Last week, Iran ended its third
major military exercise of 2006. The stated
purpose of the Great Prophet II exercises, held
November 2-12, was to enhance the military's
unified action capabilities.
The exercises
involved air, land and naval maneuvers spread over
14 of the country's 30 provinces, but
Major-General Yahya Rahim Safavi said they
simultaneously focused "on the Persian Gulf and
the Oman Sea". While the rhetoric surrounding the
spring's Great
Prophet I games aimed to boost
national prestige and buoy Iran's populace, the
Islamic Republic engaged in the Force of Zolfaqar
and Great Prophet II games primarily to deliver an
external deterrence message.
The
military drills Highly publicized in the
Islamic Republic, the Great Prophet I maneuvers
merely served as a show of force in the Strait of
Hormuz, the Persian Gulf's only gateway and vital
supply route for 20% of the world's oil supply. As
analysts dismissed Tehran's claims of highly
developed technology equal to or surpassing that
in the West, wide consensus arose that the
demonstrated weapons systems were antiquated
designs of Chinese, North Korean and Russian
origin that pose no serious threat.
In
contrast to the exaggerated claims made in the
spring to boost Iranian morale during a crisis
over its nuclear program, the Zolfaqar exercises
underlined the Islamic Republic's defense
capabilities. As such, many exercises focused on
Iran's Persian Gulf coastline. However, with the
increased rhetoric from the administration of US
President George W Bush since spring, the Zolfaqar
exercises not only used forces from traditional
units, but tested new equipment.
For
example, the operational appearance of the Sa'eqeh
("Thunderbolt"), an aging F-5 Freedom Fighter
enhanced with a new dual vertical stabilizer, made
bombing runs. While some of Tehran's claims were
undercut, the demonstrations served to convey an
indigenous industrial ability to alter major
control surfaces on a supersonic aircraft.
Analysts note that such a native industry arose in
response to imposed sanctions and may result in
unknown capabilities.
In addition, Defense
Minister Mostafa Najjar stated that Iran
successfully test-fired a bunker-buster, the
Qassem ("Messenger"). Air Force General Amir Amini
followed up by stating that the Qassem is "a
flying bomb and can be used as a guided long-range
air-to-surface missile". While reports regarding
the bunker-buster remain unconfirmed, Iran added
to its defensive stable by deploying transporter
erector launchers with capabilities to pose a
ready-fueled missile capable of rapid-reaction
power.
Although some perceived Iran's
growing capabilities as aggressive in nature,
Major-General Ataollah Salehi declared that the
Zolfaqar exercises served to implement a "new
defensive doctrine". In emphasizing "Iran's
friendly approach to the neighboring states,
[Iranian leaders] believe that such war games are
not considered a threat to the region". Salehi
went on to say what has been repeated for decades:
"Any threat facing the region is caused by
extra-regional enemies."
With the
increasing rhetoric against the Islamic Republic
and the polyvocality of such discourse, Tehran
moved from Zolfaqar's perimeter defense and
coordination exercises to the Great Prophet II
games. This has been an attempt to solidify such
defensive coordination in rapid-response fashion
so as to deliver messages to domestic and
international audiences.
Over the course
of the games, Tehran claimed it was deploying
dozens of live rockets and missiles. Included was
a Shahab-2 that for the first time used a
cluster-munition warhead with up to 1,400
bomblets. In addition, the first firing of the
medium-range (about 1,0001,200 kilometers)
Shahab-3 in a live training exercise was
announced. Other ballistic and artillery rockets
used were the Zolfaqar-73, the Scud B, the
Fath-110, and the Zelzal.
While noting
that the exercises served as a response to US
exercises in the Persian Gulf, the Israelis
focused on the threat potential of Iranian
missiles. Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel's
anti-ballistic missile program, noted to
journalists that "the intensity of the military
exercises was unprecedented. It was meant to make
an impression - and it made an impression ...
[because the Iranians] were able to launch so many
missiles."
Two days later, Safavi agreed.
With the Shahab-3 capable of reaching Israel,
Rubin pointed out that Israel's Arrow system
successfully intercepted a simulated Shahab-3
missile in a test last December and that such a
system had to be taken into account.
Tehran's motivations Safavi
announced the Great Prophet II exercises on
November 1, a day after the completion of the US
Navy-led "Leading Edge" joint exercise that
included personnel from Australia, Bahrain,
France, Italy, Qatar and the United Kingdom. The
US 5th Fleet defines Leading Edge as part of the
Proliferation Security Initiative in "response to
the growing challenge posed by the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems and related materials worldwide". The
exercise in the Persian Gulf was the 25th since
2003 and the third in the region.
Despite
claims by the US Navy that nations "are working
absolutely together as a team", Iran saw the
exercise as an additional tool of "propaganda and
political maneuver without military value". In
contrast, and given the lopsided number of
participating versus observer countries in the
exercises, Iran saw Leading Edge as part of the
escalating dispute between the Bush administration
and Iran over its nuclear program. In addition to
seeking international sanctions, the US is seen as
simultaneously applying pressure on Iran's trading
partners, the populace, and the government.
In turn, Iranian leaders feel compelled to
engage in brinkmanship with the US to avoid the
appearance of weakness in domestic and
international arenas. While psychological
affirmation requires Tehran to counter US moves
with those of its own, the Islamic Republic did
conduct the Great Prophet II exercises with
practical defense measures in mind.
Tehran's preparations Iranian
leaders did not expect n US frontal invasion even
before the Democrats re-gained control of the US
Congress and most certainly do not expect an air
campaign after US citizens have demanded a course
change for Iraq. Rather, the Iranians remain
convinced that the United States will seek regime
change through incrementally tougher sanctions
imposed by the international community, fomenting
ethnic and urban unrest, drawing Tehran concretely
into Iraq, and possibly then conducting limited
air strikes against military and/or nuclear
facilities afterwards. The nomination of former
Central Intelligence Agency director Robert Gates
as defense secretary cements Iranian convictions
regarding US tactics.
Responding to
concerns regarding the effectiveness and
efficiency of a military beset by divisions, the
Iranians have moved to emphasize rapid deployment
of various units simultaneously as a way to
counter attempts at regime change.
Two
factors have likely contributed to such an
assessment: (1) the failure of Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi's army to stage a coup during the last
days of prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar's
government in 1979 because divisions could not
enter major cities quickly and (2) Samuel P
Huntington's political order theory, which is
believed to be the cornerstone of US action and
has caused riots in the minority provinces of
Balochistan, Azerbaijan and Khuzestan over the
past two years. In such a strategy, Tehran sees
the US government operating from neighboring
countries and either crossing the Iranian border
or having co-opted Iranian dissidents in these
peripheral provinces to set off bombs or cause
riots.
In short, the chaos engulfing the
periphery would cause the movement of millions to
internal cities that would be infrastructurally
unable to meet their needs. Chaos would ensue.
Without order, mass mobilization would occur and
thereby provide a mechanism for regime change.
Despite the limited application and success of the
theory, the Great Prophet II exercises convey that
Tehran is not taking its control of the country
for granted.
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