With the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as
US secretary of defense, focus has shifted to the
bipartisan Iraq Study Group led by former
secretary of state James Baker and former
Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton. The ISG will
soon recommend a different course for the US in
Iraq.
President George W Bush and his
national-security team were to meet with the ISG
on Monday, even as Democrats, fresh from
their success in last week's
mid-term election, are demanding a "bold change"
in course on Iraq and even an early withdrawal of
troops.
Josh Bolten, Bush's chief of
staff, has conceded that "we [US] clearly need a
fresh approach". Exactly what this will be is not
yet clear, but engaging Iran and Syria to help
stabilize Iraq is regularly mentioned as an
"unofficial" aspect of consensus of the ISG.
This is all very well, but Bush, despite
accepting that his Republican Party received a
"thumping" from voters last Tuesday, has yet to
show any inclination to do anything that does not
suit his persistent views of staying put in Iraq,
no matter the cost. Even the confirmation of
former Central Intelligence Agency director Robert
Gates as Rumsfeld's successor is not likely to
change anything unless Bush shows a willingness to
accept a radical departure on Iraq.
Rumsfeld's unpopularity within military
circles and among critics of the US invasion of
Iraq was so intense that he, instead of Bush, was
envisaged by many as the ultimate face of the war.
Rumsfeld's powerful personality and abrasive style
combined with his conviction that he alone had the
right idea of what US military transformation
should look like created a high degree of ill-will
and malice toward him.
Thus his perceived
failure in Iraq was the chief reason he instantly
became a highly expendable commodity after the
elections. But the fact is that the Iraq war
remains the responsibility of two people - Vice
President Dick Cheney and Bush, in that order.
It was Cheney who played a crucial role in
conveying the sense of urgency to Bush about
toppling Saddam Hussein. It was Cheney who
convinced Bush of a "linkage" between Iraq and
al-Qaeda. Cheney's "experience" in foreign affairs
seemed to overwhelm the much less experienced
Bush.
Bill Clinton had also entered the
White House with minimal experience in world
affairs: his predecessor George H W Bush once
said, "My dog knows more foreign policy than
Clinton." However, Clinton quickly learned the
intricacies of foreign affairs and stamped his
mark on the direction of US policy. The younger
Bush, however, appears to have been led by Cheney,
who remains as steadfast as ever on Iraq.
So despite the appointment of Gates, the
chances are slim that unless there is a
perceptible change of heart on the part of
President Bush, the new defense secretary is not
likely to be effective in overseeing a course
change on Iraq.
Gates nevertheless has a
spectrum of policy issues to consider. On one
extreme is the perspective that the US should stay
put in Iraq. However, the Democratic sweep of the
House of Representatives and the Senate show that
such an option is now unacceptable. That is the
easy part. The hard question is, what is
acceptable? That leads to another issue - finding
solutions by engaging Iran and Syria.
This
has always been anathema to Cheney and Bush, and
even if they bury their dislike for Tehran and
Damascus, they will have to offer both countries a
lot of carrots.
For instance, Iran would
certainly want bilateral dialogue covering a
multitude of highly contentious strategic issues,
including its uranium-enrichment program. The only
way Iran will abandon its nuclear program is if
Washington offers it a comprehensive package of
security guarantees, technology transfer and
nullification of all legislation aimed at bringing
about regime change. It is difficult to imagine
that Bush would be willing to offer this. So
Iran's chances of going along with the US,
especially in stabilizing Iraq, are slim to none.
Similarly, Syria would want the proactive
backing of the US in initiating negotiations with
Israel with a view to getting back the Golan
Heights. In principle, Bush should not have too
much of a problem accepting this. However, Syria
would also want to have some room to maneuver in
Lebanon, which might be more problematical.
One also has to keep in mind Israel's role
in any potential US engagement with Iran or Syria.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was due in
Washington on Monday for talks with Bush. Iran,
Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are high
on the agenda. In a recent interview, Olmert
warned the US against a "premature pullout" of
Iraq. He also expressed hope that the US would
rein in President Mahmud Ahmadinejad of Iran:
"President Ahmadinejad is a man who is ready to
commit crimes against humanity, and he has to be
stopped," Olmert was quoted in the media as
saying.
With Olmert around, the work of
the ISG and Gates is cut out for them.
Another issue relates to Gates putting
pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to
abolish Shi'ite militias. This cannot be done
unless the current unity government is dissolved,
as Maliki depends heavily on the goodwill and
political support of Muqtada al-Sadr and Abdul
Aziz Hakim, influential heads of the Shi'ite
militias the Mehdi Army and the Badr Organization,
respectively. Maliki cannot afford to alienate
them and still expect to survive as premier.
Maliki promised on Sunday to reshuffle his
cabinet after calling legislators disloyal and
blaming Sunni Muslims for sectarian violence.
Whether he has the will - or ability - to take on
Muqtada's men in the cabinet is doubtful.
Another issue Gates will have to give a
long and hard look at relates to building up the
Iraqi security forces. Maliki recently said the US
military should pull back into bases and let the
Iraqi army take control of security. He predicted
that his army could end violence "within six
months if left alone to do the work".
The
Americans certainly don't agree with this
assessment, and even Maliki's defense minister has
questioned the feasibility of such a move, given
the poor record of Iraqi forces as a capable and
reliable fighting force.
Before Gates'
confirmation hearings start, he is likely to
immerse himself in behind-the-scenes discussions
with top Democrats to see what is acceptable in
view of Bush's preferences regarding Iraq. He will
also rely heavily on the reduced number of
moderate Republicans for advice. However, in the
final analysis, Bush and Cheney will have to be
convinced that they must accept even the most
unpopular policy options. One option would be to
set target dates for the reduction and even
withdrawal of US forces.
To date, Bush and
Cheney have had a free hand over Iraq. Now they
will have to view some of the issues raised above,
no matter how unpalatable they might be.
Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of
Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based
defense consultancy. He can be reached at
eahrari@cox.net or
stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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