave. But what
guarantees are there that they will not again fall to the insurgents?
To combat this threat if it does occur, Maliki needs a strong army, a strong
police force and strong support in the Sunni community. He is currently getting
that, but this support is conditioned on the disarming of the Shi'ite militias.
If they remain armed, and strong, this would be a turn-off for the Sunnis, who
would see no reason to support the prime minister if he cannot bring law and
order to the Shi'ites.
His predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, had tolerated these militias, explaining
why the Sunnis were united in bringing him down and supported Maliki, who
promised from Day 1 to end their military activity. If he fails to do that, he
would lose support of the Sunnis. Losing support would mean chaos for the
districts of Iraq that would be free of US troops from 2007 onward, should the
Casey withdrawal plan be implemented.
To bring order to the provinces once the Americans leave, Maliki would need the
support of the traditional leaders of both the Sunnis and Shi'ites. He would
need everyone who means anything in Iraq to stand firmly behind him and call on
the Iraqis to unite and set aside their differences for the task of
post-American nation-building. He would need the support of clerics such as Ali
al-Sistani, Iran-backed leaders such as Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, and revolutionary
leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr. If he allies himself with someone like
Muqtada, however, he risks angering Sadr's opponents in the Sunni and Shi'ite
communities. If he angers Muqtada, he risks more sectarian violence in cities
and towns liberated from the Americans.
By all accounts the war-weary US public welcomed the Casey initiative, meaning
that more than half of the US troops in Iraq would soon be returning home. The
US administration would be able to sell this retrenchment on the grounds that
Iraq was ready to stand on its own, that Maliki's cabinet is in place, the
insurgents are laying down their arms, and Zarqawi is dead. This after all, is
what President George W Bush has been promising all along.
Observing the rhetoric of the Sunni groups supportive of the insurgency,
however, one understands that the Sunnis would not lay down their arms, and
endorse Maliki's truce, simply based on what Casey said regarding troop
reductions. This is certainly not good enough for them. Bringing 7,000 troops
back to the United States means nothing to the insurgents - except that there
would be fewer troops to fight. The Sunnis would not lay down their arms in
response to bringing the US troops levels down from 127,000 to about
50,000-70,000. To them, 50,000 means the same as 127,000. They would only lay
down their arms and stop the violence to enable to Americans to make a rapid
and immediate exodus. Anything short of that would be curtly refused by the
Sunni insurgents.
As things stand, Maliki will have to make several strategic and highly
important decisions in the weeks to come, if Casey's plan for partial and
gradual withdrawal materializes. He will have to walk a tightrope between
different political groups that seem to be united around him, at least for now.
To do that, he needs to continue giving them what Churchill called for: Facts
and Results.
