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2 Titans square up for clash in
Iraq By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The United States and Iran have reached a
critical crossroads at which the path of potential
conciliation rooted in their shared "common
concerns", to paraphrase President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad's latest letter to Americans,
intersects with the path of even greater
hostility, which could turn Iraq and the rest of
the Middle Eastern landscape into a theater of
their power rivalry.
Unfortunately, the
latter alternative appears to be gaining, and
unless remedial action is taken by both sides, in
Tehran and
Washington, to arrest the
growing momentum toward the "clash of titans", it
may not be long before we observe a new
realignment of forces in Iraq and beyond, with
both sides jockeying for influence and support
among the Sunni insurgents in Iraq and beyond.
Within Iraq, the government's tailspin
toward a complete collapse has been accentuated by
Muqtada al-Sadr's group's withdrawal of support of
the government in response to Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's decision to meet with US President
George W Bush in Amman, thus casting a heavy cloud
of uncertainty over Maliki's administration. This
is illustrated by a leaked memo by US National
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, questioning
Maliki's "capability". As a result, the chances
are that the Amman summit - postponed from
Wednesday to Thursday - may be the last for the
embattled premier who cannot appease either his
domestic or American critics.
The two
(and a half) war Despite Bush's objection
to the term "civil war", the US media are now
framing the Iraq conflict as such, echoed by the
likes of United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan and former US secretary of state Colin
Powell. This terminology, however, has problems.
It tends to play down or ignore the ongoing
conflict associated with the "insurgents", some,
if not the majority, of whom are home-grown
fighters committed to liberating Iraq from foreign
occupation.
Concerning the latter, until
now, with a couple of exceptions going back to the
summer of 2004, when US forces and Muqtada's Mehdi
Army traded blows in Najaf and Karbala, the
majority Shi'ites in Iraq have not posed much of
an insurgency problem. This much has been
confirmed by, among others, the head of Central
Command (Centcom), General John Abizaid, in his
recent interview with the Columbia Broadcasting
System's 60 Minutes. He admitted that most
of the US casualties were inflicted by Sunni
insurgents. Abizaid's conclusion has been echoed
more than once by the head of Centcom's
intelligence directorate, General John Custer, who
has pointed the main finger at Sunni Arabs and
foreign fighters.
Added to this is another
violent conflict brewing, between Turkey and the
autonomous Kurds in northern Iraq. This could
happen at any time, but will in all likelihood
occur when and if Iraq breaks up, leading certain
US diplomats, such as Richard Holbrooke, to call
for an immediate redeployment of US forces to act
as a buffer on the Iraqi-Turkish border. Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani echoed this sentiment in
his September interview with the Washington Post.
Unsurprisingly, in his recent trip to
Tehran, Talabani did not second his Iranian hosts'
call for the immediate departure of US forces,
letting his son, residing in Washington, express
his sentiment that such a departure would cause
further "chaos".
But increasingly the
Iraqi Kurds may find themselves isolated on the
thorny issue of the US military presence, which
has divided the US public. Unlike the Shi'ites,
bearing a major brunt of Sunni insurgency, the
Kurds are prospering and may need to play a more
forceful role, given the formidable force of their
nearly 100,000 Peshmerga, throughout Iraq, if they
are serious about national unity and territorial
integration.
As for the Iraqi Shi'ites and
their present quandary, signs of a more assertive
anti-occupation stance on their part point to a
growing realization that the best way to avert a
costly civil war might, indeed, be none other than
to form common cause with the Sunni insurgents
against the occupation forces. Switching
allegiance from government backers to outright
opponents is a distinct possibility that may save
the beleaguered Shi'ites from the Sunnis' wrath,
yet expose them to the lethal power of the United
States.
Who could blame the Shi'ites if
they shed their collaborationist behavior and put
their military prowess at the disposal of a great
nationalist crusade to liberate Iraq? For more
than three years, the Shi'ites have vested their
hopes on the state-building process, elections and
non-violence with regard to the occupation armies.
With those hopes increasingly dashed at a time of
their growing military strength, the Shi'ites now
seem poised to challenge the United States' power
directly, with direct assistance from Iran, should
the US refuse to set a timetable for withdrawing
its forces.
The race for Sunni hearts
and minds On the eve of Bush's visit, King
Abdullah of Jordan met with a Sunni leader, Harith
al-Dari, head of the Association of Muslim
Scholars, which is considered a terrorist
organization by the Iraqi regime. Despite his dire
warning of "coming civil wars in the Middle East",
King Abdullah has not retreated from his earlier
anti-Shi'ite statements, such as his warnings of
the risks of a
