On Thursday, Israeli
Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, who is a
member of the country's security cabinet, told the
press that after more than one week of military
operations against Lebanon, Hezbollah's offensive
capabilities had been cut in half. Mofaz added
that Israel was determined to finish the task and
to annihilate the rest of Hezbollah's
capabilities.
While the regional
political-strategic context suggests that the
ongoing Israeli-Lebanese conflict needs to be
analyzed in light of the interests of other Middle
Eastern players, Israel's primary security goals
are strictly related to Hezbollah's offensive
arsenal.
The administration of Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert insists that Israel's
strategic goals in the conflict are the
destruction of Hezbollah's rocket-launching
capabilities, the elimination of the
organization's leaders, and
the disruption of its chain of command.
While the task of physically destroying
Hezbollah's offensive capabilities seems possible,
notwithstanding tactical difficulties, the goal of
virtually ending Hezbollah as an organization will
probably backfire since the group is deeply rooted
in Lebanese society and, most important, such an
action would inevitably cause massive civilian
casualties.
At the start of the present
conflict, Israeli and Western military
intelligence agencies seemed surprised by
Hezbollah's rocket arsenal, which had been
believed to be less substantial than it proved to
be. After Hezbollah fired Fajr-3 rockets (range:
40 kilometers) at Haifa, a turning point was
reached in the conflict.
In the first
hours of fighting, Western intelligence agencies
declared that Hezbollah possessed more than 10,000
Katyusha rockets (range: 20km), hundreds of Fajr-3
and Fajr-5 rockets (range: 40 and 75km,
respectively), dozens of C-802 missiles (range:
120km), and even a small, but unknown number of
Zelzal-2 rockets capable of a 200km range and an
explosives capacity of 600 kilograms.
Paradoxically, Israel's sophisticated
anti-ballistic capabilities are more vulnerable to
Hezbollah's rockets than to the much more powerful
missiles such as Scud or Shahab, since the latter
missiles are larger and fly at a higher altitude,
making them easier to shoot down. Israel will not
have the necessary laser defense technology to
destroy the smaller rockets until 2008.
Such an arsenal gave Hezbollah the
capability to strike all major Israeli cities such
as Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, thus threatening
Israel's core. After Hezbollah's retaliatory
strength became clear, the Israeli military began
to perceive the threat differently, with military
analysts saying that some of Israel's worst fears
were coming true. Therefore, the Olmert
administration considered its vital interests at
stake and decided that a decisive victory against
Hezbollah needed to be achieved at all costs.
Such a decisive victory, however, may be
more complicated to achieve than it appears.
Although the Israelis can overcome tactical
difficulties, such as the tracing of all launch
infrastructure deployed by Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon, they cannot rely solely on air strikes
since they are trying to eliminate Hezbollah from
southern Lebanon permanently.
As often
happens in conflict, strategic and political goals
are difficult to harmonize. Whereas the
destruction of rockets and the related
infrastructure is feasible and internationally
acceptable, hunting and killing militants requires
a ground invasion. Obviously, such an invasion
must not be perceived as the prelude to an Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, but instead seen
as a rapid operation intended to "clear" the
region.
However, ground invasions and open
fighting are unpredictable, and they raise tricky
political questions. Israel is already under
pressure by the United Nations and some of its
traditional Western allies because the air
campaign against alleged Hezbollah's ramparts in
Beirut, Tyre and other Lebanese towns is causing
hundreds of civilian casualties and thousands of
refugees. Such a fact may give Hezbollah - an
organization already deeply entrenched in the
Lebanese Shi'ite community - a window of
opportunity to increase its prestige and influence
in Lebanon, thus preventing Israel from achieving
a political victory, notwithstanding its military
superiority.
Additionally, Hezbollah
militants, chased by Israeli forces, are likely to
escape to Syria, which may cause Israel to act
militarily inside Syrian territory, a move that
could trigger a regional expansion of the
conflict, although Damascus will try to refrain
from intervening directly in the fight until it is
necessary or is on favorable terms.
In
spite of such drawbacks, expect Israel steadily to
pursue the goal of the destruction of Hezbollah's
arsenal and to launch a rapid invasion of southern
Lebanon to eliminate Hezbollah's presence in the
region quickly. At the same time, it will seek out
Lebanon's army and the United Nations to negotiate
a withdrawal in exchange for the implementation of
UN Resolution 1559 (passed in September 2004),
which ordered Hezbollah to disarm.
Look
for the United States to maintain its near-total
support for Olmert, since Washington seeks to
weaken Syria's and Iran's influence in the region
and is obviously keen on annihilating Hezbollah's
offensive capabilities.
Nevertheless,
Hezbollah's political influence in Lebanon and
even among the Palestinians may increase at the
end of the current conflagration. Furthermore, the
United States and Israel will continue to see the
Iranian and Syrian governments as the main threats
to the region and will continue to apply pressure
on them. The Middle East is set for a long
political conflict, with further warfare likely to
come in the near future.
Published with
permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
tocontent@pinr.com
.
