Iraq's defiant but doomed
democracy By Ehsan Ahrari
The Bush administration is finding out the
hard way that a democratic Iraq is not likely to
be cowed or bullied into following the priorities
of congressional elections that will be held on
November 7 in the United States.
Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki has started to act in the
manner of a proud democratically elected leader
who will do what is best for Iraq. President
George W Bush wanted democracy in Iraq; now he is
getting a taste of how the head of a democracy
deals with another democracy, even when one of the
parties is also an
occupying force.
On
Wednesday, Maliki condemned US military and
diplomatic representatives in Iraq for saying that
his government needed to draw up a timetable to
curb violence. "I affirm that this government
represents the will of the people, and no one has
the right to impose a timetable on it," Maliki
said at a press conference. Earlier, US Ambassador
to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad had said Maliki had
agreed to a timeline.
Maliki also
distanced himself from a joint raid by US and
Iraqi forces at the Baghdad stronghold of the
Shi'ite militia led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Such a
raid "will not be repeated", said Maliki, who
draws political support from Muqtada.
However, despite the defiant stand taken
by Maliki, the future of democracy in Iraq appears
as gloomy as ever. It's so bad that it might be
time for the US to think about bringing in Muslim
and Arab forces to take over the internal security
of Iraq, while maintaining an "over the horizon"
presence. As contentious as this option sounds, it
might be better than what the Iraqis face
nowadays.
With regard to Maliki and the
issue of a timetable for curbing violence, two
points should be made. First, the primary audience
of Khalilzad's comments at his briefing, along
with the top commander of US forces in Iraq,
General George Casey, was not Iraqis or anyone
else in the Middle East. They were an attempt to
reassure US voters, who are increasingly
questioning Bush's Iraq policies.
Second,
the event was also an attempt to show that the
administration is really on top of things, and
this includes trying to stamp out Shi'ite
militias, which are now being blamed for most of
the sectarian violence. The US wanted to twist
Maliki's arm into giving a timetable for this, as
if this would resolve everything.
Maliki
was on to the American game. He used a nationally
televised press conference of his own to publicize
his agenda to Iraqis.
Thus it seems two
campaigns are in progress to win hearts and minds.
While Khalilzad and Casey are attempting to
influence Americans, Maliki has started his own
campaign of defiance, which has a high probability
of winning support from a majority of Iraqis.
In the process, Maliki is reminding the US
that while he needs its support to stabilize Iraq,
he does not want to become its puppet. Maliki made
it clear that he was cognizant that the US talk of
timelines was driven by the mid-term elections,
and added, "We are not much concerned with it."
What Maliki is concerned about is Muqtada
and his Mehdi Army. While Maliki would like to
negotiate to get Muqtada to disarm his militia,
the US at present prefers the heavy hand. This is
bad enough, but what angered Maliki was that the
joint raid in Baghdad ostensibly to catch a
leading Mehdi Army member was undertaken without
his knowledge. Hence his assurance to his national
audience that such an unauthorized raid would not
be repeated.
The sensitivity of the
situation was underscored by the fact that Bush,
during his own nationally televised press
conference from the White House, agreed on the
necessity of coordination between the Iraqi
government and the US military. But he used that
occasion to remind Maliki that America's patience
was not infinite, a clear plea to US voters to
give the Republican Party another chance.
All this is highlighting two important
variables. First, the US has all but run out of
choices in Iraq and appears to be biding its time.
Yet the Democrats cannot be too gleeful, as they
have no tenable alternatives. Second, as much as
Maliki is being assertive, he has no credible plan
to stabilize Iraq.
And Iraq has reached a
point of no return. Those who propose a division,
euphemistically called the option of
confederation, know that even this measure, which
would introduce three autonomous regions, would
not stabilize the country. Sunni insurgents would
do everything in their power to destroy the
southern Shi'ite province, as well as Kurdistan in
the north. They have made that clear for some
time.
The best - and only - option for the
US might be to maintain the integrity of Iraq as a
single entity and look to Muslim and Arab forces
to take charge of security, but with a new United
Nations mandate. In other words, the future of
Iraq has to be brought under the legitimacy of the
UN umbrella, and with the presence of Muslim
forces.
This would at least take a lot of
steam out of al-Qaeda's charges of a conspiracy
between the "crusaders and Zionists" to enslave
Muslim Iraq. In such a scenario, US forces could
remain in the background to be brought in if the
security situation worsened. Given the steady
slide of Iraq toward disintegration, it is at
least worth a try.
Ehsan Ahrari
is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be
reached at eahrari@cox.net or
stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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