In the wake of the latest political
assassination to rock Lebanon - last week's
shooting of Pierre Gemayel, a scion of one of the
foremost Christian Maronite political families -
suspicion fell on the Syrians, and perhaps
Hezbollah, as the most likely culprits.
There is some logic to this view, given
Syria's likely involvement in the assassination in
February 2005 of former prime minister Rafik
Hariri. Gemayal's is the fifth assassination since
Hariri's; most
every victim was critical of
the Syrians, and to a lesser extent Hezbollah.
But even if we grant that Syria was behind
Hariri's assassination, and there is very good
evidence to support this assessment, it is hard to
see what Syria or Hezbollah gains from Gemayel's
killing. Syria is in a stronger regional position
than it has been in years. The administration of
US President George W Bush has been forced to eat
crow and contemplate negotiations with Damascus to
gain its help in easing the insurgency in Iraq.
Syria's main sponsor, Iran, is similarly in its
strongest geostrategic position in decades, and
its ally Hezbollah emerged as the political winner
of this summer's war with Israel.
So why would Syria
risk upsetting this favorable balance by killing
a Maronite politician when Hezbollah had already
bolted the government and was threatening
massive demonstrations to bring down the
post-Cedar Revolution political arrangement in favor of one that would
better reflect its - and thus Syria's -
increasing power? The same question can be asked of
those who would link Hezbollah to the Gemayel
assassination, which sapped the energy out of its latest
political machinations.
Of course, even if
neither Syria nor Hezbollah had much to gain from
Gemayel's assassination, it's not hard to imagine
Bashar al-Assad or Hassan Nasrallah miscalculating
the impact of such an act, as the Syrian president
might well have done if he in fact ordered
Hariri's assassination, and the Hezbollah
leadership admitted doing when they kidnapped two
Israeli soldiers this past July on the assumption
that Israel's response would be in keeping with
the rules of the game then in place.
But
before we look to who might have miscalculated in
ordering the hit on Gemayel it's worth asking who
actually benefits from his assassination. And from
this perspective the one party that clearly
benefits from Gemayel's murder is the Israeli
government.
Israel was the main loser
in the summer war, at least politically and
strategically. The country's leaders began
threatening a new round of fighting even before
they began pulling troops out of the south of
Lebanon. Hezbollah's postwar ascendence was the
most visible and troubling sign of Israel's
seemingly unprecedented military weakness and
strategic blundering.
Pulling off an
assassination like this, which is by no means
beyond Israel's ability, would serve several
goals. First, it would turn the chaos that
Hezbollah was trying to create in the Lebanese
political system against it. Instead of Hezbollah
managing the postwar chaos to strengthen its
position, the movement is now forced on to the
defensive and must react to a new dynamic in which
Christians (with the exception of the breakaway
Michel Aoun faction) and Sunnis are more united
than ever in their desire to block Hezbollah's
takeover of the system.
Second, if Lebanon
descends into civil war, which is a frightening if
still distant possibility, Hezbollah would in
effect be neutralized, and Israel could rely on
Maronites and perhaps Sunnis to attack Hezbollah
without Israel facing the international
condemnation it received during the war.
Third, suspicion against Syria - and Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt has publicly accused Damascus
of being behind the assassination - has already
stopped the momentum towards normalization with the
Assad regime by Europe and the United
States in order to bring it on
board in Iraq. As important, if
the crisis deepens, it will foreclose the possibility that the
Bush administration (now under the tutelage of the only American
diplomat to stand up to Israel since Dwight
Eisenhower, James Baker) would force Israel
to negotiate a deal for the Golan Heights
in the near future.
It
is true that the Gemayel family and Maronite
community more broadly was once aligned to Israel;
but that was a generation ago. The Maronites
proved unable to maintain power in Lebanon or
serve Israel's interests. Pierre Gemayel's uncle,
Bachir, was assassinated days before he was
to assume the country's presidency in 1982, and
his father, Amine, was unable to cement a peace treaty
with Israel because of Syrian pressure. The unofficial
alliance was abandoned once it was clear that
Israel's days in Lebanon were numbered.
Participating, or otherwise
benefiting from the killing of an old ally at a
moment when the blame would be placed on one's
enemies may seem far-fetched, but at least as far
back as the great Chinese military strategist
Sun Tzu "to mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy" has been
one of the most well-regarded axioms of warfare.
The death of Pierre Gemayel could well push Lebanon to
the brink of civil war and lead
to further alienation of Syria and Hezbollah from the
international community. This might well be the
unintended consequence of actions taken by either party; but
if the question is to be asked "Who benefits
from Pierre Gemayel's assassination?", it is hard
not to include the Israeli government among the
parties which have the most to gain from
the scenario now unfolding in Beirut.
Mark LeVine, PhD, is a professor
in the department of history, University of
California-Irvine.
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