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2 Saudi-Iran tension fuels wider
conflict By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Tehran's politicians and military leaders
nowadays boast publicly of the country's military
power and regional influence, yet beneath the
surface there is a great deal of concern regarding
the multiple crises facing Iran. These range from
the threat of United Nations sanctions to Iraq's
civil war, to growing re-Talibanization of
Afghanistan to Lebanon's political unrest, and,
increasingly, signs of crisis with the Persian
Gulf's other dominant power, Saudi Arabia.
With such an array of national-security
headaches, and the
distinct possibility of their
getting worse, it is all the more important for
Iran to ponder seriously its "crisis avoidance"
foreign-policy options. Adding to the complexity
is that at the same time, Iran must ensure that
internal unrest is not generated as a result of
the steps taken. For instance, undue compromise
over its nuclear program may precipitate a
political crisis. At the same time, though, an
inflexible approach that aggravates the nuclear
issue could accentuate the differences between the
competing foreign-policy tendencies in the Islamic
Republic.
Crisis of Iran's
perception With Saudi officials openly
complaining of Iran's meddling in Iraq to the
detriment of Sunni interests, and sparing no
criticism of Iran's role in Lebanon, which teeters
on the brink of civil war, there is much need for
confidence-building measures between Tehran and
Riyadh.
From the Saudis' vantage point,
Iran's verbal commitments cannot be trusted
anymore and its actions - fomenting trouble in the
region - speak louder than words. Iran, on the
other hand, complains that the Saudis and other
Sunni powers have yet to reconcile themselves to
the idea of a Shi'ite-run Iraq. That is why,
according to a report in a Saudi newspaper, the
Saudis are even pushing for the release of Saddam
Hussein and the resurrection of Iraq's Ba'ath
Party, to act as an anti-Shi'ite bulwark.
According to a Tehran University political
scientist, "If the Saudis had been gassed by Iraq
and lost a million people to Saddam's butchery,
then they would not be surprised that Iran is
angry at their lobbying for Saddam's pardon." Iran
has openly wondered why the US is not pressuring
Saudi Arabia to stem the tide of its nationals
infiltrating Iraq on a daily basis to fight a
sectarian war. "And why hasn't Saudi Arabia
bothered to respond to Iran's call for a
collective security arrangement in the Persian
Gulf?" the same professor asked in a recent
conversation with the author.
But while
Iran says the Saudi criticisms are unfounded, the
Saudis are not buying it and, as a result, the
stage is set for a sharp deterioration in
relations between the "twin pillars" of Persian
Gulf geopolitics.
Iran could take steps to
reverse the trend, such as by publicly
backtracking from recent statements that have
conveyed the image of a "domineering" Iran. A case
in point is a recent editorial on Baztab.com, a
website close to the Revolutionary Guards: "The
Saudis are seeking to exclude Iran's domination in
the Middle East." Another example: a regional
military commander in the province of Khorrassan
boasted of Iran's transformation into an
"unchallenged power" (ghodrat-e bela
monaze) in the Persian Gulf.
Such
manifestations of Iran's hegemonic intentions are
bound to break rather than build bridges with
Persian Gulf neighbors and convey an aggressive
foreign-policy orientation not in harmony with
official pronouncements. Indeed, in 1991 the
presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani unveiled Iran's
quest for collective security in the region.
It should not be forgotten that, in the
post-September 11, 2001, context, Iran and Saudi
Arabia share economic, energy, religious and
political concerns, including the Arab-Israeli
conflict and terrorism. The countries also play a
leading role in both the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC).
Relations
revisited Iran and Saudi Arabia
established diplomatic relations in 1928. In 1966,
King Faisal visited Iran and the (second) Pahlavi
Shah visited Saudi Arabia in 1968. By then, the
countries had successfully resolved their dispute
over the two islands of Farsi and Arabi by
agreeing on Iran's possession of Farsi and Saudi
Arabia's possession of Arabi. The agreement also
did not designate a continental shelf for either
island, only territorial waters.
During
the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia were commonly
concerned about the threat of communism and the
expansion of power of the Soviet Union in the
Persian Gulf. Also, both were opposed to the
radical Arab nationalism led by Egypt's Gamal
Abdel Nasser. This sought to sow divisions between
Tehran and Riyadh by labeling the Persian Gulf as
the "Arabian Gulf" and the Iranian province of
Khuzestan as "Arabestan".
In 1968,
Britain's announcement of its decision to vacate
its forces from the Persian Gulf culminated three
years later in a new geostrategic situation known
as the "twin pillar", whereby Iran and Saudi
Arabia assumed the primary responsibility for
peace and security in the region.
This was
in conformity with the foreign-policy approach of
the United States during the presidency of Richard
Nixon and came to be known as the "Nixon
Doctrine". Despite their common security concerns
and similar political systems, prior to the
Islamic Revolution in 1979, relations between Iran
and Saudi Arabia were not always harmonious.
Saudi Arabia was concerned over Iran's
military modernization and military dominance in
the region, and the issue of Bahrain's
independence and Iran's reluctant forfeiture of
its historical claim to Bahrain was a sour point
for some time. Another source of tension was
Iran's repossession of the three islands of Abu
Moussa, Little Tunb and Big Tunb in 1971, given
the competing claims of the United Arab Emirates
over these islands.
The 1979 Iranian
revolution initially ended decades of friendly
ties between the two Persian Gulf countries.
Tehran's revolutionary regime accused the Saudis
of corruption and of acting as an "American
puppet" with which it could not have friendly
relations. For its turn, the Saudi government
accused its Iranian counterpart of seeking to
destabilize the Saudi political system through its
"export of revolution" policy.
The
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s worsened Saudi-Iranian
relations. Saudi Arabia took sides with Iraq and
availed to Baghdad its gigantic financial
capability and its impressive influence in the
Arab world and elsewhere. At the end of the
Iran-Iraq War and the implementation of United
Nations Resolution 598, Saudi Arabi welcomed the
new developments and King Fahd openly asked the
