Page 2 of 2 Saudi-Iran tension fuels
wider conflict By Kaveh L
Afrasiabi
Saudi interior minister to end
the propaganda campaign against Iran and to take
steps toward resolving problems related to
Iranians making the annual hajj pilgrimage
to Saudi Arabia.
Diplomatic relations were
restored and embassies were reopened, and ties
improved further after the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and the subsequent 1991 Gulf War.
Iran's taking sides with the Kuwaitis and
the anti-Iraqi coalition of
the
Arab Persian Gulf states helped put Iran's ties
with its southern Arab neighbors on a friendly
path. In particular, Saudi-Iranian relations,
especially their diplomatic ones, began to
improve, as reflected by exchanges of high-ranking
delegates between the two countries in the 1990s,
even though various remaining grievances on both
sides prevented their rapid expansion.
For
their part, Iran's leaders took steps to reduce
tension with Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, as
reflected in the March 1997 trip of then-foreign
minister Ali Akbar Velayati. Saudi Arabia
reciprocated by sending a high-level delegation to
the 1997 summit of the OIC in Tehran.
That
same year, the election of Mohammad Khatami as
Iranian president acted as a catalyst in
Iranian-Saudi relations. His pursuit of a foreign
policy aimed at tension reduction and improving
ties with other countries paved the way for a
rapid expansion of ties between Iran and its
southern Arab neighbors. In particular, it put
Iranian-Saudi relations on a stable and friendly
path.
Bilateral relations encompassing
various fields, including political, economic,
educational and security, have since grown at a
steady pace. Their well-coordinated policies
within OPEC over issues such as oil pricing and
production quotas for the member states have
clearly reflected the depth of their closeness.
A major indicator of warming relations is
their cooperation on security affairs, including
regional security. As the largest and the richest
Persian Gulf countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia have
the capabilities to affect the pace of events in
their region. Thus their cooperation is a
necessity for ensuring security in the region,
which contains more than 60% of the world's proven
oil reserves, in addition to a phenomenal amount
of gas (Iran and Qatar have the world's second-
and the third-largest gas deposits, respectively).
Iran and Saudi Arabia have signed a few
security agreements since 1997, including one in
April 2002 during the official visit to Iran of
Saudi Minister of the Interior Amir Nayef bin
Abdul Aziz. In the absence of any official
statements on the specifics of the agreements,
there is little doubt that they include
cooperation on the elimination of extremist and
terrorist organizations endangering their
stability.
Apart from its obligations
under these security agreements, Iran has every
reason to seek to eliminate the anti-Iranian
Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. Iran welcomed
the Taliban's fall from power in 2001 and has no
reason to take a chance on their re-emergence. It
is wariness of any Saudi-Pakistani common cause
that would create protected zones for the Taliban
inside Afghanistan. Similarly, Iran is wary of
Saudi Arabia's assertiveness with regard to
Hezbollah in Lebanon, which the Saudis have
criticized for instigating the latest political
crisis in Lebanon.
Should the Lebanese
crisis be resolved amicably with the
reapportionment of cabinet posts more proportional
to the balance of political forces in the country,
as favored by not just Hezbollah but also by
certain Christian leaders, then the Saudis will be
forgiven for their one-sided, blistering
criticisms of Iran. Tehran will have shown that it
can influence events there in the direction of
non-violent resolution of political differences.
On the other hand, the nightmare scenario
of Lebanon spiraling into civil war will certainly
sharpen Shi'ite-Sunni hostilities pervading the
region, no matter what steps Tehran takes to
ensure that Iraq does not drown in sectarian
conflict. In this respect, pro-Iran Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, head of the Shi'ite Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is in Washington
for a meeting with President George W Bush.
Clearly, Hakim's visit will be regarded in the
Persian Gulf as an indirect US dialogue with Iran.
Their common fear of (pro-Israel) Turkey's
intervention in Iraq is yet another glue that
binds Tehran and Riyadh, a relatively neglected
issue so far.
Equally important, in
removing the walls of distrust between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, is an explicit sign from Riyadh that
it is not simply concerned with "Sunni" interests
in Iraq, in light of a recent pro-Saudi article in
the Washington Post by a key Saudi expert, but
that rather its concerns are all-inclusive,
covering the embattled Shi'ites as well. To that
effect, the kingdom's own Shi'ites must be better
respected in their civic rights.
Measures to improve Iran-Saudi
relations Several measures could put an
immediate halt to the visible deterioration of
relations between the two countries, including the
following:
An all-inclusive Persian Gulf conference on
Iraq, including Iran and Iraq, hosted by the Gulf
Cooperation Council. This would be instrumental in
closing the cognitive gaps on both sides on the
nature of security threats and what to do about
them.
A sub-OIC Iraq group inclusive of Iran and
Saudi Arabia to be formed to hammer out
differences and to explore workable solutions for
Iraq, perhaps by fathoming an OIC peacekeeping
force for Iraq. Enhanced Iran-Saudi cooperation on
Iraq within the OIC framework will help Iran to be
perceived as an Islamist rather than a purely
Shi'ite power, keen on the welfare of all Muslims
irrespective of their sects. (See A role for the OIC in
Iraq, Asia Times Online, April 17,
2004.)
A joint Iran-Saudi-Iraq council should meet
periodically to discuss security matters and to
offer ideas.
In the absence of such
initiatives, the likelihood of more sharpened
hostile relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is
almost a guarantee.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with
Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's
nuclear potential latent", Harvard International
Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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