The Iraq Study Group
presented its report to President George W Bush
and the US Congress on Wednesday. The report was
made public at a news conference on Capitol Hill
in Washington. The 10-member commission was led by
Republican James Baker, who is a former secretary
of state, and Democrat Lee Hamilton, a former
congressman who once chaired the House
International Relations Committee. The following
extracts highlight the 79 recommendations made by
the group.
RECOMMENDATION 1: The United
States, working with the Iraqi
government, should launch a comprehensive new diplomatic
offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of
the region. This new diplomatic offensive should
be launched before December 31, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the
diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional
players should be to: i. Support the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq. ii. Stop
destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's
neighbors. iii. Secure Iraq's borders,
including the use of joint patrols with
neighboring countries. iv. Prevent the
expansion of the instability and conflict beyond
Iraq's borders. v. Promote economic
assistance, commerce, trade, political support,
and, if possible, military assistance for the
Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim
nations. vi. Energize countries to support
national political reconciliation in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming
diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and
reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. viii.
Assist Iraq in establishing active working
embassies in key capitals in the region (for
example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). ix. Help
Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on
Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in
achieving certain security, political, and
economic milestones, including better performance
on issues such as national reconciliation,
equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the
dismantling of militias.
RECOMMENDATION 3:
As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and
in addition to the Support Group discussed below,
the United States and the Iraqi government should
support the holding of a conference or meeting in
Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference or the Arab League both to assist the
Iraqi government in promoting national
reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their
diplomatic presence in Iraq. This new diplomatic
offensive cannot be successful unless it includes
the active participation of those countries that
have a critical stake in preventing Iraq from
falling into chaos. To encourage their
participation, the United States should
immediately seek the creation of the Iraq
International Support Group. The Support Group
should also include all countries that border Iraq
as well as other key countries in the region and
the world. The Support Group would not seek to
impose obligations or undertakings on the
government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group
would assist Iraq in ways the government of Iraq
would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq's
sovereignty - not diminish it.
RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the
New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International
Support Group should be organized immediately
following the launch of the New Diplomatic
Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support
Group should consist of Iraq and all the states
bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key
regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf
States; the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council; the European Union; and,
of course, Iraq itself. Other countries - for
instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea - that
might be willing to contribute to resolving
political, diplomatic, and security problems
affecting Iraq could also become members.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic
Offensive and the work of the Support Group should
be carried out with urgency, and should be
conducted by and organized at the level of foreign
minister or above. The secretary of state, if not
the president, should lead the US effort. That
effort should be both bilateral and multilateral,
as circumstances require.
RECOMMENDATION
7: The Support Group should call on the
participation of the office of the United Nations
secretary general in its work. The United Nations
secretary general should designate a special envoy
as his representative.
RECOMMENDATION 8:
The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic
Offensive, should develop specific approaches to
neighboring countries that take into account the
interests, perspectives, and potential
contributions as suggested above.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the
New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group,
the United States should engage directly with Iran
and Syria in order to try to obtain their
commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq
and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and
Iran, the United States should consider
incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking
constructive results.
RECOMMENDATION 10:
The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should
continue to be dealt with by the United Nations
Security Council and its five permanent members
(ie, the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia and China)plus Germany.
RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts
within the Support Group should seek to persuade
Iran that it should take specific steps to improve
the situation in Iraq. Among steps Iran could
usefully take are the following:
Iran should stem the flow of equipment,
technology, and training to any group resorting to
violence in Iraq.
Iran should make clear its support for the
territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified state,
as well as its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq
and its government.
Iran can use its influence, especially over
Shi'ite groups in Iraq, to encourage national
reconciliation.
Iran can also, in the right circumstances,
help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and
the Support Group should encourage and persuade
Syria of the merit of such contributions as the
following:
Syria can control its border with Iraq to the
maximum extent possible and work together with
Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so
will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents,
and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
Syria can establish hotlines to exchange
information with the Iraqis.
Syria can increase its political and economic
cooperation with Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 13:
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment
by the United States to a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and
Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment
to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.
RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should
include - as soon as possible - the unconditional
calling and holding of meetings, under the
auspices of the United States or the Quartet (ie,
the United States, Russia, European Union and the
United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and
Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians
(who acknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the
other. The purpose of these meetings would be to
negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid
Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks -
one Syrian/Lebanese and the other Palestinian.
RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some
elements of that negotiated peace should be:
Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the
framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control
over its territory.
Syria's full cooperation with all
investigations into political assassinations in
Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and
Pierre Gemayel.
A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to
Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for
transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to
Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve
Israel's problem with Hezbollah.)
Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and
Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli
Defense Force soldiers.
A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to
undermine the democratically elected government of
Lebanon.
A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from
or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other
radical Palestinian groups.
A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas
an acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist.
Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with
Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for
these actions and in the context of a full and
secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return
the Golan Heights, with a US security guarantee
for Israel that could include an international
force on the border, including US troops if
requested by both parties.
RECOMMENDATION
17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of
that negotiated peace should include:
Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338 and to the principle of land for
peace, which are the only bases for achieving
peace.
Strong support for Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to
take the lead in preparing the way for
negotiations with Israel.
A major effort to move from the current
hostilities by consolidating the ceasefire reached
between the Palestinians and the Israelis in
November 2006.
Support for a Palestinian national unity
government.
Sustainable negotiations leading to a final
peace settlement along the lines of President
Bush's two-state solution, which would address the
key final status issues of borders, settlements,
Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of
conflict.
RECOMMENDATION 18: It is
critical for the United States to provide
additional political, economic, and military
support for Afghanistan, including resources that
might become available as combat forces are moved
from Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 19: The
president and the leadership of his national
security team should remain in close and frequent
contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts
must convey a clear message: there must be action
by the Iraqi government to make substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones. In
public diplomacy, the president should convey as
much detail as possible about the substance of
these exchanges in order to keep the American
people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the
region well informed.
RECOMMENDATION 20:
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political
will and makes substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the
United States should make clear its willingness to
continue training, assistance, and support for
Iraq's security forces, and to continue political,
military, and economic support for the Iraqi
government. As Iraq becomes more capable of
governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the
US military and civilian presence in Iraq can be
reduced.
RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi
government does not make substantial progress
toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the
United States should reduce its political,
military, or economic support for the Iraqi
government.
RECOMMENDATION 22: The
president should state that the United States does
not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the
Iraqi government were to request a temporary base
or bases, then the US government could consider
that request as it would in the case of any other
government.
RECOMMENDATION 23: The
president should restate that the United States
does not seek to control Iraq's oil.
RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated
completion dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007
for some milestones may not be realistic. These
should be completed by the first quarter of 2007.
RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a
good start. The United States should consult
closely with the Iraqi government and develop
additional milestones in three areas: national
reconciliation, security, and improving government
services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As
with the current milestones, these additional
milestones should be tied to calendar dates to the
fullest extent possible.
RECOMMENDATION
26: Constitution review. Review of the
constitution is essential to national
reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent
basis. The United Nations has expertise in this
field, and should play a role in this process.
RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Ba'athification.
Political reconciliation requires the
reintegration of Ba'athists and Arab nationalists
into national life, with the leading figures of
Saddam Hussein's regime excluded. The United
States should encourage the return of qualified
Iraqi professionals - Sunni or Shi'ite,
nationalist or ex-Ba'athist, Kurd or Turkmen or
Christian or Arab - into the government.
RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing.
Oil revenues should accrue to the central
government and be shared on the basis of
population. No formula that gives control over
revenues from future fields to the regions or
gives control of oil fields to the regions is
compatible with national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections.
Provincial elections should be held at the
earliest possible date. Under the constitution,
new provincial elections should have been held
already. They are necessary to restore
representative government. RECOMMENDATION 30:
Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in
Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to
avert communal violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish,
Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a
powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk
(as required by the Iraqi constitution before the
end of 2007) would be explosive and should be
delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda
of the International Iraq Support Group as part of
the New Diplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty
proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful
effort at national reconciliation must involve
those in the government finding ways and means to
reconcile with former bitter enemies.
RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights
of women and the rights of all minority
communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans,
Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must
be protected.
RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil
society. The Iraqi government should stop using
the process of registering nongovernmental
organizations as a tool for politicizing or
stopping their activities. Registration should be
solely an administrative act, not an occasion for
government censorship and interference.
RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the
future US force presence must be on the table for
discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue
takes place. Its inclusion will increase the
likelihood of participation by insurgents and
militia leaders, and thereby increase the
possibilities for success. Violence cannot end
unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must
involve those who wield power, not simply those
who hold political office. The United States must
try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani and must consider appointing a
high-level American Shi'ite Muslim to serve as an
emissary to him. The United States must also try
to talk directly to Muqtada al-Sadr, to militia
leaders, and to insurgent leaders. The United
Nations can help facilitate contacts.
RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must
make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq,
with the exception of al-Qaeda. The United States
must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah
Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr, and militia and
insurgent leaders. The very focus on sectarian
identity that endangers Iraq also presents
opportunities to seek broader support for a
national reconciliation dialogue. Working with
Iraqi leaders, the international community and
religious leaders can play an important role in
fostering dialogue and reconciliation across the
sectarian divide. The United States should
actively encourage the constructive participation
of all who can take part in advancing national
reconciliation within Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION
36: The United States should encourage dialogue
between sectarian communities, as outlined in the
New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press
religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak
out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.
Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi
government are an important incentive in
reconciliation talks and they need to be generous.
Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be
difficult for the United States to accept, just as
they will be difficult for the Iraqis to make. Yet
amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the
Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite being
politically unpopular - in the United States as
well as in Iraq - amnesty is essential if progress
is to take place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain
that they have US support as they move forward
with this critical element of national
reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi
amnesty proposals must not be undercut in
Washington by either the executive or the
legislative branch.
RECOMMENDATION 38: The
United States should support the presence of
neutral international experts as advisors to the
Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration.
RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States
should provide financial and technical support and
establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate
assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert
advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize,
and reintegrate militia members.
RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States
should not make an open-ended commitment to keep
large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must
make it clear to the Iraqi government that the
United States could carry out its plans, including
planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not
implement its planned changes. America's other
security needs and the future of our military
cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions
of the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION
42: We should seek to complete the training and
equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as
stated by General George Casey on October 24,
2006.
RECOMMENDATION 43: Military
priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest
priority given to the training, equipping,
advising, and support mission and to
counterterrorism operations.
RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly
qualified US officers and military personnel
should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and
American teams should be present with Iraqi units
down to the company level. The US military should
establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for
these officers and personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States
should support more and better equipment for the
Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to
accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests
and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq,
by leaving behind some American equipment for
Iraqi forces.
RECOMMENDATION 46: The new
secretary of defense should make every effort to
build healthy civil-military relations, by
creating an environment in which the senior
military feel free to offer independent advice not
only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon
but also to the president and the National
Security Council, as envisioned in the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment
proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize
training and education programs for the forces
that have returned to the continental United
States in order to "reset" the force and restore
the US military to a high level of readiness for
global contingencies.
RECOMMENDATION 48:
As equipment returns to the United States,
Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to
restore the equipment to full functionality over
the next five years.
RECOMMENDATION 49:
The administration, in full consultation with the
relevant committees of Congress, should assess the
full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq
and its potential impact on the future readiness
of the force, the ability to recruit and retain
high-quality personnel, needed investments in
procurement and in research and development, and
the budgets of other US government agencies
involved in the stability and reconstruction
effort.
RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire
Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the
Ministry of Defense, where the police commando
units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.
Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged
with a role that bears little resemblance to
ordinary policing, especially in light of the
current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and
weaponry across Iraq's borders and the need for
joint patrols of the border with foreign
militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border
Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which
should be the authority for controlling Iraq's
borders.
RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire
Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the
Ministry of Defense, which would have total
responsibility for border control and external
security. The Iraqi Police Service, which operates
in the provinces and provides local policing,
needs to become a true police force. It needs
legal authority, training, and equipment to
control crime and protect Iraqi citizens.
Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and
the presence of American advisors will be required
to help the Iraqis determine a new role for the
police.
RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi
Police Service should be given greater
responsibility to conduct criminal investigations
and should expand its cooperation with other
elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to
better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.
In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi
Police Service, the Ministry of the Interior needs
to undertake substantial reforms to purge bad
elements and highlight best practices. Once the
ministry begins to function effectively, it can
exert a positive influence over the provinces and
take back some of the authority that was lost to
local governments through decentralization. To
reduce corruption and militia infiltration, the
Ministry of the Interior should take authority
from the local governments for the handling of
policing funds. Doing so will improve
accountability and organizational discipline,
limit the authority of provincial police
officials, and identify police officers with the
central government.
RECOMMENDATION 53: The
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a
process of organizational transformation,
including efforts to expand the capability and
reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal
Investigation Division) and to exert more
authority over local police forces. The sole
authority to pay police salaries and disburse
financial support to local police should be
transferred to the Ministry of the Interior.
Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the
Facilities Protection Service under the control of
the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Simply
disbanding these units is not an option, as the
members will take their weapons and become
full-time militiamen or insurgents. All should be
brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry
of the Interior. They will need to be vetted,
retrained, and closely supervised. Those who are
no longer part of the Facilities Protection
Service need to participate in a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program
(outlined above).
RECOMMENDATION 54: The
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed with
current efforts to identify, register, and control
the Facilities Protection Service.
RECOMMENDATION 55: The US Department of
Defense should continue its mission to train the
Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police,
which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry
of Defense.
RECOMMENDATION 56: The US
Department of Justice should direct the training
mission of the police forces remaining under the
Ministry of the Interior.
RECOMMENDATION
57: Just as US military training teams are
imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current
practice of imbedding US police trainers should be
expanded and the numbers of civilian training
officers increased so that teams can cover all
levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including
local police stations. These trainers should be
obtained from among experienced civilian police
executives and supervisors from around the world.
These officers would replace the military police
personnel currently assigned to training teams.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided
personnel to train the Criminal Investigation
Division in the Ministry of the Interior, which
handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a
large team within Iraq for counterterrorism
activities. Building on this experience, the
training programs should be expanded and should
include the development of forensic investigation
training and facilities that could apply
scientific and technical investigative methods to
counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal
activity.
RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI
should expand its investigative and forensic
training and facilities within Iraq, to include
coverage of terrorism as well as criminal
activity. One of the major deficiencies of the
Iraqi Police Service is its lack of equipment,
particularly in the area of communications and
motor transport.
RECOMMENDATION 59: The
Iraqi government should provide funds to expand
and upgrade communications equipment and motor
vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service. The
Department of Justice is also better suited than
the Department of Defense to carry out the mission
of reforming Iraq's Ministry of the Interior and
Iraq’s judicial system. Iraq needs more than
training for cops on the beat: it needs courts,
trained prosecutors and investigators, and the
ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials.
RECOMMENDATION 60: The US Department of
Justice should lead the work of organizational
transformation in the Ministry of the Interior.
This approach must involve Iraqi officials,
starting at senior levels and moving down, to
create a strategic plan and work out standard
administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and
operational measures that Iraqis will accept and
use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the US
Department of Justice to establish courts; to
train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and
to create institutions and practices to fight
corruption must be strongly supported and funded.
New and refurbished courthouses with improved
physical security, secure housing for judges and
judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and
a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts
of a secure and functioning system of justice.
RECOMMENDATION 62:
As soon as possible, the US government should
provide technical assistance to the Iraqi
government to prepare a draft oil law that defines
the rights of regional and local governments and
creates a fiscal and legal framework for
investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract
investment.
The US government should encourage the Iraqi
government to accelerate contracting for the
comprehensive well work-overs in the southern
fields needed to increase production, but the
United States should no longer fund such
infrastructure projects.
The US military should work with the Iraqi
military and with private security forces to
protect oil infrastructure and contractors.
Protective measures could include a program to
improve pipeline security by paying local tribes
solely on the basis of throughput (rather than
fixed amounts).
Metering should be implemented at both ends of
the supply line. This step would immediately
improve accountability in the oil sector.
In conjunction with the International Monetary
Fund, the US government should press Iraq to
continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector,
instead of providing grant assistance. Until
Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic
fuel shortages will remain.
RECOMMENDATION
63:
The United States should encourage investment
in Iraq's oil sector by the international
community and by international energy companies.
The United States should assist Iraqi leaders
to reorganize the national oil industry as a
commercial enterprise, in order to enhance
efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
To combat corruption, the US government should
urge the Iraqi government to post all oil
contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that
Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and
export revenues.
The United States should support the World
Bank's efforts to ensure that best practices are
used in contracting. This support involves
providing Iraqi officials with contracting
templates and training them in contracting,
auditing, and reviewing audits.
The United States should provide technical
assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing
maintenance, improving the payments process,
managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and
updating professional training programs for
management and technical personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 64: US economic assistance
should be increased to a level of $5 billion per
year rather than being permitted to decline. The
president needs to ask for the necessary resources
and must work hard to win the support of Congress.
Capacity building and job creation, including
reliance on the Commander's Emergency Response
Program, should be US priorities. Economic
assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian
basis. The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw
in more international partners to assist with the
reconstruction mission. The United Nations, the
World Bank, the European Union, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and some
Arab League members need to become hands-on
participants in Iraq’s reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of
reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater
involvement by and with international partners,
who should do more than just contribute money.
They should also actively participate in the
design and construction of projects. The number of
refugees and internally displaced persons within
Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation
is not addressed, Iraq and the region could be
further destabilized, and the humanitarian
suffering could be severe. Funding for
international relief efforts is insufficient, and
should be increased.
RECOMMENDATION 66:
The United States should take the lead in funding
assistance requests from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian
agencies.
RECOMMENDATION 67: The president
should create a senior advisor for economic
reconstruction in Iraq. Improving the
Effectiveness of Assistance Programs Congress
should work with the administration to improve its
ability to implement assistance programs in Iraq
quickly, flexibly and effectively. As
opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq
should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing
projects to promote national reconciliation, as
well as to rescind funding from programs and
projects in which the government of Iraq is not
demonstrating effective partnership. These are
important tools to improve performance and
accountability - as is the work of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in
Iraq should have the authority to spend
significant funds through a program structured
along the lines of the Commander's Emergency
Response Program, and should have the authority to
rescind funding from programs and projects in
which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating
effective partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 69:
The authority of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the
duration of assistance programs in Iraq. US
security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed
considerably by the differing requirements of
State and Defense Department programs and of their
respective congressional oversight committees.
Since Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped,
streamlining the provision of training and
equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance
should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a
decision to provide it.
RECOMMENDATION 70:
A more flexible security assistance program for
Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective
interagency cooperation, should be authorized and
implemented. The United States also needs to break
down barriers that discourage US partnerships with
international donors and Iraqi participants to
promote reconstruction. The ability of the United
States to form such partnerships will encourage
greater international participation in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge US
funds with those from international donors and
Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance
projects should be provided.
RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in
Iraq should be included in the president's annual
budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in
its fourth year, and the normal budget process
should not be circumvented. Funding requests for
the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to
Congress and the American people. Congress must
carry out its constitutional responsibility to
review budget requests for the war in Iraq
carefully and to conduct oversight.
RECOMMENDATION 73: The secretary of state,
the secretary of defense and the director of
National Intelligence should accord the highest
possible priority to professional language
proficiency and cultural training, in general and
specifically for US officers and personnel about
to be assigned to Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 74:
In the short term, if not enough civilians
volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian
agencies must fill those positions with directed
assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate
familial or financial hardships posed by directed
assignments, including tax exclusions similar to
those authorized for US military personnel serving
in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer
term, the United States government needs to
improve how its constituent agencies - Defense,
State, Agency for International Development,
Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community and
others - respond to a complex stability operation
like that represented by this decade's Iraq and
Afghanistan wars and the previous decade's
operations in the Balkans. They need to train for,
and conduct, joint operations across agency
boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model
that has proved so successful in the US armed
services.
RECOMMENDATION 76: The State
Department should train personnel to carry out
civilian tasks associated with a complex stability
operation outside of the traditional embassy
setting. It should establish a Foreign Service
Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to
provide surge capacity for such an operation.
Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury,
Justice and Agriculture, need to create similar
technical assistance capabilities.
RECOMMENDATION 77: The director of
National Intelligence and the secretary of defense
should devote significantly greater analytic
resources to the task of understanding the threats
and sources of violence in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 78: The director of
National Intelligence and the secretary of defense
should also institute immediate changes in the
collection of data about violence and the sources
of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate
picture of events on the ground.
RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide
additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train
an effective intelligence service and to build a
counterterrorism intelligence center that will
facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism
efforts.
