The war between Israel and Hezbollah in
Lebanon has exposed deep rifts between Iran and
Syria on the one hand and the conservative and
US-friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt on the other. This was dramatically
underlined by Saudi Arabia's unusually tough
stance against Hezbollah at the outset of the
conflict.
It is well known that among the
West's allies in the region, it is
only
the Saudis who can openly criticize US policy
without risking their ties to Washington.
Therefore, the fact they chose to chastise
Hezbollah unequivocally (knowing full well what
effect this will have on pro-Hezbollah public
opinion in the Arab world) speaks volumes about
growing Saudi desperation.
The Saudi
stance against Hezbollah has less to do with fears
of Iran's growing geopolitical weight than a
demoralized reaction to the failure of its foreign
policy in Lebanon. However, by choosing to side
with the United States and Israel, the House of
Saud risks deepening the dynamics that generate
divisions and dissent in the kingdom.
Iran and Saudi Arabia: a difficult
relationship Relations between Iran and
Saudi Arabia have been difficult, and at times
openly hostile, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The coming to power of ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic
Republic was deeply unsettling for the whole
region, in particular the Saudis. The House of
Saud's worries were twofold: at one level they
feared the impact of the revolution on the
kingdom's oppressed Shi'ite minority; but at a
deeper level they were terrified by the Islamic
regime's republicanism, which was anathema to the
traditional monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
There were wider historical and
geopolitical factors exacerbating the tensions.
Iran and Saudi Arabia had been rivals for regional
influence prior to the revolution. But the coming
to power of the Islamic Republic lent the rivalry
an ideological dimension and transformed it into
outright hostility.
However, aside from
generating legitimate fears, the collapse of the
shah's regime presented the House of Saud with
unprecedented geopolitical opportunities. The
sudden collapse of Iranian-US relations and Iran's
withdrawal from its position of political and
military dominance in the Persian Gulf were widely
welcomed in Saudi security, military and
diplomatic circles. The Saudis hoped to fill the
vacuum created by the shah's ouster by moving
closer to the Americans and amplifying the threat
from the Islamic regime in Tehran.
Iraq's
invasion of Iran in September 1980, which heralded
the start of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, was
greeted with cautious optimism in Riyadh. While
the Saudis did not want an outright Iraqi victory,
they hoped Iraqi president Saddam Hussein would
contain and exhaust the Iranian revolution. It was
this objective that informed the kingdom's
decision to underwrite Iraq's war effort by
channeling billions of dollars to the Ba'athist
regime in Baghdad. The Kuwaitis took a similar
measure and made substantial contributions to
Iraq's war effort.
Hardly any of this
money was repaid by Iraq. In fact this financial
largess (and the myopic foreign policy
underpinning it) backfired against the Saudis and
Kuwaitis in dramatic fashion when Iraq invaded
Kuwait in August 1990.
Saudis and the
Shi'ites Throughout the 1980s the Saudi
strategy of dealing with the Iranian revolution
involved delegitimizing Shi'ism. They founded and
funded various anti-Shi'ite publications and
outlets that produced countless books, videos and
documents attacking the religious and theological
premises of Shi'ism. Even today many of the
organizations and websites that are exclusively
dedicated to attacking the religio-historical and
theological premises of Shi'ism can be traced to
Saudi patronage.
For their part the
Iranians actively aided the long-oppressed and
extremely marginalized Shi'ites of Saudi Arabia,
who mostly live in the Eastern Province. The main
beneficiary of Iranian support was the Shi'ite
reform movement in Saudi Arabia led by the highly
learned Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar. Although the
reform movement was founded in 1975 (four years
before the victory of the Iranian revolution), it
acquired a higher level of importance and
prominence after 1979. Indeed, the uprising in the
Eastern Province in 1979 was partly influenced by
events in neighboring Iran.
The reform
movement remained militant and uncompromising
throughout much of the 1980s, with its leaders
even refusing to negotiate with the Saudi
government, which they regarded as fundamentally
illegitimate. [1]
Broadly speaking, the
Shi'ite reform movement harbored three core
grievances. First and foremost they drew attention
to widespread anti-Shi'ite feelings in the
kingdom, sanctioned by state ulema (Islamic
scholars). Although the Saudi state has always
resisted calls for the violent suppression (and
even obliteration) of the Shi'ites, it has rarely
taken steps to curb public calls by Wahhabi
ulema to isolate, harass and even murder
ordinary Shi'ites.
Second, they objected
to discriminatory policies by the state that made
it impossible for Shi'ites to practice their
religion freely. These policies included a ban on
Ashura processions and the proscription of the
Shi'ite call to prayer.
Third, the Shi'ite
reform movement strongly objected to the notorious
incompetence of the Saudis and their near-total
dependence on the United States.
While the
Iranians were sympathetic to general Shi'ite
grievances, they mostly encouraged the reform
movement to attack the Saudis on account of their
alliance with the United States, which they
identified as its Achilles' heel. The Iranians
hoped this would resonate with wider sections of
Saudi society who had begun to question the wisdom
of Saudi foreign policy, which seemed to be
centered on squandering the nation's oil wealth
and facilitating US hegemony in the region and
beyond.
But the movement's wholehearted
support for Khomeini-style radicalism (as
evidenced by the transformation of the reform
movement into the Organization for the Islamic
Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, or OIR) did
not force the Saudis to make concessions. In fact,
it had the opposite effect of strengthening the
government's resolve to crack down on a movement
that was - at the very least - inspired by the
political culture and revolutionary rhetoric of a
foreign power.
Moderating
reform In the late 1980s the OIR began to
tone down its rhetoric and eschewed aggressive
messages and tactics. [2] This process was
reinforced by the ending of the Iran-Iraq War in
July 1988, which had a depressing effect on Arab
Shi'ites throughout the Persian Gulf region.
Thereafter, Sheikh Hassan al-Safar and his
most senior colleagues pursued the politics of
moderation and compromise. This reached its climax
in 1993 when the House of Saud made an
unprecedented deal with the Shi'ite dissidents. In
exchange for their ending of opposition from
abroad, the Saudis promised a range of
concessions, including the release of prisoners
and a promise to tackle pervasive and
institutional anti-Shi'ite discrimination. [3]
While progress on tackling discrimination
has been painfully slow (with many of the gains
reversed in recent years), the 1993 pact between
the followers of Sheikh Hassan al-Safar and the
House of Saud remains in force.
Iranian
support The Iranians also sponsored
different types of Saudi Shi'ite activism,
including groups dedicated to violence. The most
important was Saudi Hezbollah, also known as Ansar
Khat al-Imam, or followers of the Imam's (ie,
Khomeini's) line. This group was founded in 1987
by Sheikh Hashim al-Shukus, Sheikh Abdulrahman
al-Hubail and Abduljalil al-Maa, among others. [4]
Although the group was ostensibly
dedicated to violence (and the Saudis
unsurprisingly accuse it of terrorism), there is
no reliable evidence of its involvement in any
major act of terrorism. The sole exception may be
the Khobar bombing of June 1996, which some US
investigators believe was perpetrated by Saudi
Hezbollah acting at the behest of Iranian
intelligence. However, this charge has been
seriously discredited in recent years and there is
now general consensus in US counter-terrorism
circles that the bombing was the work of Sunni
jihadis probably linked to Osama bin Laden's
network. [5]
Riyadh, Tehran and
normalization Notwithstanding the Saudi
desire to sabotage Iranian foreign policy and
Iran's active support for the kingdom's oppressed
Shi'ite minority, the two countries gradually
normalized relations in the 1990s. This process
was boosted by the coming to power of reformist
president Mohammad Khatami in August 1997, who
pursued a policy of normalization with Iran's Arab
neighbors in the Persian Gulf region. This policy
has not changed under the administration of
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, notwithstanding his
different leadership style to Khatami's.
Nearly three decades after the victory of
the Islamic Revolution, Iranian foreign policy has
stabilized around a set of rational policies
revolving around the primacy of national interest
and harmonious relations with neighboring
countries. Absent a collapse in the regional
balance of power, Iran and Saudi Arabia are
unlikely to revert to the Cold War of the 1980s.
Enter Hezbollah Saudi Arabia
has long sought to curtail the power of Hezbollah
in Lebanon. Privately, Saudi officials share the
US and Israeli view that Hezbollah -
notwithstanding its impeccable Lebanese
credentials - is ultimately an instrument of
Iranian foreign policy. However, the Saudis
supported Hezbollah's campaign in the 1990s to
drive Israel out of southern Lebanon, albeit
grudgingly.
To counter Iranian influence
in Lebanon, the Saudis invested heavily in the
country's reconstruction after the conclusion of
the Taif Agreement in 1989. In fact, the Saudis
have invested more in Lebanon than all the other
Arab countries combined (US$595 million in 2003
alone). [6] The massive Saudi investment in the
former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and his
government also served to shore up Syria's
position in Lebanon. Hariri, who held Saudi
citizenship and was the kingdom's emissary to
Lebanon in the 1980s, was at the center of this
Saudi-Syrian nexus.
The Saudis have long
favored Lebanon's Sunni middle class. But their
relationship with Hariri went beyond this; it was
personal. This helps explain the kingdom's strong
reaction to Hariri's assassination in February
2005. The reaction was so strong that it unraveled
the Saudi-Syrian nexus in Lebanon, making it
impossible for the Syrians to resist US pressures
for a withdrawal. The breakdown of the
unofficial Saudi-Syrian pact in Lebanon might have
benefited Iran, had it not provoked the so-called
Cedar Revolution that was dominated by
middle-class Sunnis and Christians. This posed a
direct threat to Hezbollah and Iran insofar as it
championed Lebanon's normalization on Sunni and
Christian terms. In short, the Cedar Revolution
risked opening Lebanon to US influence and
permanent Israeli military and security hegemony.
The Saudis stood to benefit as well, as long as
their investments in the country were protected.
On the other hand, the demise of
Saudi-Syrian understanding in Lebanon freed
Hezbollah to undertake bolder actions against
Israel. Since Syria was no longer duty-bound to
protect Saudi interests and investments in
Lebanon, it was more accommodating of Hezbollah
plans to punish Israel for its daily violation of
Lebanese airspace (and other forms of sovereignty)
and secure the release of Lebanese and other Arab
prisoners in Israeli jails.
The strong
reaction of the Saudis against Hezbollah must be
understood in this context. From the Saudi
perspective, Hezbollah has invited terrible
Israeli retribution on Lebanon and endangered 15
years of substantial Saudi investment on the
volatile country.
Of course, there are
deeper motives behind the kingdom's posturing.
Clearly the Saudis are no friends of Hezbollah and
have long resented their successes, especially
against Israeli occupation forces. But the
kingdom's reaction is, first and foremost, driven
by the collapse of its policy in Lebanon. There
(as elsewhere) Saudi policy is too often driven by
a lack of strategic planning or the ill-conceived
and irresponsible sponsorship of local players.
This strategy rarely succeeds, as has been seen so
dramatically in Lebanon.
Enter al-Qaeda
One of the more important long-term
consequences of the war in Lebanon is its
potential impact on the relationship between
Salafi-jihadism and Hezbollah.
The Salafis
(as opposed to the Salafi-jihadi movement, of
which al-Qaeda is a part) have already scored an
own-goal by caving in to Saudi pressure to issue
fatwas against Hezbollah. Both Abdullah bin
Jabreen and Hamid al-Ali (a Kuwaiti-based Salafi
cleric) issued fatwas repeating the usual
insults and accusations against Shi'ites, namely
that they are rafida (rejectors) and stand
with the enemies of Islam. The absurdity of this
position (at a time when Hezbollah is engaged in a
decisive conflict with Israel) is a reflection of
Saudi desperation, and not a knee-jerk reaction by
Wahhabis.
The fatwas of Jabreen and
Ali have reinforced Iranian propaganda that the
Salafi-jihadi movement in general (and al-Qaeda in
particular) are aligned with US and Israeli
interests. Indeed, the imagery is damning: while
the Salafi-jihadis slaughter defenseless Shi'ite
laborers in Iraq, Hezbollah successfully tackles
the Israel Defense Forces, arguably one of the
most powerful military forces in the world.
A spurious accusation But of
course propaganda is always deceptive.
The
contention that Salafi-jihadis are aligned with
Israel is as spurious as neo-conservative claims
that Hezbollah merely acts on behalf of Iran and
Syria. To understand the Salafi-jihadi position on
the Lebanon war it is best to refer to Salafi
analysis of the conflict.
Arguably the
best analysis was posted by "Barbarossa" on the
Tajdeed.org.uk forum. The author blames the
conflict on rivalry between the "Safavid-Sasanid
enterprise and those of the Zionist-Crusaders in
the Islamic world ... And the criminal group in
Tehran exploits the Arab Shi'ites as a tool to
realize their ambitious designs. Thus in Lebanon
they exploit the spirit of revolution ... and in
Iraq they exploit the spirit of revenge and
reprisals," [7] the author explains.
Therefore, according to Salafi-jihadist
propaganda both protagonists are un-Islamic powers
that are fighting their war on Arab lands.
A surprise for the
Salafi-jihadis While it is difficult to
determine to what extent Salafi-jihadis believe
their own propaganda, it is clear that they have
been taken aback by the war in Lebanon. The
inability of the jihadis to attack Israel is a
serious disadvantage. The late Jordanian leader of
the Salafi-jihadi movement in Iraq, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, alluded to it immediately before his
death, claiming that Hezbollah is a "shield" for
Israel.
While the Salafi-jihadis are
hoping for an outright Israeli military victory,
they stand to lose in the long term, as
Hezbollah's prestige and influence have been
boosted by its single-minded resistance against
overwhelming Israeli force.
Equally
worrying for the Salafi-jihadis is the broader
resurgence of Iranian-style Islamism. This has
been most evident in Iran itself, where the
conflict has boosted hardcore ideological forces
in the Islamic Republic and revived the
"Hezbollahi" spirit that had been dormant since
the late 1980s.
But arguably the biggest
loser is the House of Saud.
Already its
controversial stance against Hezbollah has divided
opinion in the kingdom. The most important
dissenter is Sheikh Salman al-Auda, a former
Salafi hardliner, who has come out in support of
Hezbollah. More broadly, there is significant
grassroots support for Hezbollah, which is seen
(as it is seen in other Arab countries) as the
only effective tool against Israeli hegemony.
In the final analysis, the Lebanon war has
not only imperiled 15 years of Saudi investments,
but once again exposed the limitations of the
kingdom's foreign policy. More ominously for
al-Saud, it has sharply divided opinion in the
country and further discredited the official
Wahhabi ulema. This is bound to undermine
the regime's security and create new forms of
challenges and dissent long after the fighting
stops in Lebanon.
Notes 1. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the
Politics of Dissent, Palgrave, New York 2001,
page 198. 2. "The Shi'ite Question in Saudi
Arabia", Middle East Report No 45, September 19,
2005, International Crisis Group. 3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. 5. Author's private discussions
with numerous American counter-terrorism experts
and former officials, Washington, DC, October
2004-September 2005. 6. Tony Badran,
"Saudi-Syrian relations after Hariri", Middle East
Monitor, Vol 1: No 1, February 2006. 7. Chris
Heffelfinger, "Jihadi Web forums revel in Lebanon
confrontation", The Jamestown Foundation's
Terrorism Focus, Vol 3, Issue 28, July 18, 2006.
(This article first appeared in SaudiDebate.com.
Published with permission.)
