As the United States gradually retreats
from Iraq, the stakes for Iran rise accordingly.
The long-awaited Iraq Study Group report - which
will likely shape US policy in Iraq for the next
two years - will start this process in earnest.
The opportunities for Iran are numerous,
but the potential risks could be calamitous. For
nearly four years, Iran has sat back while the US
repeatedly blundered in Iraq, all the while
exploiting the situation with almost breathless
subtlety and precision. This
is likely to change
as the US presence fades, thereby exposing the
Islamic Republic to the chaos that is tearing Iraq
apart.
As the stakes rise in Iraq, Iranian
policymakers will finally have to clarify their
position on Iraq and act accordingly. The true
extent of Iranian influence in Iraq will also
become clear as calls grow for the government in
Tehran to use whatever leverage it has to ease the
conflict between the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement
and the Shi'ite-dominated regime in Baghdad.
Iraq's ability to surprise Four
years ago - as the United States and the United
Kingdom were preparing to invade Iraq - this
author explained that regime change in Baghdad was
more welcome in Tehran than in Washington, DC.
Moreover, I argued that Iran would emerge as the
outright winner of intervention in Iraq, both in
the short and the long term. [1] While Iran has
clearly been the winner in the short term, whether
it will emerge as the ultimate beneficiary of the
collapse of the Ba'athist regime is still
debatable.
Surprise developments in
Iraq The sectarian terrorism started by
al-Qaeda and the so-called Salafi-jihadis
immediately after the downfall of Saddam Hussein
finally sparked a wide-scale sectarian conflict,
especially after the bombing of the Samarra Shrine
in February.
For a long while it was hoped
that the new Shi'ite elites - composed of
influential elements in the government, the major
Shi'ite political parties and the religious
establishment in Najaf - would use all their
influence to ensure that Iraqi Shi'ites did not
retaliate for the extremely provocative attacks
against them. The reason for this was simple: the
Shi'ites needed to focus on consolidating their
hold over the country and not get sucked into a
fratricidal war that would ultimately destroy Iraq
and thus the Shi'ites' new-found power.
The resolve of the Shi'ite elites to
resist retaliating faltered for two reasons.
First and foremost, the ferocity of the
extremist Sunni attacks on the Shi'ites took
everyone by surprise. The rhetorical venom of Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and his ilk was translated into
grisly slaughter, as the breathtaking extremity
inherent in the more reactionary forms of Salafism
took hold over some sections of Iraq's insurgent
community. Notwithstanding the remarkable patience
and self-control of the Shi'ite elites, the
instinct to respond to such gratuitous and
mindless slaughter could simply not be suppressed
indefinitely.
Second, the extent of
Muqtada al-Sadr's power and influence was
consistently underestimated. The so-called
"Sadrist Movement" has emerged as the only truly
national and grassroots force in Iraq. The
Sadrists, and their offshoots, in effect control
southern Iraq (with the exception of Basra and the
surrounding areas); their influence is deeply
embedded in every institution, particularly the
police and the myriad security forces that have
sprung up in the past three years.
It was
often assumed that the Sadrists could be a bridge
to the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement, on account
of their nationalism, which is wary of both
Iranian and Arab influence in Iraq. This
hypothesis was partially proved in April 2004, as
the insurgents in Fallujah made common cause with
Muqtada's fighters in Najaf. But the specter of
unity did not go beyond rhetoric and imagery, and
in any case it collapsed altogether as the
extremists in the insurgency significantly
increased anti-Shi'ite attacks in 2005. The
Sadrists have since emerged as a sectarian force
in all but name. It is quite possible that most of
the sectarian slaughter (especially in and around
Baghdad) is now the work of the multitude of
militias operating under the banner of the
so-called Mehdi Army.
The upshot of the
argument here is that Iraq is unlikely to survive
the current civil war. It may remain a unitary
state for a considerable amount of time (in effect
kept on life support by US, Turkish and Iranian
geopolitical considerations in the region), but it
is highly unlikely ever to experience the cohesion
and sense of destiny that it did prior to the
invasion of March 2003.
Iran's outdated
aims Given the near-inevitability of the
fragmentation of Iraq, a much deeper understanding
of Iranian interests in Iraq is required.
Moreover, it means that some of these interests
must be either revised or relinquished altogether.
In short, the matrix of interests and risks that
informed Iranian attitudes toward the US-led
intervention in March 2003 are now seriously
outdated.
A brief overview of events since
the invasion should clarify the complexity of
Iran's current position.
On the eve of the
invasion, there was a convergence of Iranian and
US interests. Both sides stood to benefit from the
downfall of Saddam and the creation of a new Iraqi
political society. This was reinforced by
America's willingness to work with pro-Iranian
Shi'ite parties to create new institutions in
Iraq.
However, this convergence of
interests was always hostage to long-standing and
deep hostilities between the Islamic Republic and
the United States. Indeed, neither side publicly
acknowledged the quiet accommodation; in fact both
parties ratcheted up the rhetoric, with the
Americans accusing Iran of aiding the insurgency
and the Iranians blaming the US "occupation" for
all of Iraq's ills.
In any case, events on
the ground in Iraq reinforced the propaganda of
both sides and helped incrementally to unravel the
convergence of interests that had marked the early
period of the occupation.
The rise of the
Iraqi "resistance" was the single most important
factor in this process. The Iraqi insurgency may
have surprised the Americans, but it was predicted
by the Iranians, who had a far greater knowledge
of Iraq. The Islamic Republic had been fighting
Saddam's regime for more than two decades,
enabling Iranian military and security
institutions to develop an advanced architecture
of knowledge, in effect giving them an
unassailable advantage over other countries.
US accusations about Iranian complicity in
the insurgency were driven by the humiliation of
the knowledge that the Iranians were reveling in
the Americans' difficulties, rather than any
belief that the Islamic Republic was helping Iraqi
rebels.
As for the Iranians, they have had
an ambivalent attitude toward the insurgency from
the outset. Humiliation of the US had to be
closely balanced with the interests and security
of Iraq's new Shi'ite elites. This intricate
calculation became more burdensome as the Iraqi
insurgent landscape grew more complex. In fact,
the Iranians may have made miscalculations of
their own, not least in not anticipating the
ferocity of the anti-Shi'ite onslaught.
Understanding the jihadis This
miscalculation is partly rooted in
misunderstanding al-Qaeda and the wider
Salafi-jihadist movement.
While the core
of old al-Qaeda does not wish to spark a general
Shi'ite-Sunni civil war, it still went along with
the anti-Shi'ite plans of the Salafi-jihadis in
Iraq. This strategy is informed by a relatively
good understanding of the sectarian fault lines in
Iraq that have always determined every aspect of
that country's national life.
In short, if
you are interested in defeating the Americans in
Iraq, the best strategy is to start a civil war,
and the only way to do this is to hit the Shi'ites
hard enough that they begin retaliating. It is a
clever strategy that is becoming more successful
by the day.
The start of serious sectarian
conflict has destroyed much of the implicit
Iranian-US understanding in Iraq. The Iranians are
fearful that as Iraq sinks deeper into chaos, the
Americans will be tempted to align their interests
in Iraq more closely with those of Arab Sunni
states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Certainly as the Americans begin their
withdrawal in earnest, they will have less
incentive to maintain their working relationship
with the Shi'ite Islamists who control the
fledgling government in Baghdad. The collapse of
this "functional" relationship will remove the
last remaining link of Iranian-US detente in Iraq.
Iran in Iraq Recently, a senior
Iranian diplomat who has almost 26 years'
experience of dealing with Iraq told me: "Iran
started with 0% in Iraq in 2003 and gradually
reached 30% in terms of influence, whereas the
Americans started with 90% and have come down to
20%." This remarkable statement by someone who
knows exactly what he is talking about is the
surest insight into the graduated and subtle
strategy of the Islamic Republic in Iraq.
Appreciating Iran's position in Iraq
requires a proper understanding of the drivers of
Iranian influence. Much clarity is needed here, as
Iran's influence is often distorted, exaggerated
or played down, according to the agenda of the
analyst.
The greatest distortion has been
from Arab Sunni quarters in Iraq who exaggerate
ridiculously about Iranian influence in their
country, to the point of accusing Iran of being
the real occupying power. This neatly converges
with the rhetoric of some insurgent groups in Iraq
who bemoan an "invisible" Iranian occupation
masked by the highly conspicuous US military
presence.
Unfortunately, less outrageous
forms of such banal analysis have often colored
Western reporting of this issue. Iran is
consistently accused of influencing the main
Shi'ite parties, penetrating Iraqi security forces
and being generally intent on the insidious
conquest of Iraq.
First and foremost,
Iran's influence on Hezb al-Da'wa and the Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
is often exaggerated. While these organizations
had considerable contact with Iranian military and
security institutions prior to the March 2003
invasion, they have been Iraqi through and through
from the outset, and have carefully developed a
vast political constituency in Iraq since April
2003. Indeed, much of the propaganda against these
organizations comes from people who are intensely
jealous of their successes.
Not only are
Da'wa and SCIRI accused of being Iranian pawns,
they also stand accused of facilitating the US
occupation in Iraq. What seems to have been
generally misunderstood is the very nature of
elite Shi'ite attitudes toward the United States.
While these elites share their Iranian
co-religionists' deep mistrust of the US, they are
mindful of the urgent "functional" value of a
workable relationship with the Americans. This
view was articulated to the author by senior SCIRI
official and now Deputy Foreign Minister Hamed
Bayati in May 2003, barely a few weeks after the
fall of Baghdad. [2]
While the Islamic
Republic clearly continues to maintain a good
working relationship with Da'wa and SCIRI, it
appreciates these parties' prioritizing of careful
political networking within Iraq - over and above
transnational links - as the key to long-term
success. Therefore, the main bastion of Iranian
influence is not found in the government in
Baghdad, but in the Shi'ite heartlands of the
south.
Iran and the Sadrists Ironically, the Iranians have managed to
penetrate the Sadrists heavily, a movement that
was originally the most anti-Iranian of all Iraqi
Shi'ite organizations.
The fragmentation
of the Sadr movement over the past two years has
reinforced Iranian influence over it. The Iranians
have effectively exploited the divisions and
points of friction inside the movement to build an
impressive intelligence- and influence-wielding
architecture in the south.
This has served
three strategic objectives: first, it has made
life difficult for British forces in the south;
second, it has given the Iranians and their allies
real influence over policing and security; and
third, it has given Iran a very powerful armed
leverage should the Iranian-US cold war turn into
a hot war inside Iraq.
More than any other
factor, it is this deep Iranian penetration of
militias and networks that are ultimately loyal to
Muqtada and his circle that has made the Islamic
Republic arguably the most important power-broker
in Iraq. But if Iran's influence in Iraq does
indeed exceed that of the US, in today's chaotic
Iraq this only increases the Islamic Republic's
responsibilities and risk portfolio. The key
challenge for Iran in the years ahead is to manage
its network of influence in a steadily fragmenting
Iraq. Even if Iraq retains its status as a unitary
state, its intrinsic constitutional features will
likely change beyond recognition. The best that
Iraqi nationalists can hope for is a weak federal
state that will simply delay the inevitable
fragmentation.
Long-term Iranian influence
in Iraq requires a stable regime in Baghdad. This
is why the Iranians should be deeply fearful of
the sectarian slaughter that is tearing Iraq
apart. Moreover, the Iranians would do well to
appreciate the extent of anti-Iran feelings in
Iraq. General distrust of Iran is widespread in
Iraq, much of it the product of nearly 40 years of
relentless anti-Iranian propaganda by the
Ba'athists. Given the chaos in Iraq, much of what
the Iranians have built can unravel very quickly.
Furthermore, any brazen interference in Iraqi
affairs risks provoking the ugliest forms of Iraqi
anti-Iranianism.
More broadly, the success
or failure of Iran's strategy in Iraq will have
serious implications for its ambitions in the
region and beyond. The Islamic Republic aspires to
a leadership position in the Islamic world. This
realizable objective will be imperiled if it is
seen to be acting on behalf of pure national or
sectarian interests. The risks are indeed very
high and the upshot is that while Iraq has been a
US problem up to now, it will soon be an Iranian
one.
Notes 1. "Iranian
Views on Regime Change in Iraq", Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol 4, No 11,
November-December 2002. 2. "Interview with
Hamed Bayati", Middle East Intelligence Bulletin,
Vol 5, No 5, May 2003.
(This article first
appeared in SaudiDebate.com.
Published with permission.)
