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Saudis strike back at Iran By M
K Bhadrakumar
Middle East plan, which
aims to unite moderate Arab countries who are
concerned about the rise of Iran and rampant
extremist forces, to form an anti-Iran and
anti-extremist alliance" - though it doubted what
a mere course correction could do in "extricating
the US from the quagmire it created by itself in
the Middle East".
The Saudi expectation is
that the UN decision to set up the tribunal (which
was promptly approved by the Lebanese cabinet of
Saudi-backed Prime Minister Fouad Siniora on
Friday, despite
warnings from Hezbollah)
signifies a development of historic proportions in
redrawing political alignments in the Middle East.
From the Saudi point of view, the tribunal
will inexorably lead to the unraveling of the
Ba'athist regime in Damascus; the breakup of the
Iranian-Syrian nexus in the region; the return of
Syria to the mainstream Arab fold; the near-total
isolation of Hezbollah within Lebanon, which in
turn could pave the way for its eventual co-option
(once it is cleansed of militancy and sanitized
from Iranian influence); and the overall weakening
of Iran's standing as the Shi'ite powerhouse in
the region, especially in Iraq.
Equally,
the Saudis are displaying in Lebanon their true
grit as a US ally in the region. They are showing
that in countering Iranian influence they are
prepared to dig in, no matter what it takes.
Riyadh has cast aside its proclivity to remain on
the sidelines while the Iraq crisis matured in the
critical 2003-05 period, which led to its
disastrous isolation (and Egypt's).
Riyadh
expects Washington to take note that Iran's rising
regional influence can still be arrested.
Significantly, US Vice President Dick Cheney lost
no time arriving in Riyadh on Saturday for a
hurried two-hour meeting with King Abdullah.
During the meeting, to quote the Saudi Press
Agency, the two sides discussed "the whole range
of events and developments on the regional and
international scenes ... the Palestinian problem
and the situation in Iraq in particular".
The choice of Cheney to undertake such a
sensitive mission at this point speaks something
of the thought processes of President George W
Bush regarding Iraq. It also speaks something
about the importance of Cheney in the last two
years of Bush's presidency. Three things must be
said about Cheney's beliefs. First, he is
steadfast in his belief that the Iraq war is still
a "doable" job. Second, he consistently maintains
that an Iraq settlement is inconceivable without a
regime change in Iran.
Most important,
Cheney believes that when it comes to Israel's
security, US politicians are alike. Name them,
they are all "friends of Israel" - Democratic
presidential hopefuls Senators Hillary Clinton and
Evan Bayh, Democratic National Committee chairman
Howard Dean, and the incoming chairman of the
House Committee on International Affairs,
Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos.
Thus it
is of immense consequence that Bush decided to
give Cheney a chance to perform (rather than
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) in the center
stage of the Middle East's geopolitics at this
crucial turning point. The United States' strategy
in the Iraq war is under intense scrutiny, and the
White House should soon receive the report of the
Iraq Study Group (ISG) co-chaired by former
secretary of state James Baker and former
congressman Lee Hamilton.
Cheney's
consultations in Riyadh mesh with what Seymour
Hersh wrote in the current issue of The New
Yorker: "Sources with direct knowledge of the
[ISG] panel's proceedings have told me that the
group, as of mid-November, had ruled out calling
for an immediate and complete American withdrawal
but would recommend focusing on the improved
training of Iraqi forces and on redeploying
American troops."
What does this portend
for Tehran? Certainly, what is becoming clear is
that it is small change for Iran, even if the ISG
recommends that Syria and Iraq should be brought
into a regional conference to help stabilize Iraq,
and if Bush accepts such a recommendation.
The point is Iran is inherently at a
disadvantage with regard to the Saudi stratagem.
The specter of a Shi'ite crescent is a useful
rallying cry for the beleaguered regimes in Riyadh
(and Cairo and Amman), whereas for Tehran it is a
huge embarrassment and a major obstacle. For Iran,
Shi'ite empowerment is a means to an end. Iran
considers its manifest destiny to be the leader of
the Islamic world.
As Tehran sees it, it
has been a long wait but Iraq and Syria are
finally emerging as a new center of gravity in the
Arab world. And Iran is in alliance with it. Also,
Iran sees a historic opportunity in that almost
100 years after the Sykes-Picot agreement carved
up the Middle East, the regional powers may
finally be able to fill the power vacuum to ensure
the US withdrawal from Iraq. The process is no
doubt cataclysmic and, therefore, imperfect,
stuttering and difficult. Iran nonetheless must
pursue it to its optimal potential.
But
the brusqueness with which Washington moved last
week to stifle the Iranian initiative on the
trilateral summit with Iraq and Syria also
underscores what Tehran is up against. Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani just couldn't emplane for
Tehran on Saturday. The Americans clamped a curfew
on Baghdad and simply shut down the city's
airport.
