Incoherence stymies US's Iran
policy By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Next week, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) will once again address the issue of
Iran's nuclear program and, in light of the
growing impasse at the United Nations Security
Council over a draft sanctions resolution on Iran,
a new window of opportunity to relieve the council
of this unwanted pressure and to tackle it at the
atomic-watchdog agency has now emerged.
On
Tuesday, the IAEA director general Mohamed
ElBaradei submitted a new, brief report on Iran,
reiterating the absence of
any
evidence of military diversion, calling for Iran's
re-adoption of the intrusive Additional Protocol
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, again,
complaining of Iran's inadequate transparency and
the need to resolve certain outstanding questions.
In response, Iran's representative at the
IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, has insisted that the
"remaining" issues can be resolved if Iran's file
is brought back from the Security Council, urging
the governing board of the IAEA to stand up to the
US lobbying aimed at denying the agency's
technical support for Iran's heavy-water reactor
in Arak.
According to Soltanieh, the Arak
reactor under construction, which will serve
entirely peaceful pharmaceutical purposes, is one
of 12 nuclear projects for which Iran is eligible
for the IAEA's help and yet the only one that the
US is pressuring the IAEA to deprive of
assistance.
Meanwhile, there are reports
of the IAEA finding traces of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium at an Iranian waste facility.
This is acting as a fresh log in the furnace of US
accusations against Iran.
Back at the
Security Council, US Ambassador John Bolton has
publicly scolded Russia for substantially
weakening a draft resolution calling for mild
sanctions on Iran for its defiance of the UN's
call to halt enrichment-related activities. The
draft, prepared by the European Troika, the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, calls for a ban on
the sale of dangerous nuclear and missile
technology, as well as a similar ban on the export
of nuclear fuel to the Russian-made power plant in
Bushehr. Russia successfully watered down the
resolution, excluding any references to Bushehr,
thus making it unacceptable to the US and its
European allies.
Behind Russia's
amendments Time and again, Russian
officials have justified their opposition to any
sanctions on Iran by referring to the absence of
corroborating evidence regarding Iran's
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Case in point,
on October 31 Russia's national security secretary
stated: "Russia has no information indicating that
Iran is pursuing a non-peaceful program."
Last week, returning upbeat from a meeting
with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his
chief advisers in Moscow, Iran's chief nuclear
negotiator, Ali Larijani, told the Iranian press
that Russia supports Iran's nuclear stance and has
promised not to back down from pushing for serious
revisions in the draft resolution.
"We
will revise our relations with the IAEA if the UN
adopts the European Troika's resolution that will
not take into account amendments proposed by
Russia," Larijani has warned.
Russia's
proposed amendments contain several key
components. Per the words of Sergei Kislyak, a
Russian deputy foreign minister, they are "aimed
at backing negotiations on the resolution, with
there being no alternatives". First, Russia wants
a refocus of priorities, "with the emphasis placed
on tangible problems identified by the IAEA", to
quote Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Second, Russia wants "clear time limits" for the
punitive measures and, fourth, a "mechanism for
lifting these measures".
According to
Lavrov, the main problem with the draft resolution
is that it "extends beyond the framework of
agreements" by the so-called 5+1 (the Security
Council's permanent five members plus Germany),
and for seeking measures that are not "appropriate
to the actual threat". Consequently, Russia has
sought to introduce major loopholes in the draft's
call for a ban on nuclear and technological
cooperation with Iran, defending its planned
completion of Bushehr power plant by arguing, in
the words of Lavrov: "Bushehr is not so much a
commercial as a political project ... [it] serves
as an anchor bringing Iran under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty regime ... Until the
resolution on Iran is agreed upon, we will not
take any steps to modify the plans of our
cooperation with Iran ... These plans ... do not
upset the balance of forces in the region."
Clearly, the implicit message behind such
official declarations in Moscow is that Kremlin is
wary of any side-effects due to the proposed
sanctions, such as a substantial weakening of
Iran, an anchor of deterrence vis-a-vis US power
in the region. As a result, it is almost a sure
bet that Moscow will not heed President George W
Bush's recent call for "international isolation"
of Iran, which Bush made after meeting Israel's
embattled prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who has
publicly called for instilling "new fears in
Iran".
Israel's new offensive against
Iran Unlike Russia, Israel has no doubt
about Iran's nuclear intentions and has begun a
new, spirited public relations offensive against
Iran, which it brands as "Islamo-fascist" and bent
on the "existential destruction" of the State of
Israel. Thus, in an interview with the Jerusalem
Post, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh
stated that the Israel Defense Forces "must be
ready to stop Iran at all costs".
While
somewhat distancing himself from Sneh's
inflammatory statement, Olmert in his week-long
visit to the US has prioritized Iran's nuclear
threat, telling his US audience that Tehran's goal
is to "ultimately wipe Israel off the map" and
"the whole world has to join forces in order to
stop it". Seeking Arab sympathy for his anti-Iran
stance, Olmert has cleverly hinted that he is now
serious about peace with the Palestinians, this
despite a horrific episode of shelling civilians
in Gaza on the eve of his trip.
Iran has
reacted angrily to Israel's blunt threats, and
Iran's ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Javad Zarif,
has lodged a complaint against Israel with the
UN's secretary general, calling Israel's actions a
threat to international peace and security.
President Bush, on the other hand, has
echoed the sentiment of his Israeli visitor by
calling for "international isolation" of Iran and
adding that "one source of isolation would be
economic". As a clue to the incoherence of US
foreign policy, only hours earlier, Bush had
hosted a meeting at the White House with the
members of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), which it is
expected will advise a strategy of "engaging" with
Iran.
Unable to jettison its one-sided,
pro-Israel orientation in favor of a more balanced
approach, the Bush administration is today caught
in the crossfire of paradoxical preferences, in
light of the defeat of the Republican Party in the
mid-term elections by the Democrats, who are now
poised to take control of Congress.
Foreseeing a sea change in the United
States' Middle East policy, Olmert's visit has
clearly taken the wind out of the Democrats'
sails, given his blunt portrayal of US policy in
Iraq as a "success". In fact, Olmert has no notion
of any defeat and has also branded Israel's recent
military gambit in Lebanon a "success", his
reasoning being that the Lebanese army and an
international force are now in southern Lebanon
acting as buffer between Israel and Hezbollah.
What, then, are Israel's intentions
vis-a-vis Iran? Is Israel on the verge of going it
solo against Iran's nuclear facilities, now that
it has considerably less fear of a Hezbollah
backlash? And what about Iran's backlash in other
parts of the Middle East, above all Iraq?
Ironically, Olmert's campaign tour against
Iran comes at a time when the US public has grown
completely disillusioned with Bush's cowboy
diplomacy and seeks a softer approach abroad,
reflected in Donald Rumsfeld's replacement with a
new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, known as
an advocate of a "talk to Iran" policy, decried as
outright "appeasement" by the Israeli leaders and
their lobbyists in Washington. Too bad for Olmert,
Gates and his former colleagues at the ISG are not
alone and have found a powerful new ally in
Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair.
Washington and London: Parting ways In his video teleconferencing with the ISG,
Blair has reportedly emphasized the need to engage
Iran and Syria over Iraq, which will no doubt
hearten the relatively moderate US officials,
particularly in the Department of State, who favor
comprehensive dialogue with the Islamic Republic
of Iran. The latter include a veteran diplomat,
James Jeffrey, who has recently told the British
Broadcasting Corp that the US has no problem with
the existence of the Islamic Republic.
Blair's advice has not gone unheeded in
Tehran, which has recently gone out of its way to
show its preparedness to engage in direct dialogue
with the US. Yet in spite of the positive signs by
Ambassador Jeffrey cited above, the US government
appears caught between the Scylla of its Iraq
policy requiring engagement with Iran and the
Charybdis of its Israeli policy nullifying that
desire in the direction of confrontation. While
the ultimate direction of this policy flux is yet
to be determined, what is clear is the sign of a
parting of ways between Washington and its closest
European ally.
"There is a fundamental
misunderstanding that this is about changing
policy on Syria and Iran. First, those two
countries do not at all share identical interests.
But in any event that is not where we start. On
the contrary, we start with Israel/Palestine. That
is the core." Such a powerful and categorical
statement by Blair must have jolted Washington's
pro-Israel forces, who have been trying in vain to
frame the conflict in terms of "war on terror",
with Israel as America's staunch ally against the
rogue states of Iran and Syria.
Offering a
"new partnership" with Iran, Blair, notorious for
his sudden flip-flops, may not remain consistent
on his new, bold statements on the Middle East,
but for now at least he has opened a whole
brand-new vista for the Western approach toward
the Middle East hitherto clogged up under the Bush
administration. Without doubt, the success of this
new realism on Blair's part depends on no small
measure on Iran's willingness to reciprocate by
moderating its stance.
Need for Iran's
policy adjustment For its part, Tehran is
beginning to show signs of a serious debate on its
foreign policies and priorities, including the
thorny subject of foreign occupation of Iraq.
Whereas Iran's leaders have repeatedly called for
the immediate departure of US forces from Iraq, in
the aftermath of the Democrats' electoral victory
and their call for a "phased withdrawal" from
Iraq, suddenly a great deal of disquiet about the
unwanted consequences of such a possibility can be
heard in Tehran, some going as far as openly
pushing for a "delayed" departure in view of the
security threats in Iraq.
While there is
no question about the long-term Iranian desire for
the complete departure of US forces from the
region, in the short run this is held back by the
growing realization that there is no alternative
to US power and that Iraq will almost definitely
break up to the detriment of Iran's Iraq policy;
the latter has been identified, in the words of
Larijani, in terms of "Iraq's national unity and
territorial integration". Yet both pillars may
vanish almost overnight in the aftermath of a US
pullout.
Thus the need for a more nuanced
foreign-policy balancing act on Iran's part,
following the prescriptions of its national
(security) interests. Until now Iran has too
closely linked its Iraq policy with its nuclear
policy, which may require a new adjustment should
there be a firm US pledge of no invasion.
Concerning the latter, Jeffrey has assured Iran
that "we have no desire to invade Iran" and that
if Iran cooperates with Iraq's stability, then the
"150,000 soldiers will go back home" and will
"maintain regional peace and stability".
In the same interview, Jeffrey also
guaranteed that the US will "live up" to the
agreement that it has signed on to with the 5+1
respecting an incentive package for Iran,
exhorting Iran to "put us to the test". Iran
should take up that challenge, deepen its
cooperation on Iraq (and Afghanistan), and thus
help stabilize a neighbor that is quickly drowning
in the quagmire of deadly sectarian and ethnic
warfare.
Perhaps Blair's interpretation is
not so apt after all, and even a resolution of the
Palestinian problem will not prove more than a
panacea for the crisis in Iraq, which has its own
set of root causes.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with
Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's
nuclear potential latent", Harvard International
Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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