Saudi Shi'ites: New light on an old
divide Interview by Mahan
Abedin
Fouad Ali al-Ibrahim was born in
Safwa, eastern Saudi Arabia, in 1960. He joined
the Islamic Revolution Organization in 1980 and
served in its central committee until 1993.
Currently, Ibrahim is a leading member of the
National Coalition for Democracy in Saudi Arabia
and continues to oppose the Saudi regime from
London. From 1988-90 Ibrahim was on the editorial
team of Al-Thawrah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic
Revolution) and from 1991-93 he was the
editor of Al-Jazeera
al-Arabiyah (The Arabian Peninsula). Both
publications belonged to the Shi'ite opposition.
Ibrahim is the author of The Shi'ites of Saudi
Arabia (Saqi, 2006). He holds a PhD in Near and
Middle Eastern Studies from London's School of
Oriental and African Studies.
Mahan Abedin: How do you
account for the rise of Saudi Shi'ite political
consciousness in the modern era?
Fouad Ibrahim: The main
factor was the relationship between the Shi'ites
and the Saudi state. This relationship has never
been based on anything even remotely resembling
the concept of modern citizenship. It has always
been based on the concepts of forced annexation
and extreme oppression. This is why the Shi'ites
have never felt part of the Saudi state. This goes
back to the foundation of the first Saudi state in
the middle of the 18th century
MA: So basically the
historic Shi'ite narrative in the peninsula
revolves around oppression and alienation?
FI: Yes, but there is also
an external factor relating to the flooding of
foreign workers to the Eastern Province, many of
whom worked for Arabian-American Oil Company
(Aramco). These foreign Arab workers imported Arab
nationalist ideology to the Eastern Province and
managed to win over the loyalties of many local
Shi'ites. They contributed to the development of
Shi'ite political consciousness. In fact the
Shi'ites of the Eastern Province have constituted
the base for many opposition movements in the
region.
MA: Has the area now
known as the Eastern Province been Shi'ite since
the beginning of Islamic history?
FI: Yes! Actually Shi'ism
has been the most indigenous form of Islam in the
region. It was the Shi'ites of our region that
traveled to Iraq and Iran and won over many
converts to their faith. For instance Sheikh
Ibrahim al-Qatifi, among others from Lebanon, Iraq
and Bahrain, played prominent roles in the Shi'ite
conversion of Iran in the early Safavid period of
the 16th century.
MA: Given
this prolific proselytism, why have the Shi'ite
remained a minority in the peninsula?
FI: Dividing the Saudi state
into minorities and a majority is a misconception.
Saudi Arabia is a state of minorities. Dividing
Saudi Arabia along Sunni/Shi'ite lines will not
work, as the Wahhabis do not even recognize the
Sunnis as true Muslims.
MA:
They recognize Hanbalis.
FI:
That is the only mazhab [religious
school] which they recognize. They accuse all the
others of innovation and deviation. But even the
Wahhabis are not a majority in Saudi Arabia.
MA: But what about the
Hanbalis?
FI: You could say
the Hanbalis constitute the biggest minority in
Saudi Arabia.
MA: From a
Shi'ite perspective, is the modern Saudi state
legitimate?
FI: From a
purely ideological point of view, the Saudi state
(like other states) is illegitimate on account of
its preemption of the Imam Mahdi's utopian state.
But since the Islamic revolution in Iran, which
promoted new forms of Shi'ite political thought,
the Shi'ites of the Eastern Province have accepted
the legitimacy of temporal states, provided they
are just in their application of the sharia. But
of course, the Saudi state is anything but just
and merciful.
MA: Broadly
speaking, are the Shi'ites loyal to the Saudi
nation-state?
FI: We need to
distinguish between loyalty to the homeland and
loyalty to the state. The Saudi state has three
parochial components: the al-Saud royal family, a
broader Najdi constituency and the Wahhabi sect.
These are the components of national identity in
the kingdom. It has been successful in Najd, but
it has failed in every other region because the
inhabitants do not identify with this imposed
identity. In that sense, Saudi Arabia is not a
nation-state. With regards to the Shi'ites, we
have not developed a sense of Saudi citizenship
because of the extreme forms of oppression we have
faced. When the state transgresses your basic
rights, how can you develop loyalty to it?
MA: Let's talk about Shi'ite
organizations. How important was the Harakat
al-Risaliyin al-Tala’ (Movement of Vanguards
Missionaries - MVM) to the political development
of Saudi Shi'ites?
FI: Our
organization, Munazamat al-Thawrah al-Islamiyah
[the Islamic Revolution Organization - IRO], was
affiliated to the MVM from the outset. The MVM was
the mother organization for a number of movements
in the region, especially in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia.
MA: Why
has there been so little coverage on the MVM, both
from journalistic and academic perspectives?
FI: The MVM was inclined
towards secrecy. In fact until 1993 nobody knew
much about its activities, especially in Iraq and
Bahrain. For instance, observers did not know that
it was the MVM which organized the failed coup
against the ruling dynasty in Bahrain in December
1981.
MA: I'll come to the
failed Bahrain coup later. Is the MVM still
operational?
FI: No, they
are not. After the ending of the Iran-Iraq War
[1988] the leaders of the movement reassessed the
situation and formed new conclusions. There was
deep disappointment about Iran's failure to emerge
as the outright winner. There was also resentment
in some sections of the movement about the
over-concentration on Iraq. Many activists felt
that the movement should have divided its
attention equally between the other regional
countries.
MA: At its
height, how big was the MVM in terms of numbers of
activists?
FI: It was very
big.
MA: How big?
FI: We are talking
thousands. It was the biggest Shi'ite Islamist
movement of its time.
MA:
What happened to the movement?
FI: As far as its Saudi
branch is concerned, the October 1993 pact with
the Saudi regime obligated Shi'ite activists to
dissolve the Reform Movement and to formally and
practically dissociate itself from outside
movements. It should be mentioned that the IRO had
transformed into al-Haraka Islahiyah (the Reform
Movement) in 1991.
MA: How
decisive was the leadership of Hassan al-Safar to
both the MVM and IRO?
FI:
Sheikh Hassan al-Safar is widely regarded as a
spiritual leader of the Shi'ite movement in the
Arabian Peninsula. His strongest point was his
ability to relate to the people. Because of his
ideological training he was able to transform
historical Shi'ite narratives into effective
populist themes. But this does not mean that he is
an intellectual.
MA: To what
extent did the Muharram Intifada of 1979 transform
the relationship between Shi'ite dissenters and
the Saudi regime?
FI: This
was a major turning point in the relationship
between the Shi'ites and the Saudi regime. It
changed everything.
MA:
Reading your book [The Shi'ites of Saudi
Arabia], it is clear that it was also a
personal turning point for you because you
witnessed the shooting to death of your cousin.
Did many others experience the same kind of
psychological transformation?
FI: The events of Muharram
in 1979 left a deep scar in the consciousness of
the majority of Shi'ites in the Eastern Province.
MA: But given that Shi'ites
had experienced extreme oppression for hundreds of
years, why did this turning point occur so late in
the day? I say this because the demonstrations of
Muharram in 1979 were not huge, nor did they
result in many casualties.
FI:
There had been clashes between Shi'ites
and the authorities for decades. For instance, in
the 1920s a Shi'ite revolt was led by Sheikh
Mohammed al-Nemr. In the 1950s and 1960s the
Shi'ite workers of Aramco staged demonstrations,
mostly in support of Arab nationalism. But the
events of 1979 must be understood in the context
of the ideological transformation of Shi'ism
itself. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
represented the culmination of the revolutionary
political thought of Shariati, Jalal al-Ahmad and
Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini. The Islamic Revolution
in Iran turned the old Shi'ite belief in the
illegitimacy of temporal states on its head.
MA: What were the main
inspirational features of the Iranian revolution
to the Shi'ites of the Eastern Province?
FI: The most attractive
feature was the leadership of Imam Khomeini. The
Imam's charismatic features were truly
extraordinary and resonated deeply with all
Muslims, particularly the Shi'ites. Second, the
new interpretation of Shi'ite political thought
inspired by the Iranian revolution was highly
liberating. Third, the Shi'ites of the peninsula
deeply appreciate the independence of Islamic
Iran. They compare the Islamic Republic to the
Saudi regime, which is dependent on America for
its basic security. Fourth, the leadership of the
Iranian revolution had good links to the
leadership of the MVM and this had fostered
familiarity and mutual respect.
MA: Given the close
relations between the MVM and the new Islamic
regime in Iran, do you think Iran had a hand in
the Bahrain coup attempt of December 1981?
FI: No! Iran had nothing to
do with that venture whatsoever. In fact the
Iranians paid the price for that mistake.
MA: Did the coup plotters
really think they could succeed?
FI: They were convinced it
could succeed. They thought they could rely on
supporters inside Bahrain.
MA: Were you aware of the
plot?
FI: No, I was in South
Korea at the time.
MA: Who
foiled the plot; was it the Bahrainis or the
Saudis?
FI: It was the
Bahrainis. Apparently the coup plotters made many
mistakes during the preparatory stage and this
alerted the Bahraini authorities.
MA: Where were the coup
plotters from?
FI: They were
mostly from Iraq. They were led by Hadi Modarresi.
MA: The Saudis have long
alleged that the IRO was financed by Iran; is this
true?
FI: No, it is not. We
have always had a number of financial sources. The
Shi'ite of the Eastern Province live in the most
oil-rich region in the world. Moreover, as
Shi'ites we have khums [voluntary Islamic
tax] as a major source of revenue. Furthermore, we
have other contributions in the form of
tabarowat [donations]. In fact it is the
people of the Eastern Province that regularly send
money to Iran in the form of khums ... They
also support Shi'ite Islamic causes and
organizations in Iraq and Lebanon.
MA: Then what kind of
assistance were the Iranians providing to your
organization?
FI: Mostly
moral support. But they also helped materially,
especially in terms of logistics, offices and
other buildings. But Iran had nothing to do with
our activities. They never financed our
activities.
MA: So the
Iranians never interfered in your work, even in a
subtle way?
FI: No, never!
MA: How much of your
organization was based in Iran?
FI:
The majority of our members were based in
Iran until 1988.
MA: How
about Saudi Hezbollah; do you believe they were
behind the Khobar bombing [in Saudi Arabia] of
1996, as the Americans allege? [Nineteen 19 US
servicemen and one Saudi were killed.]
FI: The Americans always
raise this issue whenever they have problems with
Iran.
MA: But they accused
Iran of involvement in that attack from the
outset. My question is do you believe Iran and its
militant Shi'ite allies in the Kingdom were behind
the attack?
FI: The
Americans accused Iran and the Shi'ites initially
but later on they realized they were very wrong.
MA: Who do you think was
responsible for that attack?
FI: It was probably carried
out by a group associated to al-Qaeda.
MA: Why did the Americans
initially blame Iran; was it a case of faulty
intelligence or pure politics?
FI: It was politics through
and through! Some in the American intelligence
community may have genuinely suspected Iran of
involvement, but as I said earlier, in due course
they realized they had been very wrong. In fact
the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]
interrogated a Shi'ite activist, Hani al-Sayegh,
who had been handed over to them in June 1997 by
the Canadian security services, but they gleaned
nothing useful from his interrogation. So they
released him and then deported him to Saudi
Arabia! The Americans are well aware that the
Shi'ites of the peninsula are not into terrorism
MA: But surely you don't
deny that Shi'ites from the Eastern Province have
been involved in acts of political violence.
FI: There have been a few
cases, but these have been on a very low scale.
MA: Have people been killed
as a result of these actions?
FI: Not to my knowledge.
MA: What targets were they
attacking?
FI: Mainly the
oil industry. But we are talking about minor acts
of sabotage, not major acts of terrorism.
MA: Let's talk about the
1993 pact between the Saudi government and the
Shi'ite opposition. What were the main factors
that led to a meeting between then-king Fahd and
the leaders of the Shi'ite Reform Movement in
October 1993?
FI: There was
a new political climate in the region after the
Gulf War of 1991. People were demanding their
rights. This was reinforced by international
pressures for reform. Moreover, the explosion of
Sunni dissent in the kingdom in the aftermath of
the Gulf War seriously unsettled the regime. Some
elements in the regime felt they should make peace
with the Shi'ites in order to concentrate on
defeating Sunni dissidents. They were fearful of
Shi'ite activists finding common grounds with the
neo-Salafi dissidents.
MA:
Why did they suspect that?
FI: We were in contact with
Saad al-Faqih, Mohammed al-Massari and others in
the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate
Rights. Saudi security was probably monitoring
these conversations and subsequently formed
certain conclusions. These conclusions informed
the regime's conciliatory approach towards the
Shi'ite activists.
MA: To
what extent did the new moderation of the Shi'ite
movement influence the Saudi government's
approach?
FI: The new
reformist discourse was crucial in the Saudi
decision to engage. Moreover, our shift towards
modern forms of citizenship and pluralism allayed
the fears of many quarters, including Saudi
liberals and nationalists and also Western
governments.
MA: Leaving
aside its implementation, do you think the main
terms of the 1993 accord were broadly acceptable
to the Shi'ite opposition?
FI: Yes, as long as they led
to the restoration of the legitimate rights of our
people.
MA: Briefly, what
were the main terms of the agreement?
FI: The main terms consisted
of the abolition of discriminatory practices
against the Shi'ites in the political, economic
and socio-cultural fields.
MA: What did the Saudis want
in return?
FI: We had to
stop all political activities.
MA: What do you mean?
FI: We had to stop all
political activities outside the kingdom. The
Saudis issued a general amnesty and offered to
renew the passports of our activists.
MA: When you say they
promised to end discrimination, does that include
general social discrimination? I am referring to
discrimination against the Shi'ites by non-state
actors in the country.
FI:
No, it only referred to government discrimination.
MA: What mechanisms did the
government set out to implement this
anti-discrimination program?
FI: King Fahd said he would
order all government institutions to comply with
this policy and added that it would then be up to
us to follow up with these institutions.
MA: Thirteen years on, to
what extent has the accord been implemented?
FI: Discrimination is still
widespread.
MA: Are you
saying that every Saudi institution continues to
discriminate against the Shi'ites?
FI: Yes!
MA: So nothing has improved
in these 13 years?
FI: The
only promise they kept was the security of the
exiles who returned in 1993. And any improvement
in the situation of the Shi'ites is not as a
result of the 1993 accord, but the changing
situation in the country and the region more
broadly. The regime is no longer in a position to
crack down as harshly as it wishes.
MA: What are Sheikh Hassan
al-Safar and other leaders doing in Qatif right
now?
FI: They conduct their
own religious and social activities.
MA: They are not engaged in
politics?
FI: If you
consider meeting government officials as political
activity, then they are politically active as
well!
MA: But what about the
Shi'ite opposition outside the country?
FI: The Shi'ite opposition
is still active but we are not as united as
before.
MA: What caused the
divisions?
FI: The 1993
accord was the main factor.
MA: Were you strongly
against the accord?
FI: Yes,
I was.
MA: To what extent is
the Shi'ite opposition cooperating with other
forms of dissent in the Kingdom? Are you talking
to the liberals and the Sunni Islamists?
FI: I can honestly say that
our old movement was the most inclusive and
nationalist in the country. We went out of our way
to cultivate links with other political forces. We
still maintain good connections to liberals,
nationalists, leftists and moderate Salafis. We
have always been very open, but the problem is
with the extremists. I personally have tried hard
to initiate dialogue with the hardline Wahhabis. I
succeeded with Salman al-Auda, who has now
moderated his views on the Shi'ites.
MA: What about [Salafi]
Safar al-Hawali?
FI: I
contacted one of his friends to inquire into the
feasibility of opening dialogue. But his friend
advised me not to contact Hawali since he is still
very radical and is not yet ready for dialogue
with the Shi'ites.
MA: Do
you think that neo-Salafism is the strongest form
of opposition to the Saudis?
FI: Absent a national
culture, any opposition will be reduced to a
sectarian, tribal or regional phenomenon. I don't
think you can talk about any general opposition to
the Saudis. This is arguably the regime's greatest
fortune.
MA: Is the regime
capable of reform?
FI: I
think gradual reforms will eventually lead to the
fracture of the state. If they want to avoid this
scenario they have to start promoting serious
reforms; for instance transforming the royal
family into a constitutional monarchy.
MA: Do you really think they
would even consider such a subversive idea?
FI: No, I don't. This is a
royal family that believes it owns everything in
the country; even the air that people breathe!
MA: Is Abdullah an asset or
liability to the House of Saud?
FI: Abdullah is just a
figurehead.
MA: But he has
been in charge for 10 years!
FI:
But he can't do anything. Princes Sultan
and Nayef have more power than Abdullah,
especially in internal affairs. Abdullah is just
the friendly face of the regime to the outside
world.
MA: What would happen
to the country in the event of the demise of the
al-Saud?
FI: The country
would fragment along regional lines. Hejaz and
Najd will become independent states. The southern
regions may be annexed by Yemen. The Eastern
Province will definitely secede as well.
(This article first appeared in SaudiDebate.com.
Published with permission.)
