Maliki on a path to self-destruction
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - The Middle East stands in political crisis, with three cabinets in
disarray: Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora's in Lebanon, Ismail Haniyya's in
Palestine, and Nuri al-Maliki's in Iraq.
These governments were created when US "reforms" swept the Middle East after
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Siniora's cabinet - embraced by US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice - is a product of the assassination of
former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005. Haniyya's is a result
of the victory of
Hamas, and Maliki's was created in May to bring an end to the deteriorating
security condition after sectarian violence erupted in Iraq as a result of a
terrorist attack on a Shi'ite shrine in Samarra in February.
Siniora's cabinet is endangered by the resignation of Hezbollah ministers and
their allies to object to the cabinet's pro-Western policies, its attitude
during the recent Israeli war on Lebanon, its animosity toward Syria, and the
debate on disarming Hezbollah.
Haniyya's cabinet fell because the prime minister insisted on a no-compromise
attitude with regard to Israel, leading to an international boycott of the
Palestinian government that has left the Palestinians in chaos and hunger since
Hamas came to power in parliamentary elections in January.
As for Maliki's cabinet, there has been talk in Iraq about the need for a
reshuffle since early summer, despite the support it enjoys from US President
George W Bush and his ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. Maliki came to
power in abnormal ways, presiding over an abnormal cabinet in the most abnormal
of times, witnessing a horrific rise in sectarian violence that the prime
minister has been unable - and unwilling - to end.
Maliki's cabinet was endorsed by Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Famed for his
anti-Americanism, he found much in common with Maliki because they both are
opponents of Iranian intervention in Iraqi affairs. But ultimately both dreamed
of an Iran-like theocracy in Baghdad and both objected to the creation of an
autonomous Shi'ite state in southern Iraq.
Maliki repeatedly promised to disarm the militias that have contributed so much
to Iraq's violence, but he has done nothing even to curb the powers of the
Mehdi Army (run by Muqtada) or the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a leading Shi'ite group.
As Maliki announced plans for a cabinet reshuffle on Sunday, a suicide bomber
killed 35 people at a police recruiting center in Baghdad. Another 58 were
wounded, while 52 bodies were found on Saturday, all killed in violent ways
near the town of Latifiyah (30 kilometers south of Baghdad) in a district known
to Iraqis as the "Triangle of Death". The previous day, 24 bodies were found in
the Iraqi capital.
This has become common news in Maliki's Iraq, where up to 3,000 people are
dying per month in different parts of the country because of suicide attacks,
car bombs, sniping, and cold-blooded murder carried out by death squads. This
month, in an important security development, mortars were used by both Sunnis
and Shi'ites against each other's neighborhoods.
Maliki's announcement of a reshuffle was warmly received within Iraqi political
circles, especially because it will mean changing Minister of Interior Jawad
al-Boulani, under whose watch so much bloodshed has occurred.
When he formed his cabinet in May, Maliki ignored calls by Iraqis not to give
portfolios to members of Shi'ite political parties. The US even threatened to
hold back military and financial assistance if Maliki insisted on appointing
men who were regarded as sectarian.
Under Maliki's predecessor and boss, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the Interior Ministry
had been used by Bayan Jabr (a member of the SCIRI) to arrest, torture and kill
members of the Sunni community who were connected or remained supportive of
Saddam Hussein.
Sunnis loudly asked Maliki to change course, as did non-religious figures such
as former prime minister Iyad Allawi, who coveted Maliki's job. Muqtada,
however, would not hear of it and announced that this was a line-in-the-sand
issue and insisted that Interior remain in the hands of Shi'ite religious
parties so they could control the police apparatus.
The result is that under Maliki and his Shi'ite-dominated Interior Ministry,
militants dressed in police uniform using ministry cars have arrested, murdered
and kidnapped Sunni citizens. Sunni political parties have finally threatened
to resign from the cabinet if Maliki does not put an end to the militia wars
raging in Baghdad. The Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front, which holds 44 seats in
the 275-member parliament, is threatening to pull out of the political process
completely.
If the Sunnis did walk out, it would unleash even more chaos and give the Sunni
militias a free hand to continue waging war against the Badr Organization and
the Mehdi Army. By bringing Sunnis into government, after initially sidelining
them upon the downfall of Saddam, the Americans hoped that the Sunni
politicians would force the Sunni militias (some being al-Qaeda-like groups,
other being former Ba'athists) to lay down their arms. Only by giving them a
share in government, the Americans believed, would the Sunnis share in security
as well.
Bassam al-Sharif, a Shi'ite politician, quoted Maliki as saying, "We need a
major government reshuffle, and we will not allow any candidate to be loyal to
his party. I will choose according to qualifications. I will reject any
incompetent candidate." Maliki also said that loyalty should be to Iraq, rather
than to a political party or a religious sect.
This would be a big change from the current cabinet, although there are
exceptions, such as Barham Saleh, the capable deputy prime minister from the
Kurdistan Alliance. He holds degrees in engineering from Cardiff University and
Liverpool and boasts an honorable record of having worked against Saddam from
London and Washington.
Other exceptions include Salam al-Zoubai, the Sunni deputy premier, Hashim
al-Shibli, the minister of justice, and the impressive and articulate Wijdan
Michael Salim, the Christian minister of human rights.
But the real problem in Maliki's cabinet - which must change if he does
reshuffle posts - are the Sadrists. They received the lion's share of strategic
ministries: Education, Trade, Health and Agriculture.
By controlling the health sector they have been able to establish a network
over hospitals, clinics and medical assistance to the poor and the needy,
endearing Muqtada to the millions living in the slums of Baghdad.
Repeating the Hezbollah experience in Lebanon, Muqtada's followers now provide
assistance to grassroots Iraqis, making it increasingly difficult and unpopular
to disarm their Mehdi Army, or curb Muqtada's influence.
By controlling the Ministry of Education, the Sadrists have marketed radical
Islam to schoolchildren. Although they have been unable to distort the Iraqi
curriculum, as has happened in Saudi Arabia, they have appointed thousands of
like-minded teachers to spread their views. The minister of education is
Khodeir al-Khozaei, a writer and academic in Islamic thought and Koranic
interpretations. His appointment - thanks to Maliki - is widely viewed as
having been destructive to the "new Iraq".
Heads on the line
Two men who surely should get sacked are Defense Minister Abdul-Qadir Obeidi
al-Mifarji and Interior's Boulani. Obeidi is a Sunni Arab from Ramadi who was a
general under Saddam. Maliki appointed him to appease rising Sunni discontent
at the overwhelmingly Shi'ite identity of his administration.
Pleasure at Obeidi's appointment, however, was overshadowed by anger over
Boulani because it meant that sectarianism still reigned in the police and
public-security departments.
Obeidi fell out with Saddam for opposing the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and was
arrested in 1994. After the downfall of Saddam in 2003, he joined the new army,
rising in rank to become commander of military operations in western Iraq.
During his new tenure in office he participated in the campaign in Fallujah in
November 2004, and was accused of being a "war criminal" for supporting a US
assault that according to some killed up to 4,000 people.
Although not affiliated with any party, Obeidi's candidacy was strongly backed
by the Iraqi Accordance Front. But under him the Ministry of Defense has been
unable to bring security to Iraq or challenge the Shi'ite-led Ministry of
Interior. Obeidi lacks charisma, oratory skills and strong leadership, and has
turned out to be a colorless minister. Iraqis confess that his men cannot even
venture into areas controlled by the Ministry of Interior, for fear of
upsetting Boulani and Maliki.
Boulani, representing the younger generation of Iraq politicians, was born in
Baghdad in 1960 and studied mechanical engineering and worked as an air force
engineer under Saddam. He joined Muqtada's camp after the downfall of Saddam,
supporting the cleric's anti-Americanism.
Many wondered how someone like Boulani, who had supported the Mehdi Army in
2004, could work to disarm the same army in 2006. Boulani was once a member of
the Iraqi Hezbollah headed by Abdul-Karim al-Mohammadawi. He was also once an
associate of US-backed Ahmad al-Chalabi.
Although not religiously driven like some Sadrists, Boulani identifies with
Shi'ite nationalism as a way of professional development and protection. He has
acknowledged corruption in his ministry and vowed to cleanse it from Shi'ite
militias. He has failed to do this.
Maliki needs to find ministers who are not affiliated with, or even close to,
any religious group or party. Someone like Allawi, who is not driven by
religion and is not allied to the mullahs, would be a good choice. He would be
welcomed by Sunnis as well as seculars and the Kurds. But then again, this
would anger Muqtada.
When Maliki came to power in May, his cabinet was expected to define Iraq's
relationship with the United States, set a timetable for US troop withdrawal,
bring an end to sectarian violence, and disarm the militias. It was also
supposed to crack down on former Ba'athists and al-Qaeda-linked militants.
It has achieved none of these proclaimed goals. The problem can be traced to
Maliki, who is a weak and underachieving leader, rather than to his government.
A vigorous shuffling of the cabinet will not be enough - Maliki should go, if
for no other reason than over the case of one Abu Deraa.
Dealing in death
Shortly after coming to power, Maliki proudly announced in June that the
al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had been killed in a joint
US-Iraqi operation, raising hopes that Maliki's Iraq would witness a gradual
end to the bloody insurgency. For long he boasted of Zarqawi's death as his
single most memorable achievement.
Now, though, a new Zarqawi - this time from the Shi'ite community - has
emerged, named Abu Deraa. A ruthless killer like Zarqawi, he recently emerged
to carry out attacks on Sunnis, leaving behind a grisly trademark: a drill
through the skull of his victims, as opposed to Zarqawi, who enjoyed slitting
the throats of his victims - on camera.
Abu Deraa is reported to be a former ally of none other than Muqtada. One of
Muqtada's fighters has been quoted as saying, "We are proud of leaders like Abu
Deraa. His drills destroy the crazy minds of the Sunnis." The new terror master
is said to be a former commanders of the Mehdi Army who defected to create his
own militias, probably after losing faith in Muqtada because he joined the
political process and let his followers become members of parliament and the
Maliki cabinet.
With citizens like these roaming Iraq, Maliki has two choices: either he lives
up to his duties as prime minister, centralizing power, and imposes law and
order on enemy and ally alike, or he steps aside and lets someone with talent,
determination and character carry out the job.
