Osama's answer to Iraq's
violence By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - That the spiral of sectarian
killing between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq has
reached crisis point is evidenced by a recent
landmark gathering of prominent religious scholars
from both sects at which they called for an end to
the violence.
In a joint declaration,
signed at Al-Safa Palace overlooking the Holy
Kaaba in Mecca, the religious scholars, in a move
toward mutual recognition unprecedented in Iraq,
called for a complete
end to sectarian
killings.
Meeting under the auspices of
the 56-country Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) and
the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, a member
organization of the OIC, the Shi'ite and Sunni
scholars called on Iraqis in plain terms to stand
united in protecting the independence, unity and
territorial integrity of their country. "This is
necessary," they said, "in order to put an end to
the [foreign] occupation and restore and reinstate
Iraq's Arab-Islamic role."
The
declaration, in essence a fatwa, has
received full approval and endorsement from key
Shi'ite and Sunni leaders in Iraq, most notably
from influential Shi'ite cleric Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani. OIC secretary general
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu said he could not say what
effect the decree would have, admitting, "It is a
moral obligation. Neither the OIC, nor anyone
else, has power over the consciences of men."
This, in a nutshell, is the problem in
Iraq: militia and other leaders no longer have
control over the "consciences of men", and a
seemingly endless circle of violence appears to be
the result.
Tracing the roots A
security memo circulated among various
intelligence organs of the countries involved in
the US-led "war on terror" (including in Pakistan)
tells how, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the
Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK -
Iranian intelligence) launched an operation to
assassinate Iraqi Ba'ath Party leaders to root out
anti-Iranian Aflaqism (Michael Aflaq was the
founder of the Ba'ath Party).
Members of
the Shi'ite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution
in Iraq's Badr Organization and Shi'ite cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, who were trained by
Iranian intelligence for decades, were to be used
for the mission.
They were given lists of
Iraqi military officers, academics and
intellectuals to be eliminated. The majority of
them were Sunnis, with a few being Shi'ite and
Christian. Many were known to have been killed.
This period marked the emergence of
militias in Iraq, but these "official" outfits
were soon joined by a growing number of small,
home-grown, paramilitary-style brigades formed by
local tribes, religious leaders and political
parties to settle their own scores.
Initially, they had defined goals, but
over time many of them deteriorated into little
more than bands of bloodthirsty thugs beyond the
control of their original leaders.
For the
US administration to lean on the Iraqi government
of Nuri al-Maliki to disarm the militias, then, is
of little help as they appear to be a will unto
themselves and, lacking ideological or
organizational backing, are certainly beyond the
authority of Baghdad.
Ignoring Osama
bin Laden In many encounters with people
in Pakistan's Waziristan tribal areas who were
once a part of Osama bin Laden's close circles,
this correspondent is clear that while the
al-Qaeda leader had very strong ideas that
rejected Shi'ite philosophies, he kept himself
away from any sectarian confrontations.
That is why he always maintained a
distance from such people as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
the erstwhile leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who is
attributed with significantly ramping up
Sunni-Shi'ite violence before his death this year
at the hands of US forces.
Bin Laden
believes that Shi'ites should not be alienated and
that, in alliance with Sunnis, they could end the
United States' imperial adventure in Iraq.
Indeed, it appears that some months before
Zarqawi died he had been prevailed on by bin Laden
and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, to stop
attacks against Shi'ites and concentrate on
forging an anti-US bloc.
Judging by the
escalation in sectarian killings, it appears to
have been too little too late.
In
Pakistan, the militant Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
played havoc against Shi'ites. When the Taliban
were in power in Afghanistan, most LJ members fled
to Afghanistan, where in al-Qaeda training camps
they were motivated toward global jihad and forced
to give up their narrow anti-Shi'ite perspectives.
It worked to some extent. After the
Taliban's retreat in 2001, the LJ divided into two
factions. One remained involved with al-Qaeda,
while a smaller faction stayed committed to
killing Shi'ites. The latter group thus became
isolated, which enabled the intelligence agencies
to track down members. Most of them are now either
dead or behind bars.
Any plan to defuse
the situation in Iraq will require a similar
approach. From the top, an attempt needs to be
made to bring back as many renegades as possible
into the spiritual and ideological fold.
Thereafter, intelligence operations would
have to infiltrate the myriad networks and
identify those isolated at the grassroots level,
and then use brute force to crush them.
The latest call by Shi'ite and Sunni
religious leaders could be the first step in this
direction.
Syed Saleem Shahzad
is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He
can be reached at
saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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